The riddle of The MMRCA RFI The symptoms of an ancient Malaise?

They play “Abide with me” at the end of Beating the Retreat Ceremony on 28^th January. It was Gandhiji’s  favourite hymn but truth to tell I do not care much for Victorian Hymns. The words and the music is all right I suppose and in this case there was a tinge of tragedy- Lyte, who wrote the lyrics was dying of tuberculosis when he wrote it-but generally, being on the Native and therefore, receiving, side of Pax Victoriana- the humbug, hypocrisy and self righteous sanctimony of that era spoils the flavours for me. My remembrance of “Abide with me” comes from my recollection, perhaps faulty, of the phrase “the encircling gloom” which is a pretty accurate summing up of the present situation vis a vis the MMRCA and the LCA and the morass that passes for a process of building up of our Air Strength.

The RFI

My gloom was not lightened when a friend sent me a copy of the recent RFI for the 110 MMRCA aircraft. Seventy three pages long it seems to be an amalgam of Pilot’s notes, vague questions and a lack of connectedness. Coming from one of the innovative and experienced Air Forces in the world it does not impress.

First is the style. What is the kind of answer that is expected from a question like “Is the canopy material prone to “crazing” and cracking? Do we need to ask this question in the 21^st Century from vendors like- in alphabetical order- Boeing/EADS/LM/RAC Mig/SAAB ? If the answer is yes then go whole hog and specify 2.8 kW/sq.M/Hr.radiation strength with UV of such and such strength etc. The same “questions for question’s sake” is noted in asking if the ECS is good for 45 degrees centigrade. Is it 45⁰ C on the tarmac or 45⁰ C at 450kts LLXC?  Should we ask if the parking brake lever is in the cockpit? Isn’t it that black and yellow striped pull thing on the left? I don’t buy aeroplanes but if you will pardon me I found the style slightly effete- “pansy” is the word one wants to use!

It has been ages since I have forgotten all the carefully taught lessons on accusative voice and passive voice, dative and nominative case but I felt that a certain more assertive style of writing would have shortened the length of the document considerably. If we are in market for a 110 fighters we can be more firm about it e.g. the Technical life of the airframe should be at least 4000 hours for single engine airframes and 7000 hours for twin engine types when flying a profile as outlined in Fig X, if you see what I mean?. Why the two different figures for life? Because, for one reason or the other, the single engine type won’t last much longer than that in low level fighter missions!

I have a charitable explanation for the 73 pages of “bumpf”. It is quite possible that someone in DASR, Air HQ  got a “rocket” for the previous RFI which I believe was just one page. There seems to be an extremist inside Air HQ! Having received the said “rocket” the receptor’s reaction was “All right you so and so of uncertain parentage, if it is length you want try ploughing through this!” In a way I rather hope that is the case because it would show that all is well with the Air Force.

Style is subjective, but it is a matter of concern when an endurance, with flight refueling, of ten hours is being called for with night capable FR! If all this capability came for free and with no penalty in terms of performance then one could let that pass and pity the aircrew but otherwise this is  serious outrage. What kind of mission are we having in mind when we are asking for this capability? Has that been requested/approved by the cabinet? Or was it put in to favour a particular type? Only the Americans will have the need, specify or have this kind of capability? If it is only to join “Red Flag” then it will be cheaper to route through Cairo and Paris. Cairo is, alas, no longer what it used to be but I am sure the aircrew would endure manfully the boredom of being stranded in Paris for the whole night!

The second objection is that this RFI does not seem to be any different for what would have been released for the heavy fighter such as the SU 30 MKI or the SU 35. It seems illogical that we take on the complexity of inducting three types of combat aircraft – Heavy/MMRCA/LWF from three different countries and not reap the benefits. The greater effort of keeping three types in service must be compensated by having sharply “optimized for the role” kind of capabilities. All the sorties will not demand the same kind of capability. Particularly for the light weight types the percentage of war load/MTOW load goes down sharply. Therefore equipment levels have to be carefully pared to retain performance and range-payload. We need a large air force but we cannot have it by having a series of Bonsai –as in Japanese gardening- aircraft.

