The assessment of a rival’s warplane suffers from a
primary lacunae in that the information is secret. There is perforce reliance
on secondary sources but this is inevitably heavily dosed with rivalry, jealousy,
envy, disdain, NIH ( not invented here!) racialism and similar human failings.
The task therefore becomes difficult and the output subjective. To illustrate
my observation I will mention the case of two very well known warplanes.
The existence of the Mitsubishi Reisen ( Zero) first
came into US knowledge almost a year before Pearl Harbour. The American
Volunteer Group (AVG) Flying Tigers sent back reports from China of an
astonishing Japanese fighter with unimaginable maneuverability and range. The
US experts discounted these frontline reports because such a fighter could not
exist. One can sympathize with the experts. Going by their lights such as
aeroplane could not be designed. They did not know that the Japanese had got
rid of everything which the West would consider “essential”- armour, bullet
proof windscreen, self sealing tanks radios etc to produce the ultimate
dogfighter that swept everything before it. It is an illustration of how human
emotions cloud judgment that when the first wrecks were examined after Pearl
Harbour much time was spent and much evident satisfaction gained on “identifying” what part of the Zero was
copied from which American aircraft! In fact this copy allegation was so
sustained that much later, Jiro Hirokoshi, the Zero’s Chief Designer was to
say, perhaps with testiness, Japanese style “The Zero was a copy of all the
aircraft before it!” Even today there is a persistent view that the Zero had
erred by sacrificing protection for performance. This misses an important point.
Battle damage resistance would have improved pilot survivality but given the
Zero’s phenomenal long range and the fact that it operated over the ocean and
over tropical jungles did Japan have the resources to ensure pilot recovery? Without
pilot recovery battle damage resistance is less meaningful. Note that when the
fighting was over the homeland the later versions of the Zero was given a fair
measure of battle damage resistance- it was not all Bushido and Banzai as is
popularly believed. The real weakness in the Zero was it had to fight an enemy
industrially ten times as big. Putting it in another way if Japan had the
Corsair and the Hellcat and it was the US which had the Zero the outcome would
still be the same. This, by the way, is an argument for maintaining large
forces. It pays on the long run.
One would think that things would have improved with
time but the MiG 21 case is illustrative. To the Indian Air Force used to the
fit and finish of the Mystere IVA, the MiG 21was “brute force supersonics”
possibly because it was at the time of its induction the most powerful fighter
in IAF service. The truth is both the MiG 21 and the Su7 were the lowest
powered aircraft in their categories though one must add the Soviet aircraft
often had no exact equivalent because they were designed for different
scenarios. In 1966 an Iraqi MiG 21 F 13 defected to Israel and very soon
afterwards a leading US Aviation Magazine carried a very detailed examination
of the aircraft. Much of the focus was on the poor fit and finish of the aircraft
and the mushroom head rivets ( discoloured) used in the rear fuselage. The
three shock two position translating cone intake ( the mighty EE Lightning had
a fixed cone and encountered intake buzz problems during development) and the
semi encapsulated SK ejection seat ( surely the best for high altitude
supersonic ejection) must have been covered but the overriding impression one
carried away was of gaps and discoloured rivets on the aeronautical equivalent
of a combine harvester. Generally the MiG 21 s lack of
F104 and F4 Phantoms level of avionics and long range missiles were disparaged.
Unfortunately the Viertnam War started in earnest soon after and it was
the Americans who had to go back to school- the excellent Red Flag ,the F 15
and F 16 being a typical energetic US
effort to correct things.
The point of citing the above is to accept that
assessing a rival’s warplane is difficult not only because of the lack of
information but also because of the “schooling” one has gone through. I sometimes envy the Chinese in that they generally
know less English and being “unschooled” look at things in their own pragmatic
Chinese way.
With that as
both a caution and as disclaiming any infallibility the following is a very
personal assessment of the Sino /Pak JF 17.
Enter
the (JF 17) Dragon
Wikepedia
carries a review of the JF 17 Xiaolong
( Fierce Dragon) with several pages of references. The figures cited below are
drawn from this review and I will presume that the reader has access to the Net
to avoid total repetition. I am therefore confining myself to a commentary.
