Friday, 19 April 2019

Appropriate technology Transport Aircraft- White hope or red herring ?



This has been published by Vayu Aerospace e- version-in March 2019. Below is the original unedited copy. Copyright but may be reproduced for non commercial purposes.

Unlike the design of Military aircraft which is led by the “latest” (i.e. unproven) technology the design of a successful civil aircraft is more hard headed; it is very closely defined by the surface transport speeds, availability, the density of population, the distance between the population nodules, the condition of the economy, the connectivity between the airport and the city centre. These factors are quantifiable. The other factors- the expectations in terms of punctuality, regularity, tolerance to noise, comfort and economy and their relative priorities go beyond statistics and slip into the realms of culture and philosophy. If the East is East then the air transport solutions will also be “Eastern”. The air transport scene has been dominated by the Western paradigm. Asian countries used western equipment to solve a part of their air transport need, there being no equipment to provide an end to end transport solution. Western solutions available e.g. helicopters are infeasible to the point of being “exotic”. The Western designs, whilst acceptable, are definitely sub optimal and “second best” for the Asian market.

Changing economic conditions in India is now opening up a new market. This is a new rather than a competition area and the prospect of collaboration with the West makes commercial sense. New aircraft designs will be needed not only to cater to the expected growth of what the Soviets called the “Selskoe Khozaistanni” ( Rural Economy”)  aircraft but also to replace the Western designs for this genre of aircraft  which will be shortly retired. The market is large.

. The emerging market can be an opportunity also for foreign entrepreneurs to invest in India. The cost of skilled labour is the single largest item of cost in the development and production of aircraft. The Technology for civil aircraft is lower, indeed the basis technology is almost a century old and is well within the existing capability of the Indian Industry which however lack the “know why”. Once Europe had one or more aircraft manufacturer for every letter of the alphabet. There was Zmaz as well as Zlin ! Famous names disappeared as the cost of aircraft development became unviable for the medium and small scale enterprises of Europe. However the “seed” of that ability still exists. Our enterprise and low labour costs together with Western Aviation culture and the exchange rates of the Rupee Western investments would “go” almost ten times more than in their home countries. The picture is exciting.

Whether the potential will be realized will depend on the way the Government of India’s policies are changed. There has been happy change in the recent times but as is said “as much remains to do as has been done”. Since Independence our own Government followed towards the strategic Industries (Weapons and Aviation), a policy that was of an occupying power.  The Imperial Government did not allow Lala Walchand to set up HAL on Imperial Territory, the notorious Industrial Policy resolution of 1956 forbade the manufacture of aircraft by the private sector. In 1945 the German Aerospace companies like Dornier or Messerschmitt went to Spain as the Allied Control Commission forbade the design or manufacture of aircraft in Germany. Our “Liberalization” studiedly avoided this sector.When one of our Industrialists wanted to enter the Light Aviation Industry they found Australia a better country to start despite the obvious advantages of India for that class of aircraft and Australia is not the best example of a nurturing Government. When the excellent Victa Airtourer was beginning to attract worldwide attention it appears that the Australian Parliament actually reduced the import duty of imported competing aircraft. The Australian Company sold out and shifted to New Zealand.

The development of Civil Aviation.
The basis of modern Civil aviation was the technical development of the nuclear bomb carrying intercontinental jet bombers. Amusingly, this bomb carrying technology proved quite amenable to the carrying of tycoons and the glitterati who previously went Cunard or the P&O. Whilst the laws of Physics held the reasonable maximum speed to Mach 0.82-never mind the Boeing Sonic Cruiser cat to Airbus’s A 380 pigeon- advances in engine technology tempted the design and the airline people to move into the mass market changing the entire concept of air travel from earlier one of “Speed and Grace” ( one got an overnight bag on booking the ticket) to “Max Pax.”

 The paradox is that the early inefficient jetliners were profitable whereas the latest equipment of incredible fuel efficiency is causing their operating airlines to go “belly up”. Fuel prices have been identified as a reason for the unprofitability but the underlying reason is really that the earlier equipment specification is being used as a “template” for the mass market. The fuel burn is exceedingly sensitive to speed. A fifteen percent increase in speed requires fifty percent more power and burns thirty percent more fuel over the same sector. The airliners for the mass market are likely to be flying a little too fast to be profitable! For the West there is little choice because of the ground conditions but for Asia we can profit to be different.

