This has been published by Vayu Aerospace e-
version-in March 2019. Below is the original unedited copy. Copyright but may
be reproduced for non commercial purposes.
Unlike the design of Military
aircraft which is led by the “latest” (i.e. unproven) technology the design of
a successful civil aircraft is more hard headed; it is very closely defined by
the surface transport speeds, availability, the density of population, the
distance between the population nodules, the condition of the economy, the
connectivity between the airport and the city centre. These factors are
quantifiable. The other factors- the expectations in terms of punctuality,
regularity, tolerance to noise, comfort and economy and their relative priorities
go beyond statistics and slip into the realms of culture and philosophy. If the
East is East then the air transport solutions will also be “Eastern”. The air
transport scene has been dominated by the Western paradigm. Asian countries
used western equipment to solve a part of their air transport need, there being
no equipment to provide an end to end transport solution. Western solutions
available e.g. helicopters are infeasible to the point of being “exotic”. The
Western designs, whilst acceptable, are definitely sub optimal and “second
best” for the Asian market.
Changing economic conditions
in India is now opening up a new market. This is a new rather than a
competition area and the prospect of collaboration with the West makes
commercial sense. New aircraft designs will be needed not only to cater to the
expected growth of what the Soviets called the “Selskoe Khozaistanni” ( Rural
Economy”) aircraft but also to replace
the Western designs for this genre of aircraft
which will be shortly retired. The market is large.
. The emerging market can be
an opportunity also for foreign entrepreneurs to invest in India. The cost of
skilled labour is the single largest item of cost in the development and
production of aircraft. The Technology for civil aircraft is lower, indeed the
basis technology is almost a century old and is well within the existing
capability of the Indian Industry which however lack the “know why”. Once
Europe had one or more aircraft manufacturer for every letter of the alphabet. There
was Zmaz as well as Zlin ! Famous names disappeared as the cost of aircraft
development became unviable for the medium and small scale enterprises of
Europe. However the “seed” of that ability still exists. Our enterprise and low
labour costs together with Western Aviation culture and the exchange rates of
the Rupee Western investments would “go” almost ten times more than in their
home countries. The picture is exciting.
Whether the potential will be
realized will depend on the way the Government of India’s policies are changed.
There has been happy change in the recent times but as is said “as much remains
to do as has been done”. Since Independence our own Government followed towards
the strategic Industries (Weapons and Aviation), a policy that was of an
occupying power. The Imperial Government
did not allow Lala Walchand to set up HAL on Imperial Territory, the notorious
Industrial Policy resolution of 1956 forbade the manufacture of aircraft by the
private sector. In 1945 the German Aerospace companies like Dornier or
Messerschmitt went to Spain as the Allied Control Commission forbade the design
or manufacture of aircraft in Germany. Our “Liberalization” studiedly avoided
this sector.When one of our Industrialists wanted to enter the Light Aviation
Industry they found Australia a better country to start despite the obvious
advantages of India for that class of aircraft and Australia is not the best example of a nurturing
Government. When the excellent Victa Airtourer was beginning to attract worldwide
attention it appears that the Australian Parliament actually reduced the import
duty of imported competing aircraft. The Australian Company sold out and
shifted to New Zealand.
The development of Civil Aviation.
The basis of modern Civil
aviation was the technical development of the nuclear bomb carrying intercontinental
jet bombers. Amusingly, this bomb carrying technology proved quite amenable to
the carrying of tycoons and the glitterati who previously went Cunard or the
P&O. Whilst the laws of Physics held the reasonable maximum speed to Mach 0.82-never
mind the Boeing Sonic Cruiser cat to Airbus’s A 380 pigeon- advances in engine
technology tempted the design and the airline people to move into the mass
market changing the entire concept of air travel from earlier one of “Speed and
Grace” ( one got an overnight bag on booking the ticket) to “Max Pax.”
The paradox is that the early inefficient
jetliners were profitable whereas the latest equipment of incredible fuel
efficiency is causing their operating airlines to go “belly up”. Fuel prices have
been identified as a reason for the unprofitability but the underlying reason
is really that the earlier equipment specification is being used as a
“template” for the mass market. The fuel burn is exceedingly sensitive to
speed. A fifteen percent increase in speed requires fifty percent more power
and burns thirty percent more fuel over the same sector. The airliners for the
mass market are likely to be flying a little
too fast to be profitable! For the West there is little choice because of the
ground conditions but for Asia we can profit to be different.