Because both aircraft originated as MiG 21 replacements comparison with the LCA
is inevitable.
The Chinese
have made so many MiG 21 based derivatives that one can be forgiven for
initially thinking it was yet another derivative with a nose job like the Qiang
JiJi 5 ,surely one of the ugliest jet as I ever wish to see. This impression is
quickly corrected by looking at the Table.
The JF 17 is no MiG 21 clone. It is altogether a more
potent aircraft, reminiscent of the Northrop F 20 Tigershark. Though Yang Wei, the Chief Designer, did not have access
to the F 20 he may have had opportunity to examine ex Vietnam Air Force F 5A aircraft
or airframes and why not-only an arrogant fool will not “flatter” a good piece
of engineering by imitating? Mitchell of Spitfire fame was “inspired” by the
Heinkel He 70 Blitz’s graceful lines and Yang Wei may have been similarly
“inspired” by Welko Gasich/Lee Begin’s work on the F5/F20 series. Northrop of
course threw the game away by adding 80% more power and 20% more weight without
changing the wing which remained the same as the F5 series. The figures of the
wing loading speak for themselves. Digressing for a moment one sees the same
reluctance in BAe to design a proper light strike aircraft using perhaps the
Hawk systems in a Gnat derived airframe ( see Vayu III/2016- Going against the
Wind) instead of trying to fob off native Air Forces with an inappropriate
airframe too big for the job.
It would seem that the JF 17’s able Chief Designer Yang Wei carefully studied the F 20 concepts and made very well thought out “nips and tucks” type bespoke tailoring of the F20 design so that the JF 17 did not carry an extra ounce of fat or skin. Comparing the lengths the JF 17 is 0.53 mts longer but that is largely the difference between the F 404 and the RD 33 engine lengths. The empty weight of the JF 17 is 622 kgs. heavier but again if you factor in the weight differences of the two engine types and the additional 5.8 sq.mts of wing area that the Sino/Pak fighter carries the weight is commendable. The weights indicate that either the weight control supervision on the JF 17 was up to US/International design standards or Shri Wang Wei had enough domain expertise to tell the powerful PLAFAF faction where they got off regarding equipment fit standards of the JF 17! One can recount that when the US Navy wanted any additional equipment on the little A4, Douglas’s Ed Heinmann would reputedly take off fuel of weight equal to the additional equipment requested. Of such stories is aviation is made. One final point on weights that should make us think: The JF 17 is a larger aeroplane with a heavier engine and with an all metal structure and yet it is “as near as dammit” the same weight as the largely composite and smaller LCA Mk 1. That is an indication of how much we have erred and how much we can correct.
It would seem that the JF 17’s able Chief Designer Yang Wei carefully studied the F 20 concepts and made very well thought out “nips and tucks” type bespoke tailoring of the F20 design so that the JF 17 did not carry an extra ounce of fat or skin. Comparing the lengths the JF 17 is 0.53 mts longer but that is largely the difference between the F 404 and the RD 33 engine lengths. The empty weight of the JF 17 is 622 kgs. heavier but again if you factor in the weight differences of the two engine types and the additional 5.8 sq.mts of wing area that the Sino/Pak fighter carries the weight is commendable. The weights indicate that either the weight control supervision on the JF 17 was up to US/International design standards or Shri Wang Wei had enough domain expertise to tell the powerful PLAFAF faction where they got off regarding equipment fit standards of the JF 17! One can recount that when the US Navy wanted any additional equipment on the little A4, Douglas’s Ed Heinmann would reputedly take off fuel of weight equal to the additional equipment requested. Of such stories is aviation is made. One final point on weights that should make us think: The JF 17 is a larger aeroplane with a heavier engine and with an all metal structure and yet it is “as near as dammit” the same weight as the largely composite and smaller LCA Mk 1. That is an indication of how much we have erred and how much we can correct.
