(Updated and expanded from version sent for
publication December 2018. The views expressed are personal and the reader is
cautioned that I find a credibility difference between the press declarations
and the report.)
Prof. Prodyut Das
09/05/2019
A friend sent me a copy of
the 114th PAC report “Design Development manufacture and induction
of the Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) by the Public Accounts Committee PAC no 2153
dated 12.12 2018 wanting my reactions. The PAC 2153 report is based on the CAG
report no 17 of 2015 and seeks to establish the present status of this
programme
A group of Lok and Rajya
Sabha members reviewed the situation in late 2018 with the senior most
officials of the MoD, DRDO and HAL. The responses of the officials had the
quality in part reminiscent of a group of schoolboys up before the Rector in
his study, with erstwhile rivals providing lame alibis for each other and in
part pure “Yes Minister”! The
Parliamentarians also sensed it and observed some of the replies were
“baseless”.
Precis is a forgotten skill. In keeping with
Government reports this one is also lengthy and very loosely worded. It took
the report some several paragraphs to marshal five facts about the situation of
simulators and trainers. It is also difficult to comment when one has to
struggle with babudom profundities of Biblical sonority, and I quote, “LCA
programme has taken ab initio development and LSP is blessing in disguise” or
pure gobbledegook as “two concessions are linked with weapons accuracies above
Tactical Mach.No. which has no impact on combat potential”. I defy you to work
that one out. I have restricted myself
to a summary of the 130 paragraphs followed by remarks as I felt appropriate
and some suggestions at the end. The numbers in brackets after the headings are
the paragraphs numbers. Any “progress” report on the LCA makes for grim reading
and this one is no exception.
Funding (1-5)
In August 1983 the GOI
sanctioned the development of the LCA over a period of 8 to 10 years i.e. by
1991/ 1993 with a funding of 560 crores including the development of six prototypes. The sum, dates and deliverables may be
compared with the equivalent of Rs. 410 crores the Americans had spent in the
period 1973 to 1979 to put the F 117 Stealth Fighter into squadron service, the
Americans being handicapped by the high cost of manpower. To date an arithmetic
sum of Rs. 10,397 crores in various tranches have been given out whose present
day value, adjusting for inflation is Rs 80,000 crores. This does not include
money spent on Kaveri and Radar and other related developments. Trained manpower the great input for
aircraft design was never in short supply. The hiatus between the HF 24 and the
LCA ensured that this manpower was ready and waiting. In fact by 1983 i.e. at
the start of the project the senior most people in HAL were those who had been
trained by the Germans and some even had independent and successful project
experience with goods delivered. Indeed the first Chief Designer – to use the
expressive old term- selected to lead the LCA project was one of such trained
cadres. He was later removed along with the then ADA Chairman for what appears
to be “tribal” i.e. DRDO vs HAL reasons.
Audit Review (6-8)
Every ten years the delays in
the execution of the LCA programme with
respect to project definition and deficiencies in planning and financial
management were adversely commented on in 1989
( Report no.3) and in 1998 (Report no 8) by the CAG. The question that arises is why were we
violating a fundamental rule of management of reinforcing a continuing failure? The correct decision would have
been to restart the project under new management or at least to bring in competing
alternate project studies as insurance to a project which was neither meeting
specifications nor timelines.
Project progress (9-28)
The word progress is of
course hyperbole. It has been a sorry tale of mismanagement and delay. The then
CMD of HAL giving reasons for the delay deposed in 2018, “Sir, Yes there was
delay … so initially you would appreciate when the engineers of DRDO and HAL
started producing the aircraft first the belief was not there… So this
programme … might look a little
(sic!) longer, the kind of achievement…”
The above statement would indicate:
i)
The senior officials do not seem to appreciate the
scale of the non performance. A mindset that thinks a thirty year delay, with
continuing uncertainty, being described as “a little delay” is certainly to be
noted and acted on.
ii)
There was at all times a considerable degree of scepticism
about the programme. Subsequent events have unfortunately proved that the
skeptics were grounded in realities.
Scepticism, especially by “outsiders” may be
discouraging but it is no explanation why the work should have suffered.
Inadequate expertise in flight testing (29-38)
A consultancy fee of Rs.
127.65 crores was paid to EADS to cover aspects of IOC and FOC. These contracts
expired before the scheduled tests could be carried out because of the lack of
aircraft. Subsequently a third contract had to be signed to re-cover the
remaining tests which remain to be completed.