The Asian Paradigm
The density of population of
India is fifteen times that of the USA and the population nodules are very
close. Agricultural land is at a “to die for” premium and new Industry must go
to areas now considered “remote”. Consider the case of the traveler who wishes
to proceed from Kolkata to Mokukchung. Mokukchung has a population of about
70,000 and several excellent schools. The people of Mokukchung are educated and
there is a fair population of English capable, industrially trainable people.
The hinterland grows excellent pineapples which can be had, literally for the
asking, because there is no market. If transported to Kolkata a load of a
thousand pineapples, (1500 kilos, with their tops) gain Rs. 45,000 in value. It can transform
some one’s life. Nothing much happens in Mokukchung because of the difficulty
of getting there or getting out once you are there. One takes a turboprop which
takes more than an hour, the Jet is about fifteen minutes faster but it does not
matter because once at Kohima one has to rely on the surface transport.
Mokukchung is about 90 kilometers from Kohima and that can take “the remains of
the day”. Our traveler would have been better served if there was the modern
equivalent of the Ford Model AT 5 “Tin Goose” which would have wallowed
directly into Mokukchung from Kolkata within the time our traveler had come out
of Kohima airport. I am being deliberately provocative about suggesting the
Ford Model AT 5 because I want to emphasise how little is needed – especially
in terms of speed performance – to be effective in Asia.
The cost of the ticket
Edward Hillman, the owner of
a bus fleet was, in 1932, also one of the pioneers of the low cost airline. He
started by using the De Havilland Fox Moth which carried four passengers plus a
pilot at the astonishing economy of 22kW per person. The Fox Moths operated
from paddocks, and being simple, required little maintenance. Hillman used
retired RAF Sergeant Pilots who flew for lower pay than the Officers. As
happens in cases of detailed attention to every aspect of operations, Hillman
went from strength to strength and was soon looking for bigger equipment and
was in part responsible for the development of the twin engine DH Dragon and
the Dragon Rapide. Mr. Hillman may have lacked much of a formal education but
he translated his bus fleet experience to low cost air service and the aircraft
he chose did not overwhelm him with its technology. Instinctively but unerringly
he was tackling and controlling the elements of the cost of an air ticket.
These factors are:
i)
The cost of the
aircraft
ii)
The cost of
amortization and finance
iii)
The fuel bill
iv)
The airport
charges
v)
The wages of the
crew
vi)
The cost of
maintenance
vii)
The cost of
sales, marketing and passenger handling.
These are relevant even today
and significant in shaping the design of the Asian Transport. A large simple
aircraft flying at two hundred knots (360 km.ph) is to be investigated. There
is possibility of significant savings in each of the above areas resulting in
perhaps halving of the costs!
The price of speed
The cruising speed of the
aircraft is closely dictated by the surface transport speed. A rough working
figure would be between five and six times the average surface speed (including
the “chai” breaks) for a journey. My experience in shuttling between Baroda and
Nashik and similar gave me a figure of 50 km.p.h so to be competitive for such
ground speeds an aircraft cruising speed
must be between 250 and 300 km.p.h. In lands of Autobahns and Freeways the
minimum must be close to 500 and 600 km.ph. The sky will not fall if you use a
550 km.p.h aircraft on the Baroda-Nashik sector but you will be burning four
times more fuel. The circumventing trick of course is to fly higher but then
the aircraft will need pressurization which results in excess weight (the
fuselage becomes a large pressure
vessel, which is the worst in terms of weight- full pressurization can add up
to 45 kg/passenger to the aircraft!) and then there are maintenance problems, seals, barometric units etc. These
are manageable but the idea of a simple large turbine engine Piper Cub concept
of aircraft is lost and puts up the costs on Mr. Hillman’s list. An interesting curiosity is that optimum “low
speed” shapes are more “blunt” and compact which lead to significant weight
savings for the same “cargo/pax.” volume.
The Airports
India has many landing strips
mostly a legacy of WW2. West Bengal for example has thirteen. The Government
has taken a programme to update and upgrade these and other existing airports
but it would be wise not to rely on such plans. It would be better to carry out
a survey of all the airstrips in the country to asses where things stand. One
is reminded of Ed Heinmann’s approach to the USN’s request for proposals for a
nuclear weapons capable bomber for their planned 100,000 tons super carrier to
replace their Forrestals. Heinmann chose to examine what could best be done
within the limitations of the Forrestal class and came up with the iconic
Douglas Skyhawk. As foreseen by Heinmann the super carriers never came about
and the USN learned that whilst the customer has the privilege of always being
right they lose nothing by listening to the other chap’s point of view.