The other idea would be to have a “stripped to essentials” airframe basic equipment for VFR short range strike against average “non Bekaa Valley” targets with ground based /AWACS control) and have fairly comprehensive sets of mission packs carrying just the few sensors required for the more exotic missions. The argument is that any capability that is not required in a mission is a handicap of that mission. The example of the MiG 21s used for cratering Tejgaon in ’71 can be cited. The pilots would have much appreciated if they didn’t have the radar which was never needed but had more fuel and two 30mm NR revolver cannon which the MiG21PF originally had and which were deleted in the FL and later sorely missed.

Transfer of Technology

More than one third of the RFI, about 26 pages covers the wish list of Technology transfers. It covers everything but the proverbial kitchen sink. The following were my reactions:

i)                    TOT does not come for free. It will pad up the bills and the commissions but is it relevant to us.  For example the Technologies for Blisks and Single crystal blades (SCB) has been asked for. Suppose we get them where is the engine programme to use the TOT? Will an engine development programme be funded keeping in mind the negligently planned Kaveri/GTX programmes? Do we have the engine test beds? A Blisk is not an unmixed blessing. At the cost of more expensive FOD repairs it gives maybe a 2-3 % improvement in compressor performance- once you have reached the 80-85% ( for example) compressor efficiency ranges. If we are at say 55% efficiency we better spend effort trying to get the efficiency up to scratch. Acquiring technology without sanctioned plans to use it reveals callousness with funds and an un engineering like expectation that all we need to get a serviceable engine is to cram it with high technology stuff.

ii)                  The same applies to the SCB. This gives better sfc as well as longer TBOs. It is essential for an “expeditionary” air force like the USAF even in peacetime because of their need to “transfer of assets to various theaters”. We have no ambitions to global policing. We can have a matching if not identical capability usually by degrading TBO. There are more ways of killing a cat than drowning it in cream! Why are we steeplechasing something we do not just now need? The Chinese engines DO NOT match the US engines in terms of TBO and TTL but in terms of Thrust to Weight they are probably close enough to the US engines. The Chinese are not losing too much sleep with such a situation because they have designed their airframes for quick engine change and employing more people- they can afford that sensible solution. In the meantime they beaver away, sometimes by fair means, to improve the ever narrowing menu of lacunae in their engines.

New readers may wish to read “The Lessons of the Kaveri” in Vayu III/2014 for more on our engine options.

It would be cheaper and more certain if we spend a decimal fraction of the expected TOT costs and without “socialist” bias, fund companies that are already in this approximate field and with the right spirit – for blisks Bharat Forge comes to mind -and get them to do a”cold” i.e. non flying, blisk of the LP spool of the RD 33 or Kaveri compressor and measure the aerodynamic efficiencies and creep and other relevant properties as well as the problems of manufacture and heat treatment. Just that- not a ten years pie in the sky programme. We will learn, at very low costs heaps more than getting “Blisks for Dummies” in three volumes as I suspect is the hopeful expectation. We should remember our past dismal track record where the taxpayer paid good money to get TOT which was then allowed to be wasted down the drain.

i)                    The HDW submarine programme ended and we had no follow up programme. It was only when the entire workforce at MDL had retired that people woke up to the need to replenish our submarine fleet. Of course the TOT had to be paid for again.

ii)                  TOT was paid for the Bofors FH 77 155/37 technology. Then we sat on those drawings for thirty years- until the artillery requirement had changed to 155/52 before suddenly waking up with a start. Perhaps the hope was for another round of TOT! The change was in another magnitude of machining, heat treatment and propellant technology. In the interim what happened? Firstly we did not build one single howitzer to those drawings for which we had paid TOT. Whilst our people sat on the Bofors drawing there was a separate induction of light weight howitzers- something which we could have cobbled together from the TOT if we had let our engineers loose with a brief and a little funding. An aluminum gun carriage was a possible solution at a fraction of the cost even if the carriages had to be remanufactured more often. Did anyone responsible even think? If “no” why not? Even if it failed- in a short period experiment- we would learn.

iii)                Why is it invariably that feasible projects are never funded and the less feasible the project the more sustained support. Who sanctions these open ended projects and why are they condoned?

