Ceremonial IOCs apart the
date of the effective IOC of the LCA continues to be uncertain. The current
bets are on for June 2017 but only the congenitally gullible will believe this.
Worn out by overuse, these occasions usually mark not progress but the
retirement of someone who had joined the project as a young man. The latest
date for the Mk.1A given by the DRDO Chief is of significance.The Mark 1A’s
first flight is given as 2018 with a completion of testing by 2021 and
production starting from 2022. These dates, normal for a new project, indicate comprehensive
redesign is required to make a Mk1 into a Mk.1A. New readers are referred to
Vayu I/2015.
The truth is that this LCA project has done more
to reduce the frontline strength of the IAF than the two attempts by the
Pakistan Air Force. Precisely for this reason if the LCA Mk1 was even half decent
the IAF would be glad to have the forty Mk1s if only to work out its SOPs
whilst waiting for the Mk1A. This was what the RAF did with the less than
satisfactory Hunter Mk.1.This has not happened. The official rumour, as
Sir Humphrey Appleby of Yes Minister would say is that the production is
constrained by supply of composite parts produced by NAL. It will be noted that
three limited series (italics
mine) production aircraft LSPs 3,
4, 5 were turned out within a period of six months in 2010 i.e. So if the IOC 1
was not purely ceremonial we should have had at least 36 aircraft, admittedly
hand built and admittedly below par by now. It would have given us something
better than the Hawk as a close support aircraft in an emergency. The despair
is that five years after an IOC the production rate is one per year and dates
continue to remain uncertain. Given such, below is my unkind but perhaps not
unreasonable assessment of the situation.
i)
The IOCs etc are “Nautankis”- a form of
rural folk entertainment often noted for not following of scripts.
ii)
The aircraft has severe technical flaws
and is unfit for service. No one can clear it for mass production.
iii)
Aircraft debugging is not some form of
black magic. Is the problem cultural? I mention this because I have noticed
this in the CAD/CAE Industry. When things do not come out right the people know
what needs to be done but lack the faith and the energy to put it right on the
actual product.
iv)
Or worst ,were the delays condoned so that
things slid to imports?
The Prognosis
The story is told of a RAF twin engine light
bomber of WW2 whose engine speed governor required “a look at” every fifteen
hours. Unfortunately the cowling had for
aerodynamic reasons not been provided with a suitable access panel and it was
in one piece so the entire cowling had to be taken off. To take the cowlingoff
first the propeller had to be taken off. In the LCA where the customer was kept
at arm’s length to “fast track the project” (official “pomp” in the ‘90s, if I
remember aright) serviceability related issues would be quite likely.
There have also been
reports of an engine /inlet mismatch. This would be more serious at take off -
at high speed the ram effect would help- so we have an engine which is giving
less than max. thrust at take off. MTOW from standard fighter fields would be
degraded. Recall that the LCA has operated so far from civil airfields. Does
this tie up with the extraordinary keenness at this pre IOC stage- I am sorry I
do not believe 45 squadron being raised- for a FR capability? That way one
could take off with a lower load and then tank up on fuel once flying. Sounds ridiculous?
So does two IOCs! It is disappointing that we could not get the intake
reasonably right first time; Intake sizing is not rocket science. The
shame and the pity is that this problem was sat on for sixteen years!
If the above prognosis is
roughly right this is what needs to be done:
i)
Presuming individual systems are working reliably
the Mk1 airframe has to be stripped skin inwards of every system and frame and
redesigned for weight improvement, inlet modification etc.
ii)
The airframe will then have to be re-engineered
for ease of production, re stressed and tested for fatigue.
iii)
The systems have to be repackaged for and
of servicing. This last means that on the ramp the armourers do not get in the
way of re-fuellers and so on. The ballast weight has to be reduced to the
minimum, perhaps less than 30 kg.