STOL
STOL is a fair substitute for
cruising speeds. The West produced some remarkable STOL aircraft e.g. Fiesler
Storch and the Westland Lysander. Post war Dornier produced the DO 27, DO28
which were particularly noted for their STOL performance as was the Polish PZL Wilga.
The Hunting Scottish Aviation Twin Pioneer is also of interest because despite
heavy radial engines it could lift 16 fully equipped troops off aground run of
78 meters from the jungles of Borneo and the hills of Nepal! In India where
even expansion of existing airstrips may run into organized (for political
gains only) local agitations, we have to look at STOL capabilities quite carefully.
The Fairey Rotodyne of 1950,s gave VTOL capability to airliner sized (40-70
pax) capacity and was simpler than the Osprey whose civil version is next thing
to be marketed. The Rotodyne project needs a re-look at as noise- a Western
concept- is less critical in Asia. Collaboration/ buying of data may be called
for. Western Twinjets require around 1024 acres and twin turboprops require
around 930 acres. The emphasis on STOL can be judged from these figures- arable
land being a “to die for” commodity. A good target would be a STOL 130 pax-er
that can operate out of a 500-600 acre paved field.
Cubing out
Western designs have a relatively
narrow cabin to reduce drag and as a result these designs have a tendency to
“cube out” i.e they can lift the load but it cannot be fitted in the cabin.
India being an agricultural country and with increasing stress on “exotic
fruits and flowers’ type of agriculture not
cubing out may be a significant selling point
Is naething sacred !?
Decades ago a Japanese
Company applied modern analytical methods including, allegedly gas
chromatography, to to analyse Scotch to come up with a Japanese Whisky that was
indistinguishable from “the real McCoy” stuff. If Punch (late and still lamented) is to be believed The Scotsman printed the news with a
very plaintive “Is naethin’ sacred?
“.
No, nothing is sacred in the business of strategic technology
development and the way it is marketed. We must review the certification norms
for Asian conditions. Are the various
civil aircraft certification agencies being scrupulously and impartially fair?
Or are there various subconscious agendas? Consider the following:
i)
In the late
sixties there was a huge “to do” about the HAL built Avro’s inability to meet
the phase two of the climb out requirements. That this requirement is a safety
issue is indisputable. Given India’s high ambient temperatures the engine’s
power and the wings lift both suffer by about 7% is also indisputable. It
resulted in pressure to reduce the MTO of the Avro 748 which would have
impacted on the profitability of the type. I can understand that in Switzerland
the requirement would be absolute. But in India? Could the restrictions been applied to only selected airports? Or was
it an effort to keep the market open for imports- which was probably a blessing
in disguise- given HAL prices!
ii)
Western
regulations for long insisted on twin engines for any aircraft carrying more
than nine passengers and our people nodded in synch. The statistics however
showed that there were more fatalities when twins lost an engine because the
pilot, under stress, often feathered the surviving
engine and the aircraft went in! They say more Canberra crews died practicing engine out approaches then in
actual engine out emergencies!
It is
interesting to compare the experience of the Russians with the Antonov AN 2.
The DOSAAF regularly would allow the single engine AN2 to amble off with a crew
of two, two jump masters and ten parachutists each with two parachute packs
plus the odd one or two “observers”! That is a load equivalent of perhaps 18
people! So were the Russians being callous, you know being Slavs and all that?
The possible logic is that the AN2 had a controllable minimum speed of 45kts (lost
in a fog in mountainous terrain the drill was to just fly at minimum speed!) so
the impact energy of the AN2 crash was less than half that of the Western
types. Secondly the very capacious fuselage of the AN2 meant getting out was
quick and lastly Russia being sparsely populated and flat, chances of a
successful emergency landing was quite high. Now for the twist in the tale!
After the collapse of the Soviet Union many AN2s ended up in the USA. Given
their safety record one would think they would easily get the US certification.
Last I heard they did but it was so restrictive ( it had to return to the
takeoff airfield at the end of the sortie! ) that commercial use except for
parachute jumping was impossible. People
say that it was done to protect the US Light Aviation interests but the only
point I want to make is that before we quote anybody’s flight safety rules as a
Father’s unalterable curse let us examine the relevance and the
applicability of that rule.