Shortfalls of ASR (39-45)
It was clear by 1989 (pl. note
date) at the end of the Project Definition phase (PDP) when the project was
reviewed by the Air. HQ. that the proposed
aircraft was deficient in terms of weight control, “real estate” (internal
volume ) and Aerodynamic Configuration. Reminiscent of the Indian Army’s 1959
projection of how the PLA would run through NEFA, this competent analysis was
ignored. The “peculiarity” of the
fuselage length was about 1 to 1.5 metres shorter than similarly powered
aircraft e.g. Gripen ,F 20 Tigershark was evident to even amateur aircraft
enthusiasts. The Committee was informed of the shortage of real estate. Lack of
real estate meant lack of upgradability and below average range made worse by
higher than estimated drag. These two facts, tied up, should have led to calls
for redesign to extend the fuselage. Instead of revising and refining the
proposal it was proposed to go ahead and build two technology demonstrators
where new technology was to be tested on a new “yet to be built” platform which
is a reckless violation of standard practice because you then have to two lots
to test- the platform as much as the technology!
This using of bureaucratic and
“net working” clout to bypass the informed “opposition” has led to the
situation as of at least 2015 if not more recent that the aircraft has fallen
short precisely on parameters pointed out 30 years earlier. The aircraft does
not meet the ASR in terms of
i)
Range
ii)
Speed
iii)
Energy
performance parameters
iv)
Airframes volumes for growth
v)
All weather
operations.
Even simple requirements like
single point defueling, protection of the fuel systems and pilot from combat damage or a 725 litre drop tank
have not been met and unlikely to be done in any time soon. Redesign to the
extent of almost a new airframe (e.g. Heinkel He 112 to Heinkel He 112B) is now
required.
Fifty three
concessions possibly including the nine above affecting operational
capabilities have been “conceded”. I think it is, excuse me, bloody cheek of
the Ministry, after failing repeatedly to meet the ASR, to hold that shortfalls
in weapons accuracies and tactical Mach no. do not affect combat potential! One
expects that they would at least have the grace to blush. Going solely by the
text it is a wonder how an aircraft that has not fired its gun .cannot (legally!)
drop a 4 lb practice bomb (the practice bomb carrier jettison test has not been
cleared yet!) or has not opened out the full envelope can be declared fit even
for peace time training. The Air Force’s rueful comment in 2019 “We have given
fifty three concessions but how many concessions will we get from the enemy?”
is a pithy summary.
Delays in the development of trainers and simulators.
(46-56)
The Trainer version cannot be
made to IOC or FOC standards because the development to those standards is not
complete. The Full Mission Simulator (FMS) is not ready for the same. The Real Time
Simulator (RTS) upgraded to FMS standard by ADE is being used in the interim. Again
the MoD maintained that this was not an issue.
Change of specifications (57-68)
Change of the CCM from the R
60 to R 73 E and the introduction of the M62 bomb- the Runway buster bomb- has
been cited as a cause for delays there being as many as ten changes in all. Given the time span of thirty years one is
surprised to see how few the changes have been. The Japanese used to have as
many changes in the course of half a year and Mitsubishi or Nakajima would
handle that! The delay has been cited as
12 to 14 months. R60/R73 change requires further detailing because it is
typical of the self created problems that arose and the evasive answers that
have been offered.
The R 60, an excellent CCM in its day, became obsolescent
in due course and needed to be replaced with the R 73E whose seeker was
“cueable” by the Helmet Mounted Display System (HMDS.) The R 73E weighs 110
kilos as against the 45 kilos of the R 60. Space and power had to be found for
some additional “black boxes” required to read the helmet movements and in
addition the wiring harness has to carry the signal i.e. low current, from the
HMDS to the missile via the wing and the pylon. Wing pylons in this class of
aircraft are usually stressed to standard weights of 500 kilos for the inboard
ones and 500/250 kilos as one goes out towards the tip. The point I am making
is that the pylon and the wing structure did not require any major redesign because
the new missile was within the standard weight limits. The wing was not “plumbed”
to take the slightly bulkier wiring harness nor had space been provided for the
R 60/R 73 electronics upgrades the anticipation of which was the job of the
Armaments Group. The same goes for the cannon armament. There were only three
or four possible models. Why did the group wait to be told for doing the
project layouts? This lack of anticipation cost a lot of time. In aluminum
structures one simply drills and positions the new bracketery. In composites
one cannot simply locate a new clamp; composites can’t easily take point loads,
so a new wing incorporating the mods had to be made. Hence the 14 months delay
and this must have happened for every change. Lucky there wasn’t a war on! (We were
pretty close to one in February 2019-Ed.)