Unless this disconnect is removed TOT would only waste money. TOT does not happen. The fact that Jubbalpore factory could get out the 155/46 calibre gun out in a commendable short time indicates that there is the ability to “figure things out” at the rank and file level. If one can’t then one should not call oneself an Engineer but an “Engineering degree holder”! There is a difference between the two.

Finally I have a fundamental doubt about buying TOT. The Chinese have an embarrassing trade surplus with the US about which the US complains. Why is it not that the US sell and the Chinese just buy the TOT. Perhaps the Chinese enjoy Industrial espionage or do it just for the sport of it.

The cost of the horses

If wishes were horses beggars would ride!

The cost of the buy without TOT It is currently at $ 18,000/kg X 8000kgs./aircraft X Rs 66/$ X 110  that works out Rs. 104540 crores upfront to buy and at least another Rs.3,12,632 crores to keep them in service for just the next twelve years at 225 hrs per airframe per year. ?  This does not include the flight refuellers (see ten hrs sorties as referred above) and AWACS as will be required to make the BVRs work properly. Given that sanctioning a paltry Rs. 6600 crores to modify pensions to OROP took a mere 42 years it is clear that we are not going to go anywhere in a hurry as regards the MMRCA.

 Those prices are if we buy the whole lot from abroad. If we make the mistake of making it in the Government Factories it is likely to go up by another forty nine percent. In the case of the Sukhois that HAL built even if we accept that HAL costs should only equal and not be less than Russian costs we have lost 18,700 crores. Any wonder why we don’t have money for the Forces? Why do we continue with this wastage when “saving foreign exchange “the old explanation holds no water today?

One small but encouraging point is that there is no “bobbery” (Hobson Jobson Baap Rey! –an exclamation of awe and shock) about AOA that great requirement of a decade ago. If not by oversight it is good that we are not letting the ghost of the Phantom II’s spinning characteristics wag us anymore.

To sum up. This is an RFI produced by the IAF working in isolation. It is a “wrong” RFI because it is for an “expeditionary” Air Force. What we need is a self Defence Air Force. We need a large Air Force but this is not the way we will get there.

The plan(c)e of Wails  ( excuse the lisp!)

Digressing  for a moment to the LCA- the delays in which has perhaps got us where we are- seeking a face saving solution by labeling a LCA replacement/ supplement programme  as the MMRCA- we see the same encircling gloom. The aircraft has more than one IOC and the FOC is “just around the (by now perennial!) Corner”. The production line has been set up and augmented to cater to eleven aircraft per year. Can we expect we shall have two fully equipped squadrons (never mind if it is to FOC1 as seems to be the fashion with this project- standard) by September 2019 and four squadrons by September 2021. That should be possible but to believe that would be, like a second marriage, a triumph of Hope over Experience. My prediction is that we will get perhaps four aircraft by the end of this financial year. If there is a fifth it will be delivered on 29^th March 2019 at 23 hrs so that it can be said that five were delivered in 2018-2019. One speaks only from past experience.

The LCA situation continues to be dismal and I will share my reasons for being gloomy about any sudden improvements in this regard if only so that you will know how much salt you will take with my assessment.

i)                    The aircraft will not meet it’s speed and energy related performance parameters. The aircraft is claimed to be supersonic at sea level but there has been persistent reports that the aircraft is not meeting its Mach 1.6 max speed which is one of the reason for holding up the FOC. In my experience an aircraft that does Mach 1.1-1.2 at SL will do Mach 1.6 at the tropopause. I have always been skeptical of the drag of the airframe. Mind you I would value transonic acceleration rather than the max straight line speed. Readers are referred to Vayu I/2015 The LCA… beloved aircraft or lemon?”……for a more complete exposition.