Having accomplished his weight control Wang Wei pulled
off the first of his two coups de main
in that the generally conservative approach to the Northrop- like design was
modified to a mid wing layout of increased wing area. Despite the weight
penalty of longer u/c struts and ring frames to carry through the wing bending
loads- an additional 42 kilos somehow comes to mind for the frames-it cured
several big problems. The F 20 suffered in that though the warload was increased by twenty percent the low wing
meant that fitting the store and the Ground clearance certifications must have
been nail biting. The mid wing of the JF 17 avoided this easily and the larger
wing area meant that the high induced drag of the F 20’ in high “g” turn and
the increased CDo caused by the higher AoA, was lowered and dog
fighting and general handling improved significantly. The F 20 gave the later F
16s a hard time during fly off competition and the JF 17 should be very much
better. One will also note that sweet handling aircraft e.g. Hunter, MiG 21 and
the Lightning were mid wing layouts which reduces or eliminates roll coupling
and the JF 17 is a beneficiary. The second of his “coups de Main” was the introduction of the DSI after seven years of
parallel preliminary work. DSI reduced weight and drag. Summing up: a very competent airframe has been designed on the
lines of the Northrop F 20 but as with the F22/F31 resemblance the Chinese
design somehow manages to look more elegant and dainty! There has been some
gloating references on the Indian Net circles to the fact that Yang Wei has
been recently severely criticized for
the shortcomings of the J 20 ( AMCA
team beware!).The Gloaters have missed the significant point. Weapons
development Programmes are of National Importance and there is no room for
fellowship if things are not delivered. “You fail; you go” is the grim rule for
running successful programmes-outside of India.
Programme
Management: Hare and Tortoise
The Diagram 1 shows the difference between the
timelines of the JF 17 and the LCA. The Sino/Pak team started eight years after us and reached where we are today i.e. a
handling flight of three aircraft ten
years ago (nota bene!). To rub
the salt in properly they did it at one third
to one fifth the cost calculated at Present Day Value PDV. Below is my conjecture
as to how they did it:
i)
They chose an utterly conventional layout.
That way they could “decouple” any delay of FBW development.
ii)
They chose no “glamorous” technology and
were almost sanction proof from the word go. Being all metal the prototypes
could be built faster- the shop floor people were dealing with a material they
knew from infancy- and also airframes could be modified faster if things did
not work out as predicted. Remembering Boeing’s problems with production of the
787’s composites it is clear that the Chinese by choosing all metal could focus
entirely on the airframe development without being harassed by how to do it. As they say in the
backwoods “if you are up to your ass in alligators it is difficult to remember
that what you had actually set out to do is to drain the swamp!”
iii)
The Chinese chose a pitch only FBW.
This is less “advanced” than a four channel all axis FBW system.There is a size
limit below which FBW becomes “doubtful”. To illustrate: would you fit FBW onto
a Cessna 172 club trainer? Theoretically yes but in actuality the FBW weight
and complexity would kill the bird. In my view an aircraft like the LCA is just
teetering on the brink of this size limit. The “pitch
only” FBW. This is a very good example of “engineering” approach. If you think about it, pitch control
benefits maximum from FBW in reducing trim drag; roll and yaw have less scope
for “improvements” in “performance”. The
Chinese solution is not “brochure glamourous” or exciting but as the inventors
of the Panhard-Levassor gearbox said so long ago “C’est brutal mais ce Marche!”
– It is rough but it works! As if to add insult to our Injury the Chinese the
FBW software was written in C++ and not the more elegant ADA language. The Chinese
have reached a stage where they are very respectfully examining what is going
on and then instead of being overawed they are doing there own thing. It is
this arrogant (and I use it as a compliment!) self confidence that must be
noted carefully in assessing any Chinese defence technology product.
The emphasis in flying
the thing!
The
Chinese flew the first prototype on 25 August 2003 i.e. within four years of
funds being sanctioned. They had little faith in that if you calculated enough
you would get the thing right first time! Once the third prototype (9/04/2004)
was flying they built another three introducing a modified LERX (which needed
enlarging) an enlarged Inlet (the RD 33 was smoking like a juvenile
delinquent!) and the second significant improvement, a diverter less intake
(DSI) with the first modified prototype
flying on 28/04/2006. It must be acknowledged, howsoever grudgingly, the
Chinese/Pakistani team got their fighter in
Squadron service in two iterations, six prototypes and within seven years
of funding. The alarm bells are ringing here!