All
this will take about two years to get
together and may be another two years to test so we are looking at four years
from start date before we can think of producing in series. Assuming that the
new government put pressure on by end of 2014 we are looking at 2018 for the first
series production Mk1 and Dr. Christopher’s dates are right for the Mk.1A. Even
though the Mk.1A’s dates are breathing down the neck of the Mk.1’s, going directly to the Mk.1A is not the
best because we still don’t know all the “gremlins” in the aircraft until it
gets into some kind of normal service assuming of course that the Mk.1 can be
IOC’d by 2018/2019.
The
Crisis
Without
doubt the biggest”enemy” to this project has been its progenitor organization
which by delays and “unreliable” (and that is putting it very very
mildly) promises has now caused a condition where two very good generically
similar aircraft are on offer to be built in India. If we have two hundred
Gripen Es or Super Falcons then the LCA will slip into the “why bother” category. To avoid this we need firm and sustained
political action. The order for the eighty three Mk.1As is welcome but it
should be followed by larger orders for the specialist versions.
The
LCA and the MMRCA. Drawing the
boundaries.
There
is little point in discussing here the
capabilities of the MMRCA contenders. In a way they are as with the Howitzers, as
alike as peas in a pod. My view is that the even the most painstaking selection
could be subject to parliamentary criticism or one could get the dumbest AC2 to
pick a name out a hat and that choice could be logically defended! These are
products which are competing in peace and will compete in anger and win. They
are designed for certain scenarios-mainly North European wars where they will
fly in an environment of densely packed, sophisticated as well as well trained
and equipped opposition in appalling fog and mist and low or non- existent
daylight conditions. They are obscenely over equipped for our kind of
war. In winter North Europe compared to India all flying is night/dusk flying.
The Radar, RLG,IN, GPS, IR and GPWS ( Ground proximity warning system) is essential
and will be needed even in peace just to get safely back to base- bailing
out over the Tundra in winter from fuel starvation due to navigation error or
CFiT (controlled flight into terrain) in low visibility is not an alternative.
The question to be asked repeatedly and carefully is: are they too well
equipped for India’s wars? The Israelis were delighted with the performance of
their Mirage IIICJs in the 1967 war but being Jewish when they reordered it as
the Mirage 5 they sensibly deleted the Cyrano search radar and the Matra 530
and took the cheaper limited capability Aida ranging radar it being correctly
argued that the better radar did not give significant advantage over the
Sinai; BVR made reduced sense at the low levels. The Israelis used the weight
savings to increase range payload and reduce costs. Continuous value analysis
is at the heart of the LCA philosophy and the key to its survival as a contender.
Only someone with cloven feet will argue that all the “abbreviations” AESA,
BVR, MAWS, ECM, ESM, IRST, NV etc do not add to the capabilities but these
capabilities exact a price in terms of cost and vulnerability. More is not
always better and in a LCA intelligent frugality has to be enforced if the
concept is to succeed. The “pro capability” argument that much of these
equipment are often carried externally and the aircraft is only plumbed for the
equipment is evasive. The “plumbing”- cables, wires, brackets, pipes, power
sources, clamps, the additional airframe space and pylons add to the weight.
Northrop did a study in the 1960s and found that each kg of electronics adds
five kgs. to the final empty weight. This
figure is still too true. In the F16/ Gripen E these capacity enhancers increased
empty weight by about three tons with significant effect on handling and
prices. External carriage be it a LANTIRN or Towed decoy or a BVRM adds to the
weight and the drag en route and over the battlefield.
Further
from War further from reality
Just
after the ’71 war during planning for the Ajeet we received a request from Air
HQ to modify the ISIS F 124 sight .The focus was on simplicity and all
features- gyro tracking, ranging, span settings were to be deleted and the
sight became almost a simple collimating sight- just one step short of the
proverbial chewing gum on the windscreen. Just as we (at least my friend dear
V. Pramod ) had worked the mods. out they came back with a request for getting
the radar ranging input in. Further change requests followed with uncanny
timings until by about 1975 we got back the original ISIS F 124 configuration! The
need for all round vision even at the expense of performance was hard
learned in WW2 but quickly lost in peace. Study the Mustang P 51 A- P51B-P51C-P
51D- F86Sabre-F 100 Super Sabre-F4Phantom- F 15- F 35 canopy styles with time
for example you will see two cycles of the same mistake! Further studies since
then leads me to believe that the further one is away from combat experience
the sweeter sounds the salesmen. The F 16 story is worth recounting because it
reinforces two truths.
i)
The repeated folly of ignoring lessons
hard learned in War.
ii)
Though everyone loves a fighter finally
the main job to be done is Offensive Air Support.