EW warfare (69-78)
The aircraft cannot
accommodate a self protection jammer (SPG) for lack of internal volume and at
present only has a RWR and the Chaff and Flare dispenser. A passive jammer is
fitted but unlikely to be effective. An active jammer was always on the list.
The additional power required may now need a change in the PTO gearbox design. Given the present impasse the IAF may wish to
consider the adoption of “Wild Weasel” tactics despite its handicap –a half
loaf being better than none.
Work Packages (79-85)
A hundred and fifty two work
packages of which one hundred and ten were to the state sector and the
remainder to the Private sector has suffered delays ranging from two to eleven
years. The explanation given by ADA is
that since they did not have control over the subcontractors management the
delays could not be controlled speaks ill of ADA’s expectations. Vendor
development is an integral part of any project and speaking from experience the
Indian sub contractor will deliver miracles without having to have control over
their management. One needs to take off one’s jacket and put the shoulder to
the wheel.
It appears no records of the
financial transactions worth Rs.1164 crores between the vendors and ADA during the
period 1992 and 2006 i.e. FSED-1 period were kept. These are being retraced. One reason hinted for treating the private
Industry as Pariahs in a “socialist pattern of society” justification was that
they would “be irresponsible” with the money. Various defence related scams
over the past seventy years have shown that keeping the Defence Industries
confined to the State sector is worse because the State’s mishandling of the
project is not as rigourously scrutinized as it would have been had it been a
private sector scandal!
Lack of User involvement (86-93)
Given that the User’s (IAF’s)
remarkably accurate analysis and forecast in
1989 about the shortcomings of the proposal were disdained and bypassed
without a fair debate it is surprising this issue has been listed. It is immature to ignore, by pass or
disrespect a team member’s expertise and then complain of lack of full
cooperation. Expectedly there are user issues.
Absence of an Indigenization plan (94-100)
The following items continue
to be on the imports list. Raw materials including Composites and metallic, the
engine, the Radar, Ejection seat, cannon, Multi Mode Radar , general systems
accessories. At the same time a 70%
indigenization is claimed. This goes
against common sense. It appears that the labour and tooling costs have been
included to pad up the figures. Actual Indigenization, in terms of import
substitution, should be reckoned in terms of BOC &RM only and is likely to
be around low ten percent as of now. The only bright spot is that the
Private sector- Godrej & Boyce and MTAR seem to have delivered.
Radome (105-111)
A new more radio transparent
radome is under development as is a Smart Multifunction display. Regarding SMFDs
HAL Korwa does not find the project cost effective and the SMFD has been given
to the Private sector.
Multi Mode Radar (112-117)
Multi mode radar based on
Elta modules is being considered as acceptable the local efforts being declared
closed as there is no market. This
decision needs review because there will be a market for an Indian AESA in the
next decade for an Indian LCA for exports. Without the radar we will be that
much less competitive.
Other Hardware (121-125)
The actuators situation seems
to be satisfactory but the Jet Fuel Starter ( JFS) whilst performing
satisfactorily both for ground start and for air start needs some more
tweaking. I was a bit puzzled at the inclusion of “lube consumption (in
gms./start! ) of the JFS in this report. Whilst
fascinating, it did seem out of place in a report like this or was this “bumpf”
some kind of “pschyops” by the technical people over the Parliamentarians?
Manufacture (129-136)
16 a/c per annum capacity has
been planned and in 2018-2019 a delivery of eleven indicated with FOC of
2018-2019. It appears that only three
were delivered and five (or was it six?) produced. From past experience any
figure given really does not matter until we see the aircraft at the bases. In
2015 the delivery was one every 10 months and a “standard deviation” i.e. one sigma
of 6 months i.e. a process badly out of control. Today we have one produced every four months and the SD
is about two months but none seems to have been delivered in Calendar year 2019 as of 01/05/2019. The erratic
deliveries indicate that considerable “mods” are still being incorporated
airframe to airframe and the project remains “work in progress”. Something
is not adding up. Something is being covered up. Deliveries will remain erratic over the next few years because the Mk.1
LCA is unlikely to be of much utility - and I am going by the Air Force’s
comments and actions. So until the Mk1A comes along the production will be in
dribs and drabs.
Alternative Measures (137-140)
Since the ‘90s, the delay in
the programme required upgrading aircraft such as the MiG 21, Jaguar, MiG-29
and the Mirage 2000 at various times. This has cost an arithmetic sum of Rs
19,000 crores or a PDV of Rs. 80,000
crores. The current well considered move to acquire some thirty mothballed MiG
29 is an indication of the urgency of maintaining squadron strength as also an
unstated comment by the customer of his
assessment of the situation.
