The tale of the air war over
the Bekaa Valley has only improved with time and with telling. It was
definitely a spectacular operation but right from the start various slanted
lessons have been read off the operation. It will be noted that the Israelis
themselves have often said that its lessons cannot be generalized.
This assessment is based on a selection of analyses
done by various agencies. The references are given at the end. I have based as
my source a official analyses by Col. Dubrov writing in the Aviytsiya and Kosmonautica on the lessons
of the war and a commentary on the same by Dr. Benjamin Lambeth writing for
RAND. Both these journals can be considered “Government” and being “Government”
have the merit of being true though by no means should they be considered as
the whole truth. Governments cannot afford to work that way. A possible factor none of the reports mention
was the contribution of the terrain of the Bekaa Valley. It appears to me that
the terrain of the Bekaa Valley was a very important contribution to the final
results and makes the operation” unique” rather than “general”. These I have
discussed.
Various claims and
predictions have been made about the conflict from the Israelis having invented
a secret weapon to the fact that the Bekaa Valley triggered the collapse of the
Soviet Union to even Bekaa Valley being
a proof that third generation fighters
cannot survive against fourth generation aircraft. This is too general in their
assumptions. The Bekaa Valley combat is a question of particular importance to
the India whose design skills were “bonsai”-ed by successive Governments from
the late sixties till recently and yet we have to have adequate numbers of adequate warplanes.
What I have done is to read through the
reports and then filtered out what I thought were obvious biases. Military reports
often have a strong “marketing” angle to them. Rather than “the latest technology”
i.e. unaffordable warplanes winning
the war it was the traditional qualities- diligence, carefulness, training,
thoroughness, objectivity and planning which the Israelis displayed over a
sustained period- a decade to be precise-paid rich dividends whilst reckless
courage –which the Syrians displayed in abundance- did not get the Syrians
anywhere. It does not mean that if the Syrians had the same qualities of
careful planning as the Israelis the loss ratio would have been reversed but
even with the “hand” the Syrians had the loss ratios would have not been quite
so stunning and the Syrians could have given the Israelis – who are poorly
placed to take casualties- quite a bad fright.
For India the lessons are
that we have to evolve our own strategies. Ignoring
numbers to concentrate on quality would be as sure a way to defeat as to rely
solely on numbers. If you enjoyed the first Kung Fu Panda movie you will
remember that the secret of the Magic Scroll was that there was no secret and
no one will teach you any which way– you have to “figger” out the secret of the
Wu Xi hold yourself!
The Yom Kippur War
In the Yom Kippur War of 1973
the Isr.A.F. suffered horrendous losses to the then new and largely unknown SA
6. The flat Sinai terrain allowed the tracked launchers room for maneuver as
well as presenting the aircraft as a clear high contrast target. The flat
launch trajectory of the SA6 was also of no problem. Under ideal conditions for the SA 6 system it
was devastatingly effective and the
total Isr. AF losses in the critical first 72 hours was 50 aircraft ( Israeli
figures) and 59 as per the Egyptians the total losses over the 18 days air war
was 109 aircraft. How many fell to what system will not be known because
amongst other things the Isr.A.F. mentions all losses as “combat loss” or if
they are feeling particularly talkative that day, “due to ground fire”. Air to Air losses, like the PAF are
almost never acknowledged.
Surviving the near mortal
losses the Israelis prioritized two lessons.
i)
They focused on the
development of tactics to neutralize the threat posed by the tracked SAMs. In
this they were aided by the Americans who had a direct interest as NATO forces
would encounter the same missile systems were they to engage in hostilities
with the USSR. By 1978 i.e. after about five years the Israelis cautiously
declared that they had the measure of the SA 6 threat. By May 1980 the Israelis
were able to “field test” their solution under actual conditions when they destroyed
two SA 9 launchers but waited patiently for a suitable opportunity both
tactical and political.
ii)
They also built up their number of combat
squadrons from 14 squadrons to 21 squadrons which included helicopters for the
CAS role. This building up of air Strength is noteworthy for India and it is a process
that must have taken about 5 to 7 years to reach maturity because of the
training time.
The Bekaa Valley shootout
The details
of the operations are widely available; what is given here is a summary. Syria had
involved itself in Lebanon in support of the PLO and in the early ‘eighties. It
had moved its SA 6 batteries into the Bekaa Valley to protect its forces in
Lebanon following the shooting down of two of its helicopters by Israeli F 15s.