After Vietnam when the “swing role” (they
had not thought up of this jargon at that time!) Phantom II fared badly against the
“non-swinging” (!) MIG 17/19/21 the USAF
went in for the “not a pound for the ground” approach” This resulted in the F
15 which was too expensive ( pl. note well!) and so a cheaper solution was also
desired as a supplement. The F 16 started life as Light Weight Fighter (LWF) an
aircraft using only one of the F 15s engine. The first F 16 weighed only 6857
kilos- which justifies my view that the much smaller and lower powered LCA
empty weight should be around 5300kilos- , used a 108.57 kN F 100 engine and
with two Sidewinders and 3162 kilos of fuel and pilot weighed in at 10,952kilos
giving a clean combat T/W of 1.02. It
was sensibly equipped – a AN/ APG 66 radar, Marconi HUD, FBW, SKN 2400 INS,
Sperry CDAC, AN-ALR 69 RWR, UHF, VHF, ILS,TACAN in addition to all the usual
avionics. Today the same fighter has put on around three tons of weight, can
handle all the current abbreviations that can be mounted on its pylons and
there has been no growth in its wing area though now the engine is bigger at
131 kN to help attract the IR missiles like Stingers and its cousins. It is
undeniably a more versatile fighter but is it a more ‘sensible” fighter? Do we
need all the Night/Low daylight/ long distance navigation, Ferry capabilities
essential in the Global policing role for all our platforms? The AESA is
essential for the Western scenario because he may have to fight without ground
based radar coverage. Is it true for us? If we ape the West we will get a ”barn
door” and not a fighter and in fewer numbers because of the cost push.
The Table 1 below is
illustrative. It compares an early model A of a bestselling contemporary fighter
with a gun armament and two IR CCMs and the latest standard model F of the same
aircraft but plumbed for all the updates and with enhanced capability and
carrying full internal fuel, two IR CCMs and four BVRs.
Table 1 MKS units
Type
|
W/L
|
T/W
|
ID/T
|
FF
|
MIG 21 Bis
|
354
|
0.87
|
0.39
|
0.27
|
Model A
|
393
|
1.05
|
0.244
|
0.29
|
Model F
|
533
|
0.86
|
0.36
|
0.256
|
Degradation A to
F
|
0.36
|
0.18
|
0.16
|
0.12
|
The following is to be noted:
i)
The model F is a better ‘all rounder” but
inferior in performance both to the Model A and the MiG 21 which was the original “to beat” target.
ii)
The combined increase of Wing loading and
Power loading means handling at cruise and landing speeds will be noticeably
inferior..
iii)
The T/W ratio has gone down by 18%.The
noteworthy point is the same “philosophers” had expounded the dire necessity
about 1:1 T/W earlier. Marketing people sell not the truth but their products!
iv)
ID/T is a poor man’s index of Specific
Excess Power and gives the amount of engine thrust that is eaten away by the
induced drag as the aircraft executes a 3 g turn at 350 kts. The reduction is
significant. In reality it will be worse because the drag of those BVRs and the
increase in Cdo has not been factored in. Is it any wonder that BVRs
have been jettisoned before entering combat? Why carry them on marginal
platforms?. Let some bigger “power surplus” platforms e.g the Su 30 MKI. carry
them. They will be very effective on the Su 30MKI.
v)
FF is the fuel fraction and gives the
amount of max internal fuel divided by the engine thrust in Kgs. It is an
indicator of combat persistence i.e. who has to break off first he usually
loses. The model F has 12% less persistence than the Model A. In reality,
allowing for standard reserves the case would be worse.