Delay in Formation of LCA squadrons (141-142)
Two contracts placed for 40
aircraft have been placed in 2006 and 2010 and a total of 16 produced and 12 have been delivered at the moment of writing. What we may get in
2019-2020 will become clearer by December 2019. My estimate is we will be lucky to get six or seven including the ones
produced before 31 March 2019 but not delivered in that year.
The rest of the report
castigates the MoD, the ADA and HAL but of course that is water off the duck’s
back as many such reports past have shown. Nevertheless they are being
summarized below.
i)
As of the moment,
ADA has failed, after 3 decades to produce an aircraft which fulfils the IAFs
requirements.
ii)
Project is still
“in progress”
iii)
ADA took
decisions that lacked scientific basis.
This is strong stuff. It is unfortunately true. Coming from supposedly ignorant Parliamentarians it is both a
compliment to the Parliamentarian’s common sense and also an indication of the magnitude
of the trouble.
iv)
Testing towards full opening of flight envelope for
FOC remains incomplete. Testing is risky
rather than difficult. One got the impression that perhaps EADS collaboration
was as much to have someone to take the responsibility should something go
wrong during the tests “He (only!) told us to do it, Sir!”- rather than lack of
actual know how. Sufficient know how is definitely there but no one wants to
take the responsibility.
v)
Agencies
monitoring the project were casual leading to a 30 year delay. Formation of a
core monitoring team suggested and it
seems to have had some effect in the recent past.
vi)
The Committee is
appalled at the casualness of some of the replies by the Ministry Officials. This argues for the inclusion of a
Technical Counsel to aid and assist the CAG.
vii)
The Committee
desires that the Ministry identify and fix responsibility upon officers who
failed to ensure involvement of IAF personnel in the initial years of the
design. The scope of this has to be
expanded.
viii)
The committee
feels that 35% indigenization has been achieved but the MoD Officials maintain
that 70% has been achieved because the
rest cannot be achieved anyway! It is an indication of a “different” mindset.
The actual level in terms of “Sanctions resistance” is about ten percent.
ix)
HAL, ADA and
the MoD have failed miserably and are to be reviewed for functioning along. Unfortunately we can do little about the then
Political Leadership and the Establishment for its failure to take timely
action despite ample warnings.
The Theories of failure
Qui mala agit odet lucem! The evil doer will always
hate the light. We have to indefatigably
get to the roots of the delay or else suffer the same delays in the LCA Mk1a,
the Mk2 and the AMCA programmes. There has been a spectrum of critics of the
way the programme has been managed. The Critics of the programme have been, in
turn, themselves been criticized but that is merely shooting the messenger. The
bad news remains. It is as difficult to spin out a development programme for 36
years as it is to complete it in five. Indeed it would need more organization
to achieve spin out such a prolonged development. The following are some
possible hypotheses:
a)
The Conspiracy theory; the conspiracy theory
is that there was never any serious intention that the project was to succeed.
The project was sanctioned because given India’s capability India could not NOT
have a fighter project so it was ensured by various means that it did not
progress at any useful rate. For supporters of this theory the circumstantial
evidence is that firstly it does not take more than ten years to develop and
IOC a new fighter and despite early evidence of non performance the project was
not foreclosed and a new start made. There is also the fact that several practical
proposals based on the HF 24 e.g. ASA/HSS/HF73/ HF 25 /GAF etc requiring about
60-65 crores at that time were not sanctioned and yet an organization that was
yet to find its feet was sanctioned Rs.565 crores to develop an urgently wanted
replacement for the MiG 21 and- here is the catch- whilst that organization (ADA) had to rely on the “injured”
organization (HAL) to deliver the goods. This arrangement has failed
wherever it has been used e.g. the UK Aero Industry in the 1960s e.g. English
Electric /Vickers for the TSR2 and Fairey /Westland for the Rotodyne. Oversight
or deliberate- who will know?
b)
The project
delays are nothing unusual because that is the way the Government did things.