We are being out developed and the advantage of a big economy is being
neutralized by Pakistan through sheer efficiency and better organization!
The
LCA Mk 1 still needs major redesign about 35-40% before
it will be fit for service. I guess that the slow production is a cover to buy
time to effect the changes. Those readers who have seen the dramatic
cover of Vayu I/2017 with the LCA will have noticed and disapproved of the deep
boundary layer diverter plates and the bleed off channels (which would have
reduced the local lift fields). The Chinese were working on the DSI since 1997
and introduced it in 2004 claiming reduction in weight, cost and drag.
Seventeen years after the first flight the LCA fore fuselage and the merging of
the intake bulges with the centre fuselage still
requires considerable refining. It is bemusing to compare with the
undershot of the JF 17 (Vayu III/2016 p 94). Similarly if one compares the
front views of the two aircraft the LCA’s excess of reentrant corners and deep
channels indicate excess wetted areas and drags. Out of curiosity I estimated
the distance from the rear pressure bulkhead and the tip of the radome for the
two aircraft and the JF 17’s figures are 5382 mm compared to the LCA’s 4661 mm.
If correct it indicates the effort and care taken ab initio in getting the forebody drag right. Visually the cross sections
of the LCA’s forebody have a squarer section compared to the JF 17s and this increased
cross section will tell on the transonic drag. Incidentally the JF 17’s radome works out to
690mm compared to 648mm of the LCA, both in the plane of the antennae but the
longer nose length compensates.
The Avionics
Reading
so far one would think it was the Chinese who had done everything but that
would be injustice to Pakistan’s contribution. Though clearly the Chinese were
in the driver’s seat w.r.t. the airframe, Pakistan played a very competent and
independent role in the development of the JF 17 particularly in customizing
the aircraft for PAF use. Using it’s better networking and contacts with the
West, Pakistan took what amounted to an independent charge of the avionics
development for its aircraft, the Chinese going in for their own aggregates
which were always on offer to Pakistan. It is noteworthy for example that
Pakistan chose a Martin Baker PK 16LE seat over the Chinese model. Though the
Chinese had launched the JF 17 project in 1991 Pakistan came on board in 1995
and the funding for the actual aircraft development was signed as a contract in
1999. Hit by sanctions- as with us-the Chinese/Pakistan- decided to decouple
the avionics development in 1999 and it speaks well of the level of teamwork
and the “can do” spirit that both sides were willing to re-engineer the design
as and when needed. It will again be noted that choosing an all metal structure
for prototypes must have been a great help Today ,with its West Asian
connections Pakistan or perhaps the PAF is an “owner “ of the Project and bids
fair to do a good job of Marketing. They did what we should have done with the
PAKFA. Given our experience with the DARIN mods, clearly the expertise and
ability were not lacking; aims and organization were.
The
JF 17s Blocks 1&2 equipment fit is more than adequate for the job- HOTAS, MFD/EFIS,
Holographic HUD, HUMS, VHF,UHF, ATE. The leading edge and trailing edge flaps
are computer controlled to ensure controllability at high AoA. The FBW of production machines has quadruplex FBW
in pitch and duplex in roll and yaw. The defensive aids include RWR, MAWS with
3600 scan, chaff flare dispenser and there is a provision for a
jammer. Block 3 design was finalized in September 2016. The only sardonic cheer
for us is having got a decent fit the PAF is now trying to load it with
“goodies” such as IR targeting systems etc. God speed is my wish!
Propulsion
Soviet
origin engines were always derided in the West. One remembers that when HAL was
trying to see if the HF 24 could be fitted with the Tyumanskii RD 9F the story
(probably untrue) went around that the engine was so surge prone that it would
flame out on the test bench if someone so much as coughed at the other end of
the Bangalore factory. The actual reason was that the Compressor stress limit
was Mach 1.4 and the Soviets point blank (naturally!) refused to redesign it
for Mach 2 which was our “must have” specifications at that point of time!
Shows how fashions dictate “sacred” specifications and opportunities are lost.