The Dakota Genre
The Dakota is a necessary
reference point to the subject. The Dakota was successful not because, as has
been suggested, that it was so modern that it stayed relevant for eighty years
but because it was superbly appropriate for the 300 km.p.h. cruise speed.
Wherever that speed was relevant the Dakota earned its living. The Junkers JU
52 and the Curtis Commando were worthy contemporaries and need study. The JU
52’s demise can be attributed to the German collapse and the consequent lack of
spares. The Curtis C 46 Commando relative
obscurity underlines the need to be able to match the needs of each customer
closely. The Curtis carried sixty percent more at fifteen percent higher speed
but required eighty percent more power ( note well!) but had only fifty percent more fuel- the design’s capabilities was less
“harmonized ”. The Curtis initially also had a reliability problem. The
lack of wing fuel tank drain vents meant leaking fuel vapourized and after
accumulating sometimes exploded. This led to unexplained loss of aircraft which
were blamed on the fuel drums being transported- usually from Assam to China. Little
design details matter and knowing how and the why of copying is an instinct to
develop.
The Baasler BT 67 is a
popular turbine conversion of the Dakota and its sales shows the rightness of
the Dakota concept, and the advantages and problems of turbinizing. The PT 6A-67Rs-
are almost a ton lighter than the Wrights they replace and these results in CG
problems which is restored by putting a 40 inch plug in the fuselage ahead of
the leading edge. The changes result as the table 1 shows in a more capable
aircraft which is nevertheless still a compromise. It has now too much wing
area ; a modern aerofoil would save 60kW.h/hr at cruise and the not quite fully
circular fuselage cross section preclude pressurization should the customer
wish it. A new design based on the old Dakota
would be a formidable contender.
Post War the victors quickly
adopted the vanquished Germans concept of the Autobahns and consequently the
airspeeds moved out of the 300km.p.h. regime that was the Dakota’s forte.The
so-called Dakota replacements –Avro 748s/ Convairs/Fokker Friendships/Handley
Page Heralds were really birds of a different feather. The Dakota, the West
declared, could not be replaced.
It was the Soviets who came
closest to replacing the Dakota with a simpler, smaller but equally appropriate
technology aircraft- the Antonov AN 2. Oleg Antonov’s first design project was
a “Chinese” copy of the Fieseler Storch a few examples of which had been
presented to the Red Army during the Non Aggression Pact bonhomie of 1939. The
Douglas DC 3 had been under license production in the USSR as the Lisunov LI 2.
It seems to me that Antonov combined the STOL capabilities and the “bug eye”
observation window of the “Storch” with the modern structure, large cabin and
and the double freight loading door of the Dakota and creatively added the
biplane layout to create a design that demonstrated “STOL equals speed with
economy”.
The AN-2 is an obvious
anachronism-or is it? An aircraft that remained in production from its
inception to the end of the USSR with some 20,000 produced and with continuing
efforts (hamstrung by trying to keep the basic airframe intact- rather than
using just the philosophy ) to re start production commands respect. To not
carefully study the design just because “it’s a biplane” would be to keep a
flank exposed. The biplane transport is obsolete in the West but large parts of
Asia and India would be relevant to the AN2 philosophy.
Assessing the aircraft
There was an advertisement on
the TV some years ago which showed the press conference of a pioneering
aviatrix (looked like Amelia Earhart and her Lockheed Orion) and someone in the
audience asks “Mileage kitna deti?”-
How much mileage does the aircraft give? We value different things. The
aircraft has to be assessed not for speed or comfort or ability to operate in
Cat III weather but on profitability, utility, versatility, ruggedness and how
much money it will make, never mind if the services are irregular during the
monsoons, the customers will put up with that
if the tickets are affordable for the rest of the year. The table 1 gives a
comparison of the operating economics.
The aircraft
The RTA project was planned
to compete with the ATR. A snowflake
in hell has a better chance! Suppose your fairy Godmother (mine has
indignantly refused!) were to give us the entire drawings, tooling and the DGCA
certificate would we be then in a position to become a respectable supplier of
this class of aircraft? Immediately questions would rise about the cost of
production, delivery rates and their certainty, after sales service and a host
of such issues. Would Jet Airways place a big order? Could we stand the price
war that the fully depreciated ATR will probably unleash? If the Saras happens
will it stand up to the Beechcraft 19D for private airlines orders? These are not discouraging questions. We can
never have enough money if we are not going to benefit commercially from our
research.