In June 1982 Israeli forces invaded the Lebanon after informing Syria that they
had no intentions against the Syrian forces and were after the PLO and would
penetrate 40 kms into Lebanon. Apparently Syria accepted the conditions and
moved its forces out of the way. When they exceeded that limit the Israeli
advance was halted by a Syrian armoured division at the River Jazzine on the
night of 8-9 June 1982. Israel then saw that as an opportunity for its plan to
take out the SA 6 Batteries. The Armed Forces, which had been inexact about the
excessive advance- 40 kms- from where
had not been precisely defined-, and
emphasizing that taking out the SA6 batteries was crucial to the safety of the
Israeli armoured division under Syrian attack. They also assured the Israeli Politicians
that given its preparations, careful planning and homework its losses would be
minimal. Political Sanction was given by 1000 hrs of 9th June 1982 but the
strike was postponed due weather conditions over Bekaa and the need to update information. The strike
was finally unleashed on the SAM sites at around 1400hrs.
The strike consisted of
aircraft at three levels. It will be of
note to India that Second/ Third generation airframes with third generation
avionics e.g. Kfirs/Nesher and upgraded Skyhawks provided CAS at sea levels.
Further aircraft were stacked in “cab ranks” at 3000 mts and at 9000 mts were
the Boeing “jamming” aircraft and the E2A’s AWACS used to direct the strikes. The Syrians apparently withdrew their combat air patrols but by 1420 hrs the Israelis attacked
the EW Radar at Jebel Barick .The Syrians reacted with fighters about an hour
later but without any plans and were shot down flight by flight as they
blundered blindly against the Israelis who could monitor, thanks to the use of
IAI UAVs, each flight almost as soon as they took off and had jammed their
communications. At around 1550 the
Israelis went in for the SA 6 sites using HARM , Shrike and similar standoff
missiles mounted on F 4s. The F 16s and F 15s were not tied to close escorts but
were employed in the “free hunt” mode with the F 15s also being used as mini
AWACs to cover the gaps in coverage. At its peak there were up to 90 Israeli
and 60 Syrian aircraft in the conflict zone of about 40kms and 40 kms. Having
first “blinded” the guidance radars with ARMs the SA 6s were destroyed all by
cluster bombs in a very short time- reputedly about 20 minutes because of the up to the minute knowledge of the SA6
positions. No LGBS were used because the Israelis deemed them to be too slow.
The Losses
The figures usually quoted
for the Bekaa Valley shootout are about 85 to 87 Syrian aircraft shot down for
no losses for the Israelis. Unfortunately both the Air Forces are extremely
“cagey” about revealing anything and
these figures, as with the Soviet official
figure of 60 Israeli losses must be taken as untrue and for respective domestic
consumptions. The history of estimation of air combat losses shows that the enemy’s losses are always difficult to
estimate even given the best of intentions and intentions are not always the
best. In the Battle of Britain the RAF claimed destroying 178 Luftwaffe
aircraft on an occasion when the actual German losses were 45. Things really
did not change substantial over time. So what were the actual losses?
The claim of 87 losses means that there were
87 situations when the Israelis thought they had shot down or destroyed a
Syrian aircraft. Since the fighting was taking place over territory that was Syrian
held it would be difficult to verify the claims. The Syrian admission of 50 losses and 18
pilots (Note 1) are likely to be nearer to the truth.
The Israeli losses are – and
I am going only by my readings on the subject - would have been around ten to
twelve. Of these three, two A4s and a Phantom F4 have been confirmed (by the
Syrians) by photographs of the wreckages and the rest must have been caused by
the formidable AAA at Bekaa Valley. Whatever their lacunae in terms of
planning, the Syrians “stuck to their guns” (literally!) and it would be
incredible that the “dumber” weapons 2X23 and 4X23 mm AAA did not “damage
beyond economical repair” (delightful PAF phrase to describe the second Sabre
that Flt. Lt. Cooke filled up with ball
ammunition over Kalikunda on 6th September 1965). This is not to
belittle the Isr.A.F achievement because 50 kills for wastage of 12 aircraft
i.e. 4:1 is enviable.