I mention the RD 9F because when the Chinese laid their hands on the RD 9F
they re-engineered the first stage of the compressor, put in a variable angle
inlet stator, completely redesigned the hot section and put in a new
afterburner stabilizer of reduced losses. It is possible that the variable
inlet stator details were inspired by the close examination of the wrecked J
79s available to the Chinese during the Vietnam era. The
fact is that the Chinese Wopen 6 of the F6 fighters did not give the PAF any
more than the usual problems in service. This tradition of sensible engineering
to improve a base product means that the Taihang
WS 13 based on the RD 93 will probably emerge an acceptable engine though it
may not have the 4000 hr service life demanded of Western engines. Such design
targets are dishonest for countries like us. It is much better to design for
quick engine change.
The cost and the prices
Cost
consciousness is important because if there is a significant lowering in the
cost of projects as has happened with the JF 17 , it means that there is more
money to go around for other projects- bullet proof jackets or Infantry assist
vehicles for example. Unchecked spending without results can cause a ‘drought”
which will wither other possible and vital projects. The current asking price
for the JF 17 is roughly $25 M which works out to $3800/kg compared to the
$17,000-$21,000 per kg for current Western aircraft. The usual explanation is
that these prices are “political/friendship” prices. This is wrong. One’s own
considerable experience in the Industry confirms the following:
a) The
only cost really known for certain is the RM (raw materials) and the BOC (bought
out complete) costs.
b) When
it comes to the labour costs escalation starts from the shop floor supervisor and goes right up the chain, though
everyone concerned will scream blue murder and horror at the merest suggestion
of downwards revisions.
c) When
it comes to overheads it runs riot and again figures are padded up just to be
safe. For PSU’s this practice is safe but drives
up project costs which finally affect local development.
d) In
technology transfer a five- fold reduction in costs is usual.
This is not the entire picture. Thanks to our colonial
past there were rules that were actually designed so that India would NOT
develop a local aeronautical capability. Some of these were:
i)
An import duty structure that allowed
complete aircraft to be duty free, accessories had a substantial duty and raw
materials were prohibitively taxed.
ii)
A system of “aircraft quality materials”
(AQM) was the norm where the sources of this AQM was invariably from the Home
Country.
These laws and there were
many may or may not have been repealed but the spirit lives on and the
Bureaucracy with nothing to gain and not tamed by the National Leadership, staunchly
obstructs any attempt to reform. One will hear many arguments for maintaining status
quo but there has been little reasoned debate as was done in China and Russia
who do not have this anachronism. Finally with PSU’s operating at a cost plus
15% basis and Western Weapons Suppliers with a stock of horror stories if any
initiative inimical to their interests it is we who have been “schooled “ into
believing what should be the price of warplanes. The Sino Pak prices are realistic
and can be reduced further.
An
estimate of performance
Readers are referred to
Vayu (I/2015) in which I had said that the LCA Mk1 would not be able to outperform
the JF 17 as a fighter. It can be used as a strike aircraft but the outcome of
any dogfight would be in favour of the FC17. I have not seen anything in the
past two years that need me to make a drastic revision of that view. The only parameter
the LCA Mk1 potentially is superior to the JF 17 is in TO performance The JF
17 will need a 25% longer run but even that difference will be reduced as this is
not corrected for the CD0 and the reported lower engine installation
efficiency for the LCA. Readers may raise the point that an aircraft with a
sprightlier take off should perform better but this is not so because at combat
speeds the CDo drag of the LCA will be much higher. Incidentally I
did compare the TO values for the LCA and the Harrier and assuming equally
efficient intake design and CDo s .The LCA should be marginally better/similar
to the Harrier in the STO mode. If the Navy’s disappointment is purely
technical than the weight and drag problem in the LCA is still significant.
What perhaps HAL should
do is to take a deep breath and clean up the entire fore fuselage with
particular attention to the blending of the front fuselage with the mid
fuselage. The clutter is visible from afar and must be worse in detail! If ADA
is ready with the DSI, (only if!) it
should be brought forward. They should do it in metal to begin with so as to
get the prototype right quickly rather than have a nice sub project of making
it in composites! With the clean up and the weight reduced the LCA stands a
very good chance but not as things stand at the moment. C’ne marche pas! The LCA is unlikely to be clear for production
until 2019-2020-if that!