Instead of going bald headed
into such (mis) adventures we should look at the niches and the gaps in the product
range and develop products that are not possible to be economically produced by
the West- simple, labour- rich, low technology aircraft which would break their bank if they tried to compete. India
has ninety cities between three million and half a million populations and
another hundred with population between half a million and two hundred
thousand. All have an agricultural hinterland. The mean distance between the
nearest two is around 190 kms. This market is ideal for a series of (relatively)
high capacity, mixed freight /passenger near STOL rugged transports different
and not competing with any Western product. These would be:
i)
A small fifteen seat/ two-and a-half ton single
engine utility aircraft between the Cessna
Caravan and the Dornier DO 228 with emphasis on the unprepared field/ high
altitude capability. About 3000 kms. of our northern borders are at a 2000mts
AMSL A biplane with its large light weight wing area and docile handling in
confined airspaces might prove the surprising best choice. The Figure 1 shows
two configurations.
ii)
The second niche
exists for a 40 seater between the Dornier 228 and the ATR series and we are
looking at a kind of a “turbine super-Dakota”.
iii)
The third niche
exists as a 6 abreast 150-250 seater twin turboprop
– something like the cabin of an Airbus 320 or a Boeing 737 but the entire
design is optimized for a cruising of 400 kmph-200 km sectors. The Indian
Airlines used to operate a Boeing 737 Calcutta- Ranchi-Patna –Lucknow- Delhi.
The many stops meant the advantages of jet speeds were not realized. A large
turboprop- partially pressurized, if at all- would certainly be more closely
matched to the profile and significantly
more economical. The target “audience” is people who now travel such sectors by
third AC sleeper. Asia, but not the West, has such a market
iv)
Finally there is
a heavy lifter which can be imagined ( if you are old enough!) as a Blackburn
Beverly or just imagine a Globemaster II but redesigned for the ability to through load a MBT (T 72/90) or a S 400
system and fly it from Babina or Ambala to Leh or vice versa and designed for sub continental rather than
intercontinental ranges. International Air Freighting is growing. It makes
little sense to air freight equipment from say the US only thereafter to truck
it across the country. There will be a need for a matching heavy but short
range air freighting capability.
Since the profitability of
the customer will depend on how exactly we can match his needs the approach to
the design would be that of a lego brick model with various fuselage cabin
lengths, wings areas and undercarriage options would be available so that the
offer can be carefully tailored to the needs. The customer will have options of
pressurized / partially pressurized and un pressurized fuselages and
retractable or fixed undercarriages. It would mean hard but repetitive work at
certification. The “pod and twin boom” layout is a very strong contender.
Nec Quis quam Nisi Ajax
The heading roughly means “only Ajax can replace Ajax”
or “you can do nothing till Ajax comes”. The Aviation Industry is a high risk high
profit “full time” business. It
requires all the time, dedication, energy attention, knowledge and efficiency
such a business needs. The Soviet Union had it absolutely organized. Their
political leaders had seen frontline service; their Military held cabinet
ministerial rank and their top engineers held military ranks and senior party
positions. It was cohesion, and teamwork knowledge and passion at its
productive best. No time was wasted in trying to educate ab initio an intelligent, powerful but skeptical ignoramus “team
member”. It explains the excellence and rapidity of Soviet development. Despite
professions of equality the performers
had no pay bands; all of General Designer Andrei Tupolev’s cheques were
unconditionally honoured by the Soviet state. (Apoplexy epidemic in North Block!?)
In the Totalitarian states it was possible
for “the man in charge”- e.g. Admiral Gorshkov- the father of the Soviet Navy’s
renaissance to stay at the helm for thirty years (he was retired only at his
own request at the age of 75.). As a senior “cabinet minister” and political
leader he combined job knowledge, national policy and clout in one person. The
result was that the Soviet Navy became a
challenge to the mightiest Navy, the USN. The magnitude of the achievement can
be gauged by the following. In 1956, the year he took over Nikita Kruschev,
seeing some Morskoya Flota sailors in a rowboat on the River Moskva said, half
jokingly, “That is our Soviet Navy”. The Russian Navy was in one of its periodic
declines. He built it up to its present size in twenty years with the
pioneering effort of exporting Soviet naval equipment helping finance a part of
his own formidable vision.