The second Howrah Bridge, which affected the daily lives of sixteen million
people, was sanctioned in 1971 and completed only in 1989. Amongst the reasons
for the delay was the cable stayed Bridge technology had to be imported because
it was a requirement that ships of a certain size had to pass beneath it. It
was possibly quite clear at that time that after building the Farakka Barrage
the River Hooghly would be unfit for any shipping. Certainly no ship of the
stated size (10,000 tons, if I remember aright) has come upriver in the past
thirty years and it would be a brave Pilot who would even try. The River needed
dredging even for Barge traffic! I
mention this because I feel any number of justifications can be found once
there is a will to import.
c)
There is the
question of work culture. It was the Cambridge Scientist JBS Haldane who had observed
in the 1950s that little work got done because the Indian Scientists would
spend much of their time at office discussing their personal problems, their
horoscopes, their promotion prospects, putting down office rivals, general office
politics and the actual work got little priority. Understandably Haldane is not
remembered with much fondness by our Scientists. The Private sector engineers
come from the same social stock but their companies would rapidly go bankrupt
if they followed that work culture. It may be relevant to recall that when
Dassault developed the Mirage IV “Avion de Dissuasion” (deterrent bomber-Anglo
Saxon!) using the Mirage III as the basis (pl. note) his fifty engineers (pl.
also note) did not have much of a social life for the two years (again pl. note
well)) they took to go from sanction to first flight. We took eighteen!
d)
It is also
possible that having ignored the “lack of belief” (as in the PAC report) and
gone ahead with building of the two Technology Demonstrators the ADA and
Ministry leadership soon realized that they had blundered and the platform
would have to be significantly redesigned. Such sometimes happen e.g the
Supermarine Type 224/ Specn. F7/30. The predecessor of the legendary Spitfire.
The leadership lacked the knowledge and courage to grasp the nettle firmly
possibly because of loss of face and prestige was involved. The problems were
understood but repeatedly postponed for the “next watch”.
e)
There were
genuine technical problems which the top men of ADA completely failed to see
due to lack of sufficient experience in the necessary area.
One can only conjecture what actually
went on in Lyutenia and Raisina, New Delhi in the 1980s and 1990s. There has
been mentions in the memoirs by the then VCAS of various wildcat schemes by the
Scientist –Bureaucrats of that time but
if at all there is a overriding technical cause of the delay then the
following notes may help in forming an idea.
First it is to be realized
that the LCA configuration is the most troublesome to develop because changes
are inevitable during development and the configuration does not allow for easy
plan Bs. Indeed if a group of experienced aircraft engineers had been hired to
recommend a configuration package that would be the most difficult to develop
for the Indian Industry of the 1980s they would recommend a plain delta with
FBW and a high proportion of composites. Unfortunately by the end of the 1980s
ADA had unerringly zeroed onto precisely this configuration. As a footnote I
would add that in 1983 India had four proven airframes with manufacturing
information and considerable service experience but it is possible ADA chose
not to be beholden to HAL for anything and therefore did not seek access to the
information. Such organizational behavior happens and needed intervention from
the higher direction.
It would be instructive to
look at what the experienced fourth generation designers were doing around that
time. The repeated pattern was of limiting risks to the minimum whilst
venturing forth.
i)
General Dynamics using the
conventional tailed layout with blended body and LERX
strakes and FBW first ensured they had good Plan Bs in case the FBW did not
work. They also used less than 3% composites and indeed their structure was
decidedly conservative- machined rather than chemically milled skins for the
wings and traditional sheet and strip for the rest of the structure.
iii)
The Russians were
even more conservative. They used no composites on the prime structure,
discarding even that ( about 7% ,for the engine cowls) at the first sign of trouble and of course
there was no FBW. They just stuck to refining the configuration which was both
original and brilliant. Digressing, the MiG 29 is a very “flexible”
configuration permitting considerable “change and chop”; it reminds me of the
ME 262 in the way it reduces the nacelle –body interference drag though with
some additional wetted area drag. In a way they showed what could be done just
by sticking to conventional engineering. We had the MiG 29s in India in the
1980s. If only someone had the wit to “see”!
iv)
The Dassault team
based the M2000 on the Mirage III used more composites but only for the wing
skins. The Fuselage which requires more sculpting was aluminum. They had of
course previous composite experience having tried it out on the Mirage III fin
as well as FBW tried out on a modified Mirage III Stabilitie Variable.
v)
The Gripen team
had based the configuration of the Viggen so they mainly focused on the FBW and
the composites was kept again only for the wing skins. They too had previous
composite experience, having used it on the SAAB 105 rudder.
It
is no coincidence that NONE of the four teams used composites on the fuselage. ADA
went in for 65% composites without or perhaps because of not having
sufficient experience on the material.