An analysis of the results
The Bekaa Valley shootout has
been used to sell everything from the “latest and best” fighters to, I am
fairly sure, some variety of malted chocolate milk! My conclusions are somewhat
different. Bekaa Valley confirmed more than anything else the traditional
qualities of Military Planning- a mastery of one’s own weapons and a thorough
knowledge of the enemies’, careful planning,
patience, and numerical superiority(
to be noted,please!), training all played apart. As always the element of surprise and the first mover’s advantage
is also to be noted. The Bekaa Valley shoot out was an aerial Commando raid
brilliantly choreographed.Thanksto diligent
planning when it came to the actual fighting the Israelis were shooting fish in
a barrel. Below are some salient points we should note:
The terrain
None of the analysis mentions
anything about the terrain. One can conclude it played no part but this goes
against common sense. A Topographic Map of the Bekaa Valley by the geologist
A.S.A. Lateef ( presumably no relation of
“Late” Lateef of Indian Folklore!) is included and shows the contours with
the usual practice of the heights being shown to a different scale as compared
to the distances. The Bekaa is a rift valley with two ridges rising to peaks of
2800 mts and a gap of around 16 kilometers between the ridges. Being a
geological map showing rock compositions the ridges are not shown to the full
height, The Bekaa ridges were fairly narrow at the top which and the Batteries
located on the top of the ridges were very restricted in their mobility and
even in their placement. The North - South
orientation of the ridges meant that the EW Radars located in Syria and Lebanon were blinded by the ridges and any
radar located in Lebanon, Bekaa, and Syria were isolated by the ridges from
looking into the other two areas and those located on the ridges were
sacrificing their mobility for the sake coverage whereas the Isr.AF EW stations
could look into and up the valley. The fighting was confined to a very small
“bowl”. What advantages it gave to the jamming which was a big contribution to
the success or how the opposite ridge
wall may have disadvantaged the SA6s tracking radars is something the
electronics people with knowledge of clutter suppression abilities of the
respective radars in such a situation will be better able to explain but it
must have been a factor.
The Distances
A second feature was the
relatively short distances of the airbases of both the combatants from the
Bekaa Valley. Typically they would be within 80 to a 100n.m. of the Bekaa the
greater ranges of the US warplanes meant that they could loiter over the battle
area and were able to give instant support where ever needed.
AWACS
The Israelis were using at
least two of their four E2 Hawkeyes and these were operating well above the
battle at around 9000 mts and away on the seaward side looking right down into
the arena. This was supplemented by the powerful radars of the F 15 which
supplemented any “blind spots”-possibly caused by the ridges. The Israeli set
up and maintained an imaginary threat line and any Syrian flight that crossed
that line was destroyed, the Israelis sending in their forces appropriately.
The missiles
The Israelis used the AIM7F
Sparrow, the AIM 9L Sidewinder. Some sources mention the homegrown Shafrir but
this could be a marketing effort. All the IR missiles were capable of “head on”
attacks. The Syrians were using the Atoll which had very restricted launch
parameters.
The Syrian mistakes
The SA 6s were mounted on
tracked vehicles to give the Soviet battle groups instant air cover. Mobility
was also part of its repertoire for survival. Using it on the ridges of the
Lebanon ( Jabil al Libanon) and Anti
Lebanon ( Jabil al ash Shariki) mountains meant that mobility was severely
compromised. The SA 6s were literally “sitting ducks”. The Israelis knew exactly which holes to ferret and accounts for
theswift destruction of the SA 6 batteries. Indeed, having suffered from
the SA6 in the Yom Kippur war they treated the SA 6 with informed respect,
delaying at the last minute their strike until two batteries which had moved
around a village were located.
When “baited” by flights of IAI drones the
Syrians reportedly switched on all their radars thus revealing their position
and confirming them to the ELINT aircraft. This sounds something out of a Leon
Uris novel but if true the Syrians deserved what they got.
MiG 21 SMT avionics
It is fair to describe the
MiG 21 SMT as a third generation airframe with a second generation avionics
suite. The MiG 21’s avionics permitted only front and tail warning from its Sirena
RWR and the Israelis who were dominating the agenda fed in its fighter streams
to make beam attacks so the Syrians had no inkling that they were being painted
even just prior to an attack.
Jamming
Jamming of attacks is nothing
new. The RAF used “Headache” which was simply a microphone in the engine
nacelle of the bomber and broadcasting on the frequency of the Luftwaffe’s
fighter control frequency. Very soon the Luftwaffe rigged up a simple device
which would home onto the jamming i.e. they would fly to where the jamming was
the strongest.
Homing on the Jamming would have passed the
initiative of the battle over to the Syrian because the Israelis would have to
move to protect the foundation of its attack strategy. Indeed the Israelis used
two F 15s as close escorts to protect it “Jammer” at all times. The Syrians
should have anticipated heavy jamming once the Hey Avir got the Boeings and the
E2s but obviously they were resting on their laurels or relying on blood and
guts to see them through. They paid the price.