This continuity is not possible in Western
Democracies so they, recognizing reality, hand over the knowledge, passion, and
day to day dedication required to run the business to the private sector. An
example would the firm of Marcel Bloch which is better known as GA Marcel
Dassault . Marcel Dassault (1892-1986) started as a propeller manufacturer in
1913 and went on to manufacture of aircraft during the 1920s. Renaming himself
after the Second World War he went on to lead General Aeronautique Marcel
Dassault, which achieved brilliant results for its shareholders and France by
using fairly basic technology with
great élan. Dassault’s passion was so
great that as long as he was alive apparently he did not allow his worthy
successor and son, Serge, to run the company! Between the two, father and son, we are seeing a century of continuity,
job knowledge and passion. From many possible names I have deliberately
chosen Dassault and France because France was the European country most
affected by leftist ideals and communism and yet the French Communists were
knowledgeable enough, pragmatic enough and patriotic enough to realize that certain areas were inviolable even to
politicians. When they nationalized the French Aviation Industry they left
Marcel Bloch in charge of his plant.
What
do we get for our Ajax? An IAS; A good
student. St. Stephen’s or JNU with a degree in History or Economics with
perhaps a stint at Imperial College or Cambridge, usually exposed to Leftist
Economic philosophies. As a “clod hopping Collector” did good work in Gonda
district in the area of rural indebtedness. Articulate, meticulous, hardworking
and upright, he is up from a stint in the Ministry of Animal Husbandry where he
tied up with FAO for an important programme in Holstein/Zebu/ Illawarra cross
breeds and this is his third year in the Ministry and now he is stamping his
feet to move into the PMO which was his lifelong ambition; with his abilities
and experience he deserves it. He has a frequent flyer card with several
airlines but prefers Air India. Courtesies
apart, it is- technically- entirely correct to call our “Ajax” as “ignorant”. He
is certainly no Churchill/Hitler or Stalin who were interfering busy bodies
even in the matters of weapons design! The privilege of any comment is yours.
The right path of the Buddha
The
different ways the British and the Americans set about developing airliners for
the post WW2 civil market is relevant. Britain started well in time by forming
the Brabazon Committee which was headed by Lord Brabazon of Tara who was a
pioneer aviator. Though the committee was representative the “say” was concentrated with the Bureaucracy. The Committee
recommended the simultaneous development of five types of aircraft covering the
entire spectrum of air transport as visualized in 1943. Two of the projects
recommended were bemusing. These were the Bristol Brabazon (like the Ford Edsel,
the West names their disasters after the “promoter”! The idea has merit!) and
the Saunders Roe Princess. Mercifully these giants did not progress beyond the
prototype stage. The elegant Airspeed Ambassador was hugely popular but slow
development, failure to adapt the new Rolls Royce Dart and the inability of the
design to stretch-partly because of its beautiful lines- led to only twenty
being built. The aircraft could have, been the Fokker Friendship success but tardy
development did the project in.
The
Vickers Viscount was a great success by comparison with 444 sold worldwide
though probably as many more could have been sold had the company moved faster
in responding to the customer’s demands. The last of the pentad was the famous
De Havilland Comet. It entered service in 1952 as the world’s first commercial
jet airliner only to, unfortunately, pioneer the problem of metal fatigue and had
to be withdrawn from service in 1954. The cracks were mainly in the forward
escape hatch and the windows for the ADF aerials. (Over) re design of the
aircraft as the Comet 4 was completed by 1958 when it was re-launched in the
transatlantic run –a year ahead of the Boeing 707. There are people who believe
that had this “bad luck” not happened
the Comet may have “swept the board” in terms of orders but this is not borne
out by facts. The Sud Aviation Caravelle was hugely popular with passengers,
had no problems and yet ran out after 280 orders. The problem of both the
Caravelle and the Comet was that they were too slow, thanks to Government
involvement, in everything- development, rectification, and production and they
thought too small. Capacity wise the Comet and the Caravelle ended where the
Boeings – the 707 or the 737- began. They stood no chance.
The
American aims were identical to the British but there approach was much more
“worldly wise”. The US Government was never under any compulsion to prove any
political philosophy. It knew that it did
not know the business. It trusted the US Industry to take the lead as it
had ample faith that people would know more about aeroplanes and would move
mountains to do what was needed. The Government relegated itself to the role of
being a “Vigna Hanta” (destroyer of
obstacles) and a provider of venture capital! The story of the development of
the Boeing 707 is a story of how this alternate approach worked.