ii)                  During the Second World War the Russians found that they could improve the speed of the Ilyushin IL2 M3 Shturmovik by about 32 kmph on a top speed of 400 kmph by improving the fit and finish of hatches, covers, gaps between the control surfaces etc. I was reminded of this when I was examining the picture on the cover of Vayu V/2017 of an LCA. My interest was caught by the pattern of light reflecting on the upper mid fuselage /wing root area. The light pattern indicates the presence of an irregular large kidney shaped depression of poor finish in that area. It is fatal to performance. I cannot think of any excuse for that. This is on a LSP aircraft not an early TD series. I do not believe that the LCA  programme has any engineer in any responsible position or else one would not get to see such shoddy work.

iii)                There has been some mild cheering about the move of nine LCAs to Sulur. It is being hailed as a proof that the programme is finally out of the woods and the aircraft is “operational”. I too would like to believe that but it does not square up with common sense. Here we have the MiG 21s requiring to be carefully looked at for signs of popped rivets and cracks and no doubt spares are no longer as plentiful as they were sixty years ago and here we are sending it “red hot “ replacement to the deep South. There have been no reports of swarms of people invading the Coromandel Coast threatening to set up laundries and dentist shops. So why? Is it that the aircraft has been declared “fit for service” as a point of honour (Why? Whose?) but the Air Force does not want its forward bases and hardened shelters cluttered with a operationally useless type. Sulur is a good place where the Aircraft can be parked without harming themselves or the Air force. Please base the aircraft at Halwara, Hasimara or Nal before we roll out the barrel.

iv)                 The aircraft has flown 1000 sorties with 45 squadron. The usage rate works out to roughly 64.9 hours/aircraft / year which is half of the 126 hours/aircraft/year of the FC17. The RFI expects an average utilization rate of 225hrs/ aircraft /year.

v)                  The reports of the pilots being delighted with handling and the cockpit interface etc is no consolation to the IAF. Even if we get 100 out of 100 in these areas the aircraft is still a lemon. The Morane Saulnier MS 406 was a very pleasant and nice to handle aircraft but it simply did not match up to the ME 109.

At this point several questions surface.

The first is why is this periodic “blooming” of the MMRCA requirement e.g. 2001, 2007,2017, 2018 etc and how can something “urgent” continue to be deferred. My construct is that the MMRCA is the dog that is being wagged by the LCA tail and to mix several metaphors we get involved in chasing the MMRCA wild goose round and round the mulberry bush. We are in a crisis because of the continued failure of the LCA programme. If we had ten squadrons of LCA in service and more in the pipeline the MMRCA deal would not have verged on the “compelling circumstances” situation. To break this circle we need to tackle the LCA problem first. This programme is where it is because generations of Politicians could not care less.

The LCA is unlikely to be a top ranking aircraft but it can be made serviceable if we break with the past thinking. The political leadership must hammer out a compromise between the user’s expectations and the designer’s capabilities within the restrictions imposed by the unfortunate tailless delta configuration. Having got that compromise the production has to be ramped up to about forty aircraft per annum. The LCA/Mig 21 replacement is the critical shortage in the IAF’s inventory and a production line set up for thirteen airframes can also do forty. In any case we have nothing better. Air Marshal Tipnis said before Kargil “We will have to fight with what we have”. Kargil was  twenty years ago. We cannot be ,like Ethelred, continue to be Unready! This time we expect the guilty to hang- if only to encourage the others

The second question is why is it that we have a specification that seems to be for “an expeditionary Airforce”?  That is because only the Air Force wrote it out. Whilst the Raisina Babus vapour that war is too serious a business to be left to the Generals they evidently have loftier things to do. Our planning should be a joint effort between the Military and the Bureaucracy presided over by the Political Leadership. We enjoy an enormous advantage in that we are not expedition minded. Our war planning for the three weeks war can go into very precise details, targets, times, sortie rates, losses squadron cycles.  Our adversaries cannot create “Bekaa Valley” all along a 4000 km. front. So we should have some squadrons of “Bekaa Capable” and many squadrons of Tropical VFR combat capable squadrons. It will be a big relief in terms of budget and technology and “do-ability”.