The reasons I have focused on
the composite percentage is because if we analyse the delay we see a continuous
pattern of uncertainty about the
delays. In 2015 the delivery periodicity indicated a process badly out of
control. Even today a production of five in 2018 is followed by zero till date
(14/042019). It cannot be that senior officers are habitual liars. Indeed some
of those who made the promises were respected men. Nor can it be that the
production rate is 4 per annum per tool set. Boeing would need a plant the size
of Texas to meet the 787 demand. Even at the rate of 4 a/c/tool set/annum we
should have since IOC some thirty two aircraft and not twelve. The construct
therefore is as follows:
Once the prototypes fly the
development of an aircraft into a serviceable combat type shifts from
engineering and science to art, intuitions and sometimes, almost “black magic”.
Not every engineer has the required skills. An aircraft between first flight
and IOC may need perhaps three hundred “mods”. It is here that composites play
up. Their great strength- rigidity – is also there great handicap as far as our
industry is concerned. Our industry was used to a “suit on assembly” culture. Aluminum
is quite amenable to that though it does nothing for build quality.
Unfortunately one cannot do that with composites. The tolerance required -50
microns -is half the general
tolerance of Aerospace quality machined parts.
One cannot just mallet say the forward fuselage joint line with the centre
section to blend. It is possible that the production rate of four p.a. mentioned
is the probability of having acceptable quality
“snap fit” parts per annum! The “out
of control”-ness would affect both performance and a/c to a/c variations. So we
have a situation where a particularly ill informed choice of material used in a
scale not heard of anywhere made the prototyping difficult. The changes
inevitable in aircraft development could not be made and tested nor was it
possible to firmly commit that x number would be ready by Y date! Thus IOC and
FOC dates would keep on sliding. Boeing trouble in productionizing the 787’s composites
will be remembered. Coming back to the “required skills” it is quite likely
that given the bureaucratic command structure of our Aerospace Industry in the
selection process the abilities of a
prospective project leader as a bureaucrat is given greater weightage than his
skills as a “front line” engineer i.e. A Jodl or Kietel will be preferred over a Guderian. Of course we are looking for
a non- existent “Superman”. The trick lies in better teamwork and cooperation
and in a certain sense “justice” and “fairness” which was evidently not
present.
The systemic faults
Maintenance of pretensions is
often an obstacle to making progress. Pars
sanitas velle sanari fuit! The wish to be cured is a step to good health! This
wish was conspicuous by its absence. This programme has the somewhat doubtful
distinction of being the most lengthy development programme in Aviation
History. It is unlikely this record will ever be broken.
Judging by the items of
shortfall in the report the first conclusions is that all the labels issued by
ADA and DRDO/Ministry- TD, PV, LSP, SP, IOC1, IOC2 etc are just labels not
worth the proverbial Tinker’s damn. The recently granted FOC has to be viewed
against this history.
What we have is a motley
collection of prototypes of varying build standards. This is normal in aircraft
development. What is not normal is that there is no certainty of when the next
will be flown. This factor needs improvement because that is holding up
development flying.
Going strictly by the report,
the LCA Mk1 is unfit for service. The aircraft will not meet up on its range
payload required for FOC. The
superiority of the aircraft over the Combat Hawk regarding the MFDs,
BVRs, FBW etc are all LTP ( Lost Total Point) ed- as in the childhood game of
Bagatelle- because the range payload shortcoming and the energy performance as
reflected in the report.
The delay is not due to the causes
advertised by the defaulting parties e.g. high technology, first time, US
sanctions etc. We must look for other reasons. These can be categorized into
engineering related and Administrative.
The Technical corrections
I have carefully studied the CAG report and as
they say “read the tea leaves”. Having
said that I reiterate that what I am saying is very probably very true! The CAG
report confirms my long held “empirical” beliefs!
i)
The LCA will
continue to be “kutccha” (unripe, half baked) unless drastic corrective administrative action is taken.
ii)
The modifications required by the LCA Mk1 include
increasing the length of the fuselage and re-contouring the fuselage as well as
cranking the wing along with a careful weight improvement programme. About 40%
of the airframe requires redesign. The engineering is very doable.It is the
delay incorporating the necessary changes which is the crisis. New readers may
find the earlier discussion on the LCA in Vayu (V/2010 “Wisdom and Courage),
Vayu I/2015 The LCA – Beloved Aircraft or Lemon?), Vayu I/2017 Falcon ,Griffon,
Tejas and V/2018 The Riddle of the RFI of some interest. They will note that
“progress” has been glacial and “on paper”.
iii)
Mods are delaying
certifications and composites are delaying mods. It is a flat spin kind of a
situation.