Having
developed the atom bomb there was the need to transport the wretched thing
across intercontinental distances. Of the four contenders who responded to the
RFP Boeing proposal formulated from 1943 onwards were for the model 424/432/448/450
the last, the 450 being submitted in March 1945, hastily revised to incorporate
German data on swept wings “liberated “ in the advance to the Elbe and with six
engines mounted under the wing on pylons to emerge as the XB 47.
The
new bomber had many technical problems- the slender high aspect ratio wing
flexed almost two meters up and down from the datum in flight unnerving the
first crews and there was reverse aileron effect. At certain speeds and
altitudes the stalling speed and the critical Mach number coincided; this was
appropriately called the “coffin corner”. Nevertheless the structural and
aerodynamic advantages of the “podded” engine and pylon approach were amply
proved in service.
Having
developed the B 47, Boeing then proposed the development of a tanker capable of matching the B47
speeds thus making FR less of a hazard. The result of the marketing effort led
to an order for a hundred and thirty five tankers as the KC135 whose prototype
was the famous “dash 80”. The KC 135 allowed Boeing to reduce the launch costs
and risks of the Boeing 707. However their hopes of using the KC 135 fuselage jigs
were dashed because they realized that the fuselage diameter had to increase by
another 8 inches (200mm) if the customer was to be satisfied. Legend has it
that the fuselage was just one inch more in diameter than the competing DC 8
but that one inch made a lot of difference in the packing of a six abreast
sitting. This required an investment in new fuselage tooling and Boeing spent $
16 million to do so. Boeing could take
the decision to invest within the precincts of its office. There was no need to
educate anyone to get the sanction. The short decision chain helped Boeing
to move at the rate demanded by the Customer.
Conclusions
Asian
economics and demographics dictate larger capacities, short stage lengths and
more primitive field capable aircraft than is in the vision of the Western
manufacturers. These augur well for the economics of an air ticket. The civil
transport market in India has the advantage of a shorter decision chain and within
the existing capability of our Industry. It can be truly a White Hope whilst we
all wait for the Government to extract digit fully. A full discussion on the
fascinating subject of appropriate technology air transport is not possible
here nor is it necessary. The potential private sector customers and the
private sector Industry are people who use earned
money and know their business and both are equally interested in coming to a
conclusion. Between them they know what is needed and how to do it. The
complete liberalization of the strategic Industries is the need. The time to
continue with unworkable political theories is long past. The industry is too
dynamic and knowledge based to be effectively managed by the present set up-
and the results show repeatedly.
Supplementary notes: There was an interesting discussion on the topic
from an expert and there were differences in approach. I found the exchange
refreshing. An edited version is reproduced below for the benefit of the reader.
The
reply is more delayed than I would have liked but the task was voluminous. A
point by point response would have taken too long. I am confining myself to
very brief comments.
1. The
data is excellent and interesting but has been cast into a “Western” mould. For
example we have given the distances as a hub and spoke pattern which I am convinced
is not an optimum solution for India.
2. The
American airline practice is again not the best. I think we should study the
Australian/ Canadian third level airline operations of the 1950s as a basis.
3. The
main bottleneck is the Bureaucracy and the Politicians. They go abroad and see
things and are strongly influenced. They lack the training to “see through”
what they see and when they come back they try to get it implemented and they
are powerful
4. Airports
should be re defined. Again para 2 above refers. We should think of Municipalty
run airports handling between 100 to a 1000 people per day. i.e. 0.03 to 0.1 %
of the population of the municipality per day. Sangli or Akola should have an
airport accessible by three- wheeler or cycle rickshaw from the city centre.
5. One
third of Indian air space is amenable to flights where a sortie distance of 150
to 200 kms will be competitive.
6. As
said earlier “Hub and spoke” is not the best solution. We have better models
which will require much less aircraft.
7. Frequency
of service must be at least twice a day.
8. Pressurization
may add up to 45 kg per passenger in structural weight. This contradicts the
use of expensive light weight materials? If at all pressurization should be an
option/ sparingly applied.
9. In
the same vein why talk about an all electric aircraft. Why not a “Zero electric
“aircraft? For short hops manual controls is the best.
10. Freight
is important. Rear loading is a must to get paramilitary/ Military,
e-marketing markets which would be useful in proving the aircraft.
11. The
economics of passenger handling – sales /booking/ticketing /passenger
handling/information should be informal and app based. Our people are the best
in the world for the Smart Phone applications.
12. These
aircraft should avoid the metros and even the busier state capitals! Focus on
class C and D towns.