Like the LCA, the JF 17 was a MiG 21 replacement but it is
now something more – nearer to a F 16 supplement at one fifth/one sixth the
price and no threats of being sanctioned in which the PAF has much experience!.It
has potential to become “fashionable” i.e. over equipped .What the JF 17 lacks it
does not need and Pakistan should leave the aircraft well enough alone. Summing
of this section:
i)
The LCA has the potential to have significantly better field performance even at
the current empty weight of 6650kg.
ii)
In low level OAS the small size and the 5%
better fuel fraction (internal fuel/ installed cold thrust) the LCA may be a
better choice.
iii)
In any close combat as of the present the
LCA is inferior. ( See Vayu I/2015)
iv)
Thanks to more power and a bigger ( by
about 52 mm ) antennae the JF 17 is the
better BVR platform but I think it is stupid to fit BVRs simply and just
because they can be fitted on an aircraft of this size. BVR capability is a
specialized capability which ruins general capabilities to install.
v)
The current availability (raw figure) of the JF17 is 113hrs/aircraft/year as of
2016. There has been two accidents in 19,000 hrs which is close to the 1 per
10,000 hrs for “bedded down” equipment and indicates reliability,
vi)
Production has now moved to Block 2 and
about 90 airframes are delivered or on the slipway.
At this point of time the
JF 17 is the better aeroplane and the LCA is not even achieving its potential
in the areas where it has the potential to be better! Sadly the comparisons are
academic. At this point the PAF can fly 200-250 OAS sorties per day on the JF
17. The LCA?
Exports
Any Asian product is bad mouthed. The twelve Hindustan
HT2s supplied to Ghana were routinely disparaged
by the foreign instructors seconded to the NAF. The sturdiness, low prices and
the fact that they served the IAF for over thirty years “faults and all” was
overlooked. The more recent case of the ALH refers. The
Chinese are in a better position. Over the years they have exported fair
numbers to European, African and Asian Customers and have acquired useful
skills in marketing, selling and sustaining
a product on the field. The FC17 has
attracted the attention of about 21 customers with Myanmar, Nigeria and Saudi
Arabia as confirmed customers. The weak link was the RD33/93 engine of Russian
origin but if the Russians refuse the engine because of fears of the JF 17
cannibalizing MiG 29 sales they have little choice because the Chinese will
develop the WS13 Taihang. Even if the TBOs are not quite upto the
‘international standards” their prices will be extremely attractive and
‘international standards” are not an operational necessity. I would
not have minded buying the JF 17 myself. The Chinese have exported over two
thousand aircraft and the FC17 bids fair to add to those numbers and customers
list.
The
reason why
The
JF 17 is either an unremarkable warplane or a coolly brilliant piece of
engineering improvisation superbly managed. The judgment will depend on one’s “schooling”
but what cannot be denied is that the Sino Pak team has raised five squadrons
on the type. There is an old adge “ An
engineer is a person who can do for sixpence which any fool can do for six
shillings”. The JF 17 demonstrates that. The LCA’s so called “technical
superiority” has been its undoing and If we confine ourselves up to correct the
technical shortcomings of the LCA Mk1 then we shall be setting ourselves up to
fail in the AMCA. The present situation is bleak and near collapse. I do not
see any evidence of the energy and the interested management that is the need
of the hour.
The
organization for effective development is not the present topic but that is the crux. What the Sino /Pak
team achieved with the JF 17 they can do in AFVs and submarines and rifles and
every item required in warfare. We shall be out resourced and out timed- and
out gunned! India’s weapons development programmes are in the “fire and forget
“mode which will not work in a hundred years. By preoccupation with other
“priorities” The Politician, the Bureaucracy and the Armed Forces have
abdicated their role of leadership in weapons development to the technocrats..
None of the above, singly, can manage a Weapons anymore than the blind men
could “see” the elephant. Yet the solution lies in them working as a team with
respect for the undoubted competence there is in each organization. Unthinkable
in our bureaucracy dominated committees, Pakistan had serving Air Marshalls in
charge of the project who reported directly to the Air Chief whereas we had the
IAF actually ‘shorted out” so that the LCA project could be “Fast tracked”! The
Cheek of it! Left to themselves the Technical people went on a Technical
Picnic!