The jamming of communications
completely disrupted and demoralized the Syrian efforts. It was possibly the
key factor in blunting the Syrian response as the pilots were cut off from
their GCI. In desperation they were seen to fly around in figure of eights
trying to obtain visual contact until they were shot down. “It would not have mattered what aircraft
they were flying because the way they were flying they would have been shot
down anyway” said one Isr.A.F. Senior planner. Again the confined spaces in
which the battle was going on would mean that the jamming would have been
particularly effective- as a thumb rules the jamming declines as the square of
the distance.
The idea I am trying to
propound is that with more “thinking” on the part of the Syrians and with small
upgrades to their MiG 21 s and other equipment the Syrians could have got much
better results.
Lessons
for India
The Lessons for India are
somewhat different than those discussed above.
The Russo Japanese War of
1903-4 threw up all the lessons that were os grimly learnt in the First World
War. The 1973 and Bekaa Valley and even the recent Balakot episode is a
microcosm of the losses that modern technology can cause.
Our lesson will be the
horrendous losses we will suffer in the opening phases of any serious conflict
and the need to stay in the fight so that we can “give it back”. Our ability to
“Give it back” and not the initial losses, will be the decider. The estimates
could be anything between 80 to a 100 aircraft lost due to all causes and
another 100 damaged to various degrees in the first 96 hours before we could
come up with the counter tactics. It will be noted that the Bekaa Valley ended
on the third days before Syrian counter strategies, if any, could be brought
into play.
This loss rate means that of
the ten to twelve squadrons on a particular front will have been worse than
decimated. They will need replenishment/retraining and, possibly, rotation. We
need a larger air Force and the 50 squadrons.
I have written about is not just a round “Parkinson”-ian figure. Even
the archaic 42 squadrons will not be sufficient and the inevitable sacrifice of
the aircrew will have gone in vain just as the attacker’s advantage will have
been evened out. Ideally we should have the latest and the best equipment for
these fifty squadrons but the economy cannot sustain that. We would “Pakistan”
ourselves very easily. Imports would be very uneconomical in every way.
We are therefore today facing
a choice about how we are going to be inadequately prepared. Either we have a
small excellently equipped and trained air force that will be very sensitive to
losses or we will have a larger well equipped Air Force but whose training and
serviceability may suffer. The maintenance cost of equipment is usually two to
three times the procurement cost.
However within the convolutions
of the Bekaa Valley lies our answer. It will be noted that:
i)
None of the
platforms used their “end of the aerodynamic performance” limits. No one pulled
9G and more importantly none of the two hundred aeroplanes went supersonic let
alone Mach 2. The Balakot fight reconfirmed this aspect.
ii)
The “all weather”
equipment did not perform under all weather conditions. Strikes had to be
postponed according to the weather. If this was the case in the Mediterranean
how much worse they will behave under Indian Monsoon.
iii)
What did the
Syrians really need to have evened out the losses substantially? Not too much. Not new platforms but well
thought out upgrades. Jam proof communications, HMDS, some electronics – on
special few aircraft to home on the jamming- this would have tasked the
Israelis to protect their Boeing Jammer. Let me expand the idea.
iv)
I am putting a deliberately provocative
proposal. Suppose “the Syrians” had a platform with the capabilities of the MiG
17/Mig 19 in terms of top speed etc i.e something between a second and a third
generation airframe. The chances would
be zero i.e. the same as the “better” MiG 21 “the Syrians” used. But the force would have been cheaper to buy
and maintain!
v)
To that add jam proof communications. Would
the kill ratio have improved?
vi)
Then add to that
the R 73/R60 what then?
vii)
Now put in a HMDS what would have been the kill
ratio picture?
Soon we will get a picture of
a relatively simple aircraft tailor made for a clear well defined threat
scenario –like ours- which is within the reach of our Industry and costing a
fraction of a Mach 2 type. This is a
”zero based” specification for a fighter general combat (F-GC) type.You are referred to the items 7 to io in the
references list.
The basic gaming we should do
is what better minimum equipment and tactics should “the Syrians” have used so
that the kill/loss ratio became unacceptable to “the Israelis”.
I
have put “the Syrians” and “the Israelis” within inverted commas because
“the Syrians” could be us in a future
conflict. We are still relying on imported supplies and the best that is
available rather than what is more tailored to our need and therefore cheaper.
We
have chosen a very wise mix of MKI/ MMRCA/LWF aircraft to meet our air defence
needs. We must maximize the flexibility and the economies this mix gives us to
get the large air force that we need but
cannot afford.