The third and most damnning question is that why for a most crucial requirement there is not even one Indian vendor bidding? There is good money and we are nothing if not enterprising. For this we have to go into the politics so batten your hatches- I will be concise..

Some researchers hold that during the First World War- around 1916 to be more precise it became clear to the Financiers of the British Empire that India’s independence was inevitable and the new nations Industry would be a considerable threat to their investments worldwide. To safeguard their interests they started several processes aimed at reducing the efficiency of the Indian economy. These included the fracturing of the market and long established supply chains by Partition and encouragement of secession. Post Independence regime changes in Pakistan and Bangladesh prevented commercial reconsolidation of the fractured markets. The excellent education system, once vaunted to be second only to Oxford and Cambridge were politicized to its present mediocrity. For hobbling the Industry in particular there was a strong movement for a “socialist pattern of Society” in some of the UK Universities and their Indian acolytes. Unfortunately this got an ill considered support from our then inexperienced Leadership. The proposed Socialist pattern of society was a regime almost Soviet in its rigidity and central authority and significantly never allowed to be applied in the country of its origin.

The espousal of a “socialist pattern of society” in the garb of welfare for the masses had to characteristics:

i)                    It allowed a relatively small number of people in power to stifle the inherent enterprise of the people.

ii)                  By a “dog in the manger “ policy the Government created  big “no fly zones” where, illogically ,in an era of shortage of capital and management skills, private capital was shut out. When licenses were given the permitted production rate was always and unfailingly below the level to make the product globally competitive.

Just how crippling this policy was and what opportunity was lost can be gauged by examining the decline of Air India .Under JRD Tata it was a prized airline. It is now unsaleable.

iii)                The opposite and happy example is the Indian Automotive industry which pre liberalization produced a very limited variety of models of unfailing bad quality. Volume wise it was nowhere. It is today the fifth largest producer in the world exporting to several countries with a fairly good design capabilities and in some segments it is the largest producer in the world. To note with pride is that India was the only country where the home grown products were able to fend off the challenge of Japanese competition. Usually the Japanese annihilate the local industry.

      The teeth of the Elephant

I will now begin with a scenario. We have fought our 2 front three weeks war. Our losses will be around 200 aircraft lost and another 80 or so are being dragged back to the BRDOs to be repaired. They will be there for the next six months before starting to trickle back. If the adversary were to realize that thanks to our numbers we have been able to rotate our squadrons and having absorbed the lessons- retrain our crews. He is aware that after this battering and the loss of some of the cream of our crews our critical close support and strike strength remains effective he may think that discretion is the better part of valour -and not start the fight in the first place. As they say so wisely in Hindustani- “An Elephant has two ( sets of) teeth – one to show and another to eat!”

We are now caught between a rock and a hard place as far as our air strength is concerned. We need a 45-50 combat squadron Air Force not because that number was sanctioned in 1963 but because of the above scenario. The loss of 200 machines can be guaranteed given the single factor of increased effectiveness of SAMs and MANPADS since our conflict in 1971.We need the numbers .

Unfortunately if we go by the RFI we will never have that large force because no country maintains forces of this size using imported equipment. Please name one. Making in India won’t help- thanks to our “socialism” the Government factories will be even more expensive- about 49% is the quoted figure.

Political Leadership –the magic ingredient.

North Korea (NK) is to me a Business School case study of how a totally involved political guidance can maximize slender resources to achieve incredible results. It is certain that the NK missiles are below par in sophistication (pl. note) and their nuclear weapons are equally doubtful The North Koreans have succeeded in being the proverbial Indian folk tale of being the ant in the (US) Elephant’s ear. The magnitude of North Korea’s achievement can be gauged if we remember that North Korea is in terms of size population and resources about the size of the Indian state of Chhattisgarh. It is a little difficult to imagine Dr. Raman Singh, the Chief Minister of Chandigarh keeping the US President sleepless at night.