Keep
the L in the LCA!
In
the ‘80s the Soviets did not hesitate to use four different types- MiG 21, SU
17, MiG 23BN/ 27 and the SU 24- just to
meet the battlefield Air needs of their Frontovaiya Aviatsya. The IAF
has wisely gone in, like the Soviets, for a combination of LCA, MMRCA and the
MKI. Let us reap the benefits of this stratification to the maximum .The LCA
has a niche position and it can survive only if it stays within its “Laxman
rekha” of being a limited capability fighter which is its raison de etre.
Whether the fighter should be small and adequate or large and versatile for a
penalty of 50% increase in IR/ visual signature is a question that only pilots
climbing 1500 mts AGL in bright sunshine to make rocket attacks will have to
decide. In an LCA something has to go- range, payload or equipment levels.
The Beastie and the
beasts - a comparison of the MMRCA.
Below is a personal
assessment of the MMRCA contenders and why the selection went the way it did.
The MIG 29
was my personal favourite. Having worked in technology transfer projects of
various Soviet military engineering projects I am admittedly biased but I found
them robust –in war the Su 7 never missed a sortie due to unreliability- enormously
sensible and fascinatingly effective. The MIG 29 SMT/K should have won on
grounds of commonality (with the Navy), familiarity, just right equipment fit,
great performance and, one hopes, lower prices. The fact it was not chosen
means that there was sustained move to disengage from Russia.
The F 16/Gripen
E These pose the most direct threat as they are generically similar i.e. single
engine single seat to the Tejas, particularly the Tejas Mk2. However these
aircraft have put on between two and three tons since inception and are no longer
the cheerful things they were though they remain very effective for global
wars. We need something smaller and simpler. Again in its non selection the reason
is probably political. Having gingerly disengaged from the Russian Bear it is
hardly wise to rush into the arms of the American Grizzly! Both these countries
are large enough to twist our arms! The Gripen, like the Viggen earlier is
“sanctionable”. I am also leery of buying any single engine warplane from the
West. These things cost half their weight in gold and single engines have a
five time higher attrition rate than twins in peacetime .
The Rafale
is the median aircraft in the Table 2.France is economically manageable-
hopefully cannot “bully” us. They have been reliable suppliers-In the Falklands
Affair they supplied equipment impartially to both sides. The fact that they
also go by principles (hard cash only, please!) must have also played a role.
It is an excellent choice and role wise a good replacement for the Jaguars and
the Mig 23 BNs. I am sure we shall buy some more.
The Typhoon
was another excellent contender and could have been chosen but was dropped for
commercial reasons. The project is Multi-national but there is no truth in the
rumour that it was feared that after the next World Cup Italy may invade
Germany and then where would we be? Remember what happened with difficulties
about Ukrainian spares for Russian equipment.
The Super Hornet
is also excellent but falls nearer to the Su 30 but more oriented now to strike
roles and suffers from being American.
All these aircraft claim
to have been “blooded” in combat but that is sales jargon. Fighting poorly
trained North African Armed Forces which are often racked by internal
dissensions-one has had the Air Force bombing the Army etc or Jihadi Militias out to conquer the world is
really not even Spain 1936 i.e a half decent proving ground.. Successes and
achievements in these “colonial” wars are irrelevant- specially regarding effectiveness
of advanced equipment effectiveness. I am still waiting for results of PGMs and
BVRs in a full blown professional war. The Chinese or the Pakistan Armed Forces
are professional forces and the mayhem in North Africa has little relevance on
what we may expect from our two neighbours- they are in a different league
altogether.