Guided
weapons and AI are putting the onus of performance on the missiles and the
aircraft is continuing to be more of a platform than ever before. The Wst
having developed the Mach 2 platforms are continuing to use them as thebasis
for their future aircraft but there is no need for Mach 2 or even Mach 1.4. We
have to evolve a comprehensive doctrine to see how we can cobble a credible
deterrence to any threat using whatever technologies that we have developed
e.g. the LCA with more range and better
transonic handling rather than overpowering it to reach the Mach 1.6 speed and
super cruise. The role of the fighter is changing with the maturing of
guided missiles and development of electronics and artificial intelligence. I
insist on the transonic regime i.e. less than Mach 1.3 because aircraft in that
regime can be significantly smaller, longer ranging and cheaper than something
even at Mach 1.4- Mach 1.5 and what is more completely within our present
technological capability including the required engine technology. I do not
believe that we will get any engine technology by any collaboration. Even if we
did we would not know what to do with it because the “know why” will not and
indeed cannot be taught. Suppose we are given a certain combustor
technology-will we use it for reducing smoke signature or reduce the engine
weight? The Chief Designer’s contribution is his vision and surefootedness in
knowing why he is making a particular choice out of the multiple choices. How
good are we at that? What is our work culture to rapidly experiment and come to
a near optimum? A project that takes decades to come to service
may be heroic to some but it is of no use, not even technology generation
because the technology is obsolescent. Weapons development is not just science.
We have an admittedly weak base in this.
Having
selected the correct “three class” fighter formula the whole will unravel
unless we make the LCA type the cornerstone of our numbers. This would be a
transonic airframe with reduced radar (not full stealth- because it is beyond
us, the performance penalty is too much and is probably a May laurel- it won’t
last!) and IR signatures but with fifth or sixth generation information and
display systems and using homegrown VFR missile systems and operating under
AWACS and ADGES an area in which we seem to have made hopeful progress. The
transonic performance will also reduce the technology demand on the engine.
THE
Bekaa Valley Air Operations was a commando operation: violent, effective but
unlikely to be repeated. The real lesson is the likelihood of severe losses for
the “defence” and how to absorb them and still remain in the ring. Also to be
able to “asymetrize” the warfare. It was
possible for the Syrians to have done much better and foiled the Israelis with
greater losses which would have been good enough. The reasons for not doing so
will never be known because it would have been relatively easy. Perhaps for the
highly politicized Arab Armed forces this was not possible.
Note
Of
the Syrian losses claimed by the Isr.A.F., 40 were claimed by the F 15s and 44
were claimed by the F 16s and one fell to a F4. The gun fire kilss are
contradicted by the Israeli sources themselves possibly as a matter of policy.
One source said onlyabout 7% of the Syrians fell to the guns i.e. about 6-7
aircraft whereas another sources rather equivocally talked of “surprisingly
large number of gun kills.”
Amongst
the Syran pilots lost was their Ace of Aces Major Bassam Hamshu ( 8 kills
including one n the ground in earlier clashes ) and Col. Fayaz Mansour ( 4
kills) who was shot down in a”friendly fire “ incident by a Syrian tank using
its 12.7 mm AAA.
Note
Each
Syrian SA 6 battery consisted of one “Straight
Flush” fire control radar , four SA 6 launcher each with three missiles
and two ZiL 131 six wheel re- supply
trucks. Thebatteries are controlled by a Long Track surveillance rdar and a
thin Skin height fining radar.
References
1.
Lambeth. Benjamin
S “Moscow’s lessons from the 1982 Lebanon Air War” r 3000AI ISBN 0-8330-0587-1
September 1984
2.
Duvrov V Colnel.
Aviatsion in the Lebanon Conflict ( Translated by Benjamin S Lambeth) Aviatsiya I Kosmonautica No 9 and No 10.
3.
Grant. Rebecca
“The Bekaa Valley Air War” Air Force Magazine 06/28/2008
4.
Voronov. Vladimir
The Syrian Nemesis. January 2017 ( Translated Arch. Tait) Russia Studies Centre
The henry Jackson Society
5.
Flight
International no 3832 16/10/1982 “The Bekaa Valley Combat.
6.
Operation Mole
Cricket 19 Wikepedia
7.
Das. Prof.
Prodyut Kumar “ A cat amongst the
pigeons” blogspot .com profprodyutdas. Also in Vayu II/2016 “Flying against the
wind” pp 86-93
8.
Das Prof. Prodyut
“The case for simpler Fighters” Vayu
V/2009 pp 90-96
9.
Das Prof. Prodyut
“The Lessons from the Kaveri” Vayu/pp also above blogspot.
10. Das Prof. Prodyut Kumar Falcon Griffon Tejas Vayu
11. Nicolls David, Cooper Thomas Arab MiG 19 and MiG 21
units in combat Osprey Publishing 2004