The
points above indicate the simplest type of aircraft.- the turbine engine “Piper
Cub” or the Cessna Caravan ( in terms of simplicity of technology) .
We
tend to re-invent the wheel. There are two ways to design an aircraft. The
simplest is to pick a proven design and keep refining it so that the total cost
of running an airline becomes the simplest and lowest. For example I would for
the LTA /RTA for example have chosen the Avro 748 and kept simplifying and
refining the design. Modern engines, propellers, electrical systems 115V a.c.
etc will reduce the weight by a ton and drag quite significantly. Then further
refinements can be used to reduce weight whilst increasing capacity and
economics. My estimates show that we can easily achieve we/Wmto of
around 0.5 or better.
The
gap between the existing competitive products must be large. The Indian/ Asian
projects are not going to succeed.
I
strongly insist on copying. Start with a Dakota and keep tweaking it till it
ends up a same aircraft but not recognizable as such. If it is a must that we
need to draw ab initio and aircraft design then we should, like the Germans,
draw up a table listing all the possibilities and then
categorize them the list below is an indication:
Fuselage
–
Conventional/ Pod and boom/ Pod and twin
tail----- 3
Wings
--
High wing/ low wing/ Biplane/ Hurel
Dubois
4
Undercarriage
Fixed/ retractable in wings/ Retractable in
sponsons 3
Material
Totally conventional/ Advanced /Mixed conservative 3
We
have 108 possibilities. Like a matrix with zero elements many of the
possibilities will quickly be resolved and we will have a residue of 15 or 16
that can be explored in more details. The advantage is that this method induces
or forces brain storming and very attractive solutions can emerge as many
people can contribute to the evolution of the design and to avoid pitfalls. We
should have done this in our current projects. The disadvantage is that we in
India do not have the patience since we know the answer from beforehand!
The
other thought is that it is useless to even try to achieve the perfect aircraft
right by calculations alone. Deep thinking about alternate plan Bs for doubtful
areas is a must.
I
will close by saying this that the above in no way contradicts any other views.
It is merely another way or just one way of looking at the problem and another
engineering approach.
With
regards
Prodyut
Das
Kolkata
28/02/19
Yes, very insightful article. In my opinion for a profitable aerospace industry to emerge in India, the government must transfer HAL and ISRO's Tech know how and engineers to companies like TATA, Mahindra, Larsen and Turbo etc. In this day and age it is hard to see a individual who is not a billionaire starting up a aerospace venture, although aviation parts, tools, marketing and other smaller but vital aspects of an aerospace industry is ripe for the plucking by individual entrepreneurs. For this to happen the government must provide incentives for these companies and allow them to run the programs in their own way. The most successful use of this method has been in the US, with the "Commercial Space Program" This has resulted in the birth of outstanding companies like Blue origin and Space X. China has also adopted this approach but also allowed startups to partner with universities and provide government investment without the heavy handed government regulation that comes with it, and the results are for everyone to see. China has now got more up and coming aerospace and launch company startups than the US. For India to become developed, India needs to branch out from services and HEAVILY invest in manufacturing and Tech development, and guess what all the "Jobless Growth " problems will also be solved. The current government has provided Crores of funding to a gentleman who has built a plane in his backyard without asking for a long term business growth outlook. These are simply idiotic actions, and must be stopped immediately. Politicians and even Engineers for that matter know nothing about the aerospace industry, Businessmen should be making the goals and targets for India in this field and then undergo feasibility analysis with engineers and politicians. At the moment in this country Engineers and politicians make the hard choices and add in all the whistles and bells into aircraft development and end up with an aircraft that lacks marketability.
ReplyDeleteSanku
DeleteI concur. Human Resources are really a resource but in India we have a Victorian approach of paternalism made worse by smugness. Let people do what they want and we will see wonders. What would have happened to Bill Gates had he been born in India? This huge urge to control has devastated us. The IIT's churned out engineers and the Industrial Policy resolution prevented their employment and the IITs became an ethnic cleansing system for the best and the brightest and we called it Planning and we still have people who defend it!
Sanku
Deletesince you seem tobe reading me you can try prodyut7.blogspot which is te new site where I will be posting.
"Hey, I hope you are doing well. You know you wrote a very informative article on this topic. Actually I was searching for Airfreight Management System and I got your article on Google. I have gone through it is very informative and interactive.
ReplyDeleteThank You again, Keep Posting.
Regards
AuthorcodeIndia"
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ReplyDelete