Size is “armour”
In the last “one and a
half ”front war” in 1971, even with the PAF partially crippled by disaffected
Bengali personnel, we lost about 75 combat aircraft due to all causes. Of these
about sixty were involved in OAS (offensive air support).Nineteen of the very capable
SU 7 was lost to cheap AAA whilst about fifteen Hunters fell equally to AAA and
fighters in this role. The Mig 21 losses were just two to AAA in OAS roles and the
little Gnat still unreliable and hobbled
by the lack of 250 kg. bombs which confined it to RP attacks did a very
creditable job being visually and aurally stealthy. Out of over three hundred OAS
Gnat sorties only one was hit by a few bullets but even that recovered to base.
There is strong correlation between size and losses. These lessons are still
relevant. The latest F 16 and the Gripens are like the Hunters of the past and
the Tejas is the Gnat of the present. Technology can improve the Gnat’s lacunae
of range /payload and safety to very acceptable levels. It should be debugged
and more specialized OAS versions for strict VFR roles should be developed and
ordered after the present orders for eighty three Mk.1 As.
The need for numbers
The final argument for
the Tejas is a question of numbers and, therefore, costs. Numbers are also
capability. Given the improvement in Air Defence technologies since ’71 we must
prepare for a combat loss in a “one and a half front war” of around one hundred
and twenty aircraft in the first two weeks. If you do not believe this
ask the Israelis about the Ramadan/Yom Kippur War losses. Post the Yom
Kippur/Ramadan War’s devastating losses the Israeli IDFAF took ten years to
recover their former arrogant elan. They also doubled the number of their
combat squadrons from eleven to twenty. The lessons are stark and clear. One hundred
and Twenty aircrafts equal about seven squadron’s worth. To remain a viable
fighting force without any resupply by any Uncle (Sam!) as was available to the
Israelis we must have be having an OAS element alone of about twenty five
squadrons i.e. about four hundred aircraft with a suitable establishment in
pilots of whom we should expect a loss of about fifty- just to sustain the
force for re growth! A large air force
is needed. Economics limits the MMRCAs numbers and technology limits the LCA’s
versatility. We must break up the Tejas into “cheap” specialist variants and
strictly leave the multi role function to the MMRCA and the Su 30 MKI which is
superb in its own way.
The LCA variants
The Western philosophy of
‘One size fits all” does not fit us. We can neither afford nor design “swing
role” aircraft and they do not make sense for India. The LCA must be developed
in specialist variants to keep within the 5300-6000kg empty weight limits..
In the following section
the definitions are as follows: LCA Mk.1 is the “as is” aircraft and has a dry
empty weight of 6600 kgs. The LCA Mk 1A is the structurally and aerodynamically
refined version with a weight of 5300 kilos. The LCA Mk.IN is a Mk1A with a cranked delta wing with a
span of 10 mts, an area of 40 sq. mts and an AR of 2.5. (Ref.LCA 5400/2.5) Vayu
I/2015)
The LCA Mk 1 This
seems to be pretty much a “gone case” and we should induct it in the same
spirit as the Hunter F 1- a good aircraft for extended field trials of the
other systems- perhaps just the forty or until the LCA Mk 1A catches up.
Reduction in empty weight and with the intake sorted out it will be a fair
strike aircraft. Historically it would be like the Hurricane Mk IIB- a good
fighter bomber but wary when it ran into the Hayabusa on the Burma front. 40 units .
The LCA Mk 1 A Standard VFR light attack aircraft with self
defence capability for short range i.e. 180 n.m.at SL radius of action with a
three ton war load. Typical equipment fit would be a non AESA radar, VHF, UHF,
TACAN, IFF, Autopilot, HUD,INS,FBW,RWR,HMD,HUMS and CCM. No BVR, FR, NV
capability. 100 units.
LCA Mk 1B
As above but optimized for VFR close support with armoured cockpit and armoured
“get home” systems. GSh 30-2 cannon.
This is technically like a “tailless” miniaturized MiG 27 replacement in a much smaller aircraft with
better handling. This would be the ideal time to introduce ‘cranked wing” version.
(see Vayu I/2015) 200 units.