The
Armed Forces whose responses have been clumsy and indignant rather than studied and moral (why did it accept pressure when
things were obviously out of control and so much is at stake? Recall Air
Marshall Dowding’s stand just before the Battle of Britain: He stood up to that
old steamroller Churchill. Of course he paid the price but he saved Fighter
Command for the Battle. The Bureaucracy’s sniping of the Military- I think the business about Batmen being one of the latest
must stop or be regulated. If the Batman must go so should the Chuprassi!. This
tribal warfare between the Bureaucracy and the Forces has to be tamed and yoked
by the Political Leadership. The country must form a WEDOG (weapons development
Group) so that realistic threat scenarios are generated for the next say ten
years that we need to become sanctions independent. China used its large Armed
Forces and its nuclear deterrent to buy the ten years it needed. Given our
large armed forces and our nuclear capability we have those ten years. We have
the expertise to do so-if we work in a team. Realistic threat identification
will lead to realistic specifications. Realistic specifications will reduce
technical challenges and prioritize weapons programmes. Close monitoring will
stop shocking wastage and ensure timeliness. We may yet surprise the World.
Table 1.
|
Parameters
|
JF 17
|
F20
|
LCA Mk1
|
F 16
|
F7
|
|
Length
|
14.93
|
14.4
|
13.2
|
14.52
|
13.86
|
|
Target Volume
|
1.34
|
1.03
|
1.0
|
1.44
|
0.866
|
|
Wing Area
|
24.4
|
18.6
|
37
|
27.87
|
23
|
|
Empty Weight
|
6586
|
5964
|
6580
|
6857
|
5275
|
|
Internal Fuel (
KG)
|
2350
|
2450
|
2458
|
3162
|
2080
|
|
Disposable Load
|
5914
|
6510
|
6680
|
9200
|
3825
|
|
Wing Loading Clean/MTO
|
312/ 512
|
485/ 670
|
256/ 356
|
372/ 576
|
306/408
|
|
Fuel Fraction
|
0.45
|
0.5
|
0.502
|
0.47
|
0.47
|
|
Dish Dia.
( estimate)
|
690mm
|
n.a
|
648
|
n.a
|
n.a
|
|
Nose Tip to rear
pressure bulkhead
|
5382
|
n.a.
|
4661
|
n.a.
|
n.a.
|
|
TO Run
|
1.27
|
1.84
|
1.0
|
1.49
|
0.91
|
1.
Pakistan
has an excellent replacement for the F7
2.
The
LCA’s 10% higher disposable load should be noticed. With drag reduction and
weight improvement it should be quite respectable but there is no evidence of
any timely addressing of these long pending tasks.
Table
2: Costs sanctioned ( Rs. Crores unless otherwise stated) and PDV( present day value)
|
Sl
|
Date
|
Amount
|
PDV
|
Remarks
|
|
1
|
1983
|
560
|
17,920
|
|
|
2
|
1993
|
1628
|
16512
|
FSED
|
|
3
|
2001
|
3302
|
15172
|
|
|
4
|
2009
|
2475
|
5305
|
|
|
|
Total
|
|
54,969
|
|
|
JF 17 project
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
1998
|
$ 500M=2250 Crores INR
|
Rs. 13,065
|
Equally shared by Pakistan and China
|
Note:
The above does not include Rs 1729 sanctioned by the Navy ( 2003) for the NLCA
PDV ( Rs. 6512 crores)
This
excludes Rs. 4353 (2432+1921) PDV Rs. 9331 crores sanctioned for LCA MK2.
If
we further ignore the Rs 560 crores sanctioned in 1983 the comparison of costs
on the common base of PDV is:
LCA
( 16512+15172+5305)= 36,989
JF
17 ( 13,065)= 13065
Financially
we are being ‘ resourced” by at a rate of 2.83 :1 at least.
Readers will be interested to compare that the entire XST/F 117
stealth development programme was funded in 1973-1978 to the tune of 4997
crores PDV in small stages to produce the required cutting edge technology
aircraft. Unless financial management is tightened we will not have the funds
for local development.
Prof.Prodyut Das