iv)
The MK1 will be
of limited operational use, The Mk1a is
almost a new aircraft and the MK2 is fully so. I feel we are making the common
mistake of underestimating the amount of design changes involved. Aircraft have
a nasty habit of demanding attention.
v)
The situation is
not irrecoverable. It has been the experience in product development that what
is seen as a vast and insurmountable problem is in reality a bundle of simple
problems all entangled with each other. For example what is needed is that the
composite situation be impartially reviewed outside of the nexus of possible
“cronyisms” or “beneficiary organizations” and instead of relying on “It is just
around the corner” promises made by stressed “retiring in six months” officials
in some office in North Block the people should walk the shop floor and talk to
the poor devils who are trying to meet schedules on an unproven technology and
also to see the trends of the rejection rates and rework rates.
The investigations will
indicate significant redesign and a temporary retreat from composites (as the
Russians quickly did with the MiG 29) should be considered. New tooling will be
required as the fuselage which any way
needs lengthening and re-contouring be redesigned in metal to get all the
development “mods” done quickly before reverting to composites thereafter. This
will delay the programme by about twenty months but the programme will be on
firmer grounds from the word go. The main
problem to this solution is the reluctance of the “powerful” to admit they have
been wrong all along on many points-specially as regards composites.
Conventional wisdom has it
that it is madness to talk about starting alternate project studies “so late in
the day” but consider this. The LCA Mk 2 canard takes to the air and quickly we
find that the induced and trim drags are higher than estimated. This is normal
in canards because they generate lift on low aspect ratio “wings” which are
much more close coupled than conventional tail planes so they need to generate
more lift more inefficiently. Now suppose we find that out in 2023 (assuming
the prototype has been on time!) and we discover that. The Bisons will have
gone. Do we wait for 2023 to start looking at alternative proposals? It does
not cost the sky to do alternative, calibrated project studies of varying
degrees of certainty based on existing airframes. As they say “You don’t have to be mad to be in Aviation, but it helps.”
The administrative corrections
i)
Are these various
committees such as the PAC or the CAGs merely ceremonial and part of the “rites
and rituals of a republic”? The committees seem to have put the finger on the
problem even at the start – in this case in 1989- and yet –like Cassandra -
their warnings were ignored causing loss and harm to the nation and the Forces.
Such committees must be given the
counsel of a Technical team so that some cross questioning could take place. It
would improve the quality of the answers.
ii)
The focus of the
audits by this Committees should move from the Financial and procedural irregularities
to the Failure of Programme and Time Management. They could have contributed positively if they had been empowered for
“Armed Reccee” rather than “reccee” mode. The Committee should, like
the Election Commission under TN Sheshan, use its power to veto or to recommend
the stopping or changing the management of projects that have significantly
overshot their schedules. The 1989 Review clearly showed that the programme was
unlikely to meet its time target and in any case was not meeting its
specifications as per the customer. It should have been yellow flagged at that
stage for substantial redesign. The
political and Ministerial Departments showed a remarkable degree of Laissez
Faire for what was even then a case for substantial concern. Programmes
that are sliding should be recommended for closure or change in management. Let
them be restarted but at least the red flagging would be on record and it would
reduce complacency about what the Chinese say “an iron rice bowl”. It is worth
recalling that the Americans and the Soviets succeeded because the winner emerged
from a Gladiatorial contest. Our “winners” are anointed. The consequences are
plain to see.
iii)
The Committee rightly wants the Officials who failed to ensure the
involvement of IAF personnel during the initial design stage to be identified.
Indeed the scope of this activity needs to be enlarged. Rather than a
superficial identification of this SA or that PD we have to identify what was
the submerged mechanism which selected, sustained and protected such officials despite
the lack of progress. What were the forces and the mechanisms which sanctioned
FSED on a project that clearly was unsatisfactory to the customer?
iv)
Why were new pioneering
technologies left to be developed on platforms that were yet to fly.
Overlooking this common sense decision was a big cause of all the delay.
v)
Were the Sanctioning Committees just bureaucratic
procedurals with no directive capabilities?
vi)
The quality of the Evaluating and Sanctioning
Committees should be improved in terms of relevant technical knowledge as much
as for eliminating “cronyism” and “mutual indebtedness” which may well have
been the case..
vii)
Our counter espionage in the Weapons and
Strategic Industries sector- “Abwehr” to use the convenient German word -needs
to be strengthened because there is circumstantial evidence that
the delay n the Tejas programme may have been largely due to by covert action. Serial blunders cannot account for thirty six years. In this
connection the need to protect performers cannot be overstated. We have had
several key leaders in our strategic programmes dying mysteriously. The case of
the ISRO scientist Nambi Narayanan is a warning. It is not enough he was
exonerated. His potential contribution over the years has been irretrievably
lost.