LCA Mk 1C are the 40 Mk1s to be withdrawn and rebuilt to
1C standards with cranked wing to serve as VFR escort fighters with BVR
capabilities including AESA radar and flying top cover forMk1. 40+20 units
LCA Mk 1N Two
seat night capable aircraft for LLXC intruder roles. LANTIRN, NVG compatible
cockpits, Conformal tanks. This would be a replacement for the Jaguar. This may
use the more powerful GE 414 engine. 60units
LCA LIFT/Maritime As in Mk 1N but
specialized with capability of carrying Anti Shipping missiles. Trainer is
fully equipped including BVRand Night capabilities but with reduced energy and
speed performance. 60+ 60 units.
LCA F414 Mk 2 In theory thanks to having half the
wing loading of the Sea Harrier FRS Mk.1 the LCA Mk1a with the F 404 should
actually be doing a better than the Sea Harrier provided its empty weight is held
to around 5500 kilos. This weight target is not unreasonable because the Sea
Harrier FRS Mk1 weighs 5891 kg empty and it is a bigger aeroplane without
composites and with a heavier engine. If the NLCA is not doing better than the
Sea Harrier it is because of the overweight airframe and the inlet engine
mismatch problem. The risk with the F 414 solution is that the additional
weight of the engine ,systems, fuel, structure, airframe mods means fairly
extensive redesign of a tailless planform which is more “touchy” of such
things. Another point to watch out for is that the LCA Mk1 has a record low
aspect ratio (AR) of 1.8. This makes it especially critical of any weight
overruns. The configurations shown in open source that wing area has been added
in a manner to further reduce AR. This is a risky path to disappointment should
weight control supervision fall below “outstanding” levels.
The best we can do is to try
the cranked wing of the Mk1c (10mts span, 40 sq.mts. wing area, AR 2.5) perhaps
with folding tips to assist stowage and an empty weight of less than 5600kgs.
The above break up is to
illustrate the need so as to stay within weight limits so as to stay within the
LCA advantages of good performance at low costs. If one needs all the
capabilities in one platform – which I feel is difficult for us to justify-
then we are looking at something in the range of Rafale upwards.
Conclusions
The only certainty
Western Military Planners is certain about the next war he may be asked to
fight is that it will not be over home territory. The ferry distance
from his peacetime base, the weather, the terrain, the type of targets, the
quality and numbers of the bases he has to be prepared to operate form and
indeed the whole logistics of warfare is unknown to him. The equipment he must
therefore is of ‘ready for anything and for any eventuality” comprehensiveness
with a high degree of independence from ground /base located systems. Despite
complex and expensive equipment he pays the price for “swing role” capability in
terms of complexity reduced numbers and reduced performance.
By contrast the Indian
Military planner knows everything about the war he is going to fight- targets,
distances, routes, terrains, tactics ,the bases he will use, the extent of
situational awareness support he will get from AWACS and ADGES systems, the likely
time of the year he will be asked to fight and in some cases the profiles and
personalities of his opponents.
It cannot be that these
two completely different tactical situations will require the same and
identical level of equipment. The Light Combat Aircraft fits into this scenario
like a glove whereas for the Western commander it is a non starter from the
word go.
Our equipment can be simpler. India must
persist with the introduction of a large number of LCA Mk1As and its variants
as the core of its operational strength.
The
possibility of manufacturing 200 F 16s/Gripen Es is a direct threat to the LCA.
These fine aircraft are too well equipped, too expensive, too general purpose and
may be “too global policing “to be economical in our scenario and budget. The prospect
of export is ‘sales talk”. It will be six years before we ourselves get even
one! Our Bureaucracy will ensure that!
The reengineered LCA Mk1a will be an effective
solution comparable or better than the
to the others. The unpardonable delays happened because such delays were
condoned in the past by the Establishment. One hopes this is now past.
If we are forced by politics to go in for the F 16
/Gripen we should go for the simpler “tailored” versions of the Block 5/10/15
for the major part of the fleet and may be Block 60/70 for just two three
squadrons.