NK being a totalitarian state has nothing to do with the validity of the example. China ,under Mao , was equally totalitarian but Mao’s obsessive preoccupation of staying meant that the vast Chinese Armed Forces were obsolete. It was under Deng Xiao Ping’s monitoring of the weapons programme that China made rapid strides. Note that in an age of Body bag sensitivity Mao never blinked when dealing with the US. For us the lesson clearly is having large forces with home grown equipment even if slightly below par. With all these widely varied perspectives to the problem we can visualize that the way out is with the political leadership alone. The Leadership must, in the words of Shakuntala’s Dushyant /47 squadron motto live up to ““Karmani Bypritam Dhanehu” - my Bow is bent to its task.

Staking the elephant.

In pre colonial India a Commander signaling his intention to force the issue would tie down the forelegs of his command elephant to stakes driven into the ground. In doing so he exposed himself to the risk of being killed. Warfare being a mind game such an act often had the effect of unnerving his opposition and he would win the field. Political maladroitness has got us here and it is now for the political leadership to stake the elephant.

Pakistan applied the doctrine of “compelling circumstances” to their political life. They do not have a political life. If we apply the doctrine of compelling circumstances to our weapons procurements then we will neither have a weapons Industry nor finally a large armed Forces. The political leadership must reject the doctrine of “compelling necessity” This spectre will continue to haunt unless firmly dismissed. Given the nuclear deterrence no one will overrun Assam or Ladakh. Given Political will it will we need five to ten years to turn the tide as regards weaponry. We are in this dismal spot because our political leaders have almost since Independence never taken a comprehensive interest in matters of defence except as a source of funds.

Nobody can afford large forces with imported weaponry.  

In sum

The RFI reflects the malaise of organization of our overall defence planning. The decision process is narrow liner and vulnerable to a disruptive force however small. Defence plans must be made by the Bureaucracy and the Military under the yoke of the Political Leadership. Once the scenario is clear then our war plans become simpler and more focused and the need for a technology package then becomes affordably reduced. A careful review of the threat may show that the S 400 and bullet proof jackets and night vision equipment may be a compensation for the present weakness in our air strike strength. It will buy us the time.

The quick development of the LCA Mk1 A is the key to the stability of the acquisition process. The present situation cannot just have happened. It was allowed or contrived to degenerate because the Politicians of the day were too preoccupied to monitor and supervise even to the very simplest levels. This needs correction. If we do not get six aircraft by September 2018 the Government must have an internal white paper on the LCA programme. If after Rs 70,000 crores  (PDV) all w e have is nine partly operational aircraft then it requires Political intervention. The cost of the Indian production does not tie up with common sense and indicates the presence of a Tatra like Scam. What is needed is not questions but a scrutiny.

It would be willful neglect on the part of the Government if it makes the LCA mk2 the sole contender for funding. The Honeywell F 124 N powered development of the HF 24 and the GE F 414 powered adaptation of a MiG 27 ( No VG, radar Nose ) are not only viable but being proven airframes are closer to the ASR for the Mk.2 than the LCA Mk1. Their airframes are proven and have the room for all the avionics that the IAF insist on asking.  The bonus will be certainty of time scales and the ability to “tweak” the design to perfection. BRD Nashik /Air HQ can do the initial project studies for the MiG 27/F414. The LCA Mk2 must be paced if it is to deliver.

If we are forced to acquire the MMRCA from outside for factors unknown buy the cheapest and smallest- size is the LCA’s only considerable advantage. If the smallest is not the cheapest detune the equipment fit- VFR tropical warfare rather than Bekaa Valley- until it is the cheapest! Or buy the cheapest! For our needs they are all as alike as peas in a pod.

Every time we have come to the edge of the woods we have guided ourselves back to the deep woods. Only strong political will and direction – like Deng Xiao Ping of China- can change things.

Let them keep “Abide with me” for ceremonies. For the Defence Industries the tune must change to “Kadam Kadm baraye Ja” – March! March! Forward March!