Conclusions
1.
The LCA Mk1 I is
unlikely to have any worthwhile operational use. Like the Hunter Mk1 it should
be used for development of systems and SOPs.
2.
The Mk1a and the
Mk 2 be given the status of new projects because that is what they are
particularly given the difficulties of the configuration.
3.
As a matter of
ample precautions there should be several second
strings projects studies that
should run until the LCA Mk 1A/Mk2 are stabilized.
The IAF has excellent
experience in upgrades and they should be given the task of exploring a
“structural surgery” (Ref.1) on a F 414/MiG 23/27 non VG hybrid. The fuselage
size is just about right and many of the 53 concessions- armouring of the
cockpit for example would be easily rectified. The Maritime Jaguar fuselage and
systems with a “Big Wing” (which
actually was a BAC project study in the 1980s) suitable for a VFR (Feb27/2019)
combat could be another similar competing project. We have the basis
information for both as well as the service experience so we know exactly where
the shoe needs to be reworked. The present the studies should be no more than
just a “what if we do this” study and should be complete within 8 to 10 months
and perhaps one two crores if that. There can be another 3 or 4 such
explorations and the systems developed for the LCA should be repackaged in
these “new” airframes much as Dassault and SAAB used existing airframes as the
proven basis for their new designs. The Private sector should be asked for
proposals even if to get the act going. It is not that we will get a new
fighter in three years but, God forbid, should the push come to the shove, we
are 3-4 years down the road to a likely one with a first flight next year and
the consternation will be that much less!
4.
The cost of such
parallel projects to begin is not the deterrent it is made out to be. The cost
of the LCA programme at any stage should not be used as an indicator of the
funds required because they were probably very inefficiently used. Compared to
costs overseas the LCA’s costs are exorbitant once the PPP is factored in and
it has a very large component of “mark time” or Kadam taal” ( as in marching)
costs because of the PSU style of centralized functioning.
5.
Nor should we
underestimate the impact of creating design talent in the Private sector as
well as the impact of competition
There can be no abandoning
the programme. Fighter specifications are as fickle as feminine fashion .Weapons
Marketing being what it is the Light Combat Aircraft –which had become passé
after the 1980s,- being replaced by 1:1 T/W ratio, AOA ,the BVRs and then
Stealth- as the “to die for” USP features- will again be making a comeback once
the order rate of the F 35 falls below a certain rate per annum and the world’s
inventory of BVRs reach saturation! Thanks to the prolonged delay the LCA will
be right on the recycled starting line it possible competitors being the LM T50
and the Boeing BTX- 1. Further project studies of the LCA programme should be
initiated using the Eurojet 2000/ M 88/ RD 93 engines and accessories i.e.
EADS/Russian/French systems just to avoid being “Viggen”ed as SAAB was when
they tried to offer it for our DPSA. I am not being skittish. Fighter specs. go
through fashion cycles. It has happened before with the T38/F5/F20 and now we
will go through the Scorpion reprise, the TF 50 and the BTX-1.. Indeed the
entire package- Kaveri, LCA, Radar etc should be put as the phrase goes “under
new Management” because there is going to
be money in LCAs in the future.
Surprisingly the project most
to benefit from the ills of the LCA programme should have been the AMCA. All
the corrections should have been read into the management of the AMCA programme
which is at present going exactly the way the LCA followed so unfructously and
for so long. There is no evidence that this is being done. Are we going to wait
till 2030 (or whatever) to discover that the AMCA on trials at Kalaikunda
sorties for Dudhkundi as a fully stealth aircraft but after two passes at 4.25
G over the range it comes back as an unstealthy aircraft? AMCA is very
definitely treading the same path of serial digging rather than parallel
digging that the LCA has followed and the results will be exactly the same but
the “responsible” people would have retired and gone into limbo.
There are three key technical
challenges in the AMCA programme.
i)
Robust Stealth
ii)
Sensor Fusion
iii)
The cueing of
recessed GWs to the external targets.
All
three are developable independently of the final aircraft which is being shown
at the various fairs. There is no sign that we have mastered the three base
technologies. There is money to be made in LCAs and AMCAs. Let us get our act
together.
References:
1.
Prodyut Das
Aircraft Resurgery Programmes- Their role in Development of Aeronautical
Capability. Indian Defence Review, Lancer
Publication ISSN 0970-2512 July Dec 1990 pp 110-119 (7227)
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