Since
the 1960s the IAF has handled a polyglot variety of aircraft with panache. The
IAFs decision to use three categories LCA/MMRCA/MKI is extremely sound though
with development of the LCA the MMRCA category could be of lesser numerical
importance in our threat scenario. We may look at a mix of 30/4/10 squadron mix
of the respective types.
The cost of these six hundred LCAs will be less than
two hundred of any of the two hundred MMRCAs.
The Rafale selection is very good –its supply is
reliable, it is a twin and it is sufficiently differentiated between the LCA
and the Su 30MKI. We may need some more.
3.
Given the inherent limitations of the LCA
concept we must develop role specific variants for our air
superiority/OAS/Night and Maritime roles. Trying to do it all in one airframe
is foredoomed.
The LCA’s engineering problems require a different approach than hitherto. The
LCA and its variants, well re- engineered, offer an economical but effective
solution to our essentially “defensive” or “non-policing” scenario. We cannot
afford to accept the more glamourous Western concepts. We need a large core
force of LCAs beyond the eighty three Mk1As.
1.
Table 2
Type
|
U We
|
UDL
|
UDL/UWe
|
U vol
|
U thrust
|
LCA mk1
|
1.18
|
0.87
|
0.74
|
0.96
|
1
|
LCA mk.1A
|
1
|
1
|
1
|
1
|
1
|
Gripen E
|
1.42
|
1.3
|
0.92
|
1.24
|
1.3
|
F 16 Bl.40
|
1.81
|
1.63
|
1.1
|
1.44
|
1.46
|
Rafale C
|
1.85
|
2.0
|
1.08
|
1.85
|
2.25
|
Typhoon
|
2.03
|
1.84
|
0.91
|
1.85
|
2.25
|
Mig 29
|
1.98
|
1.34
|
0.82
|
1.95
|
2.6
|
Super Hornet
|
2.65
|
2.3
|
0.87
|
2.46
|
2.9
|
Sukhoi Su 30
|
3.36
|
2.31
|
0.7
|
4.15
|
4.25
|
Notes:
1.U We. is
empty weight unitized using the LCA Mk1A’s dry weight of 5400 kgs as unit. It
can be used to compare costs also by factoring approx $17,000/kg as the asking
price for current Western equipment. The LCA in established production should
cost at the rate of $ 6000-8000/kg.
UDL .is the unitized disposable load and is the
difference between the empty and MTO weights reduced by 500 kgs to allow for
pilot, parachutes, hydraulic fluids etc. It indicates how much more the type
carries compared to the LCA Mk1A’s unit of approx 6500 kgs. It indicates how
much more payload the type has compared to the LCA Mk1A range range.
The UDL/We gives how much offensive capability we are getting
per kilo of aircraft weight.”Bangs per buck” is the appropriate slang!
UTV the unified target volume compares the visual
signature of the aircraft and is also the index of the aircraft’s vulnerability
to AAA. It is based on the span x Length x Height of the aircraft compared to
those of the LCA’s.
UT is the Unified thrust and compares the type’s
installed max thrust with the LCA’s. It is being used as an index of the IR
signature of the aircraft.
What do these figures
indicate?
1. The re-engineered LCA
Mk1 A and its variants will be an effective solution comparable or better than
the others. The unpardonable delays that have happened, I feel, are because
these delays were repeatedly condoned. One hopes this is now past.
2. The Su 30s large visual and IR signature
indicates it should be only for the air dominance role where its UDL/UWe
indicates a very formidable performance even when carrying its entire ordinance
such s BVRs. It would be a disaster in low cost roles. If used in such roles it
will repeat the history of the Su7.
4.
There is little
to choose between the various contenders in terms of cost effectiveness in
our scenario.
5.
The Rafale’s selection is very good- its supply is reliable, it is a
twin and it is sufficiently differentiated between the LCA and the SU 30 MKI.For
a one and half front war we will need an OAS component of 25 squadrons. The
MMRCA contenders, are unsuitable, uneconomical and an unproven solution for
this role as we will fight it.. We need to look at a production of
around six hundred role specific LCAs over the next decade.