The Asian Paradigm
The density of population of India is fifteen times that of the USA and the population nodules are very close. Agricultural land is at a “to die for” premium and new Industry must go to areas now considered “remote”. Consider the case of the traveler who wishes to proceed from Kolkata to Mokukchung. Mokukchung has a population of about 70,000 and several excellent schools. The people of Mokukchung are educated and there is a fair population of English capable, industrially trainable people. The hinterland grows excellent pineapples which can be had, literally for the asking, because there is no market. If transported to Kolkata a load of a thousand pineapples, (1500 kilos, with their tops)  gain Rs. 45,000 in value. It can transform some one’s life. Nothing much happens in Mokukchung because of the difficulty of getting there or getting out once you are there. One takes a turboprop which takes more than an hour, the Jet is about fifteen minutes faster but it does not matter because once at Kohima one has to rely on the surface transport. Mokukchung is about 90 kilometers from Kohima and that can take “the remains of the day”. Our traveler would have been better served if there was the modern equivalent of the Ford Model AT 5 “Tin Goose” which would have wallowed directly into Mokukchung from Kolkata within the time our traveler had come out of Kohima airport. I am being deliberately provocative about suggesting the Ford Model AT 5 because I want to emphasise how little is needed – especially in terms of speed performance – to be effective in Asia.

The cost of the ticket
Edward Hillman, the owner of a bus fleet was, in 1932, also one of the pioneers of the low cost airline. He started by using the De Havilland Fox Moth which carried four passengers plus a pilot at the astonishing economy of 22kW per person. The Fox Moths operated from paddocks, and being simple, required little maintenance. Hillman used retired RAF Sergeant Pilots who flew for lower pay than the Officers. As happens in cases of detailed attention to every aspect of operations, Hillman went from strength to strength and was soon looking for bigger equipment and was in part responsible for the development of the twin engine DH Dragon and the Dragon Rapide. Mr. Hillman may have lacked much of a formal education but he translated his bus fleet experience to low cost air service and the aircraft he chose did not overwhelm him with its technology. Instinctively but unerringly he was tackling and controlling the elements of the cost of an air ticket. These factors are:
i)                    The cost of the aircraft
ii)                  The cost of amortization and finance
iii)                The fuel bill
iv)                The airport charges
v)                  The wages of the crew
vi)                The cost of maintenance
vii)               The cost of sales, marketing and passenger handling.
These are relevant even today and significant in shaping the design of the Asian Transport. A large simple aircraft flying at two hundred knots (360 km.ph) is to be investigated. There is possibility of significant savings in each of the above areas resulting in perhaps halving of the costs!

The price of speed
The cruising speed of the aircraft is closely dictated by the surface transport speed. A rough working figure would be between five and six times the average surface speed (including the “chai” breaks) for a journey. My experience in shuttling between Baroda and Nashik and similar gave me a figure of 50 km.p.h so to be competitive for such ground speeds an aircraft cruising speed must be between 250 and 300 km.p.h. In lands of Autobahns and Freeways the minimum must be close to 500 and 600 km.ph. The sky will not fall if you use a 550 km.p.h aircraft on the Baroda-Nashik sector but you will be burning four times more fuel. The circumventing trick of course is to fly higher but then the aircraft will need pressurization which results in excess weight (the fuselage becomes a large pressure vessel, which is the worst in terms of weight- full pressurization can add up to 45 kg/passenger to the aircraft!) and then there are maintenance   problems, seals, barometric units etc. These are manageable but the idea of a simple large turbine engine Piper Cub concept of aircraft is lost and puts up the costs on Mr. Hillman’s list.  An interesting curiosity is that optimum “low speed” shapes are more “blunt” and compact which lead to significant weight savings for the same “cargo/pax.” volume.

The Airports
India has many landing strips mostly a legacy of WW2. West Bengal for example has thirteen. The Government has taken a programme to update and upgrade these and other existing airports but it would be wise not to rely on such plans. It would be better to carry out a survey of all the airstrips in the country to asses where things stand. One is reminded of Ed Heinmann’s approach to the USN’s request for proposals for a nuclear weapons capable bomber for their planned 100,000 tons super carrier to replace their Forrestals. Heinmann chose to examine what could best be done within the limitations of the Forrestal class and came up with the iconic Douglas Skyhawk. As foreseen by Heinmann the super carriers never came about and the USN learned that whilst the customer has the privilege of always being right they lose nothing by listening to the other chap’s point of view.  

STOL
STOL is a fair substitute for cruising speeds. The West produced some remarkable STOL aircraft e.g. Fiesler Storch and the Westland Lysander. Post war Dornier produced the DO 27, DO28 which were particularly noted for their STOL performance as was the Polish PZL Wilga. The Hunting Scottish Aviation Twin Pioneer is also of interest because despite heavy radial engines it could lift 16 fully equipped troops off aground run of 78 meters from the jungles of Borneo and the hills of Nepal! In India where even expansion of existing airstrips may run into organized (for political gains only) local agitations, we have to look at STOL capabilities quite carefully. The Fairey Rotodyne of 1950,s gave VTOL capability to airliner sized (40-70 pax) capacity and was simpler than the Osprey whose civil version is next thing to be marketed. The Rotodyne project needs a re-look at as noise- a Western concept- is less critical in Asia. Collaboration/ buying of data may be called for. Western Twinjets require around 1024 acres and twin turboprops require around 930 acres. The emphasis on STOL can be judged from these figures- arable land being a “to die for” commodity. A good target would be a STOL 130 pax-er that can operate out of a 500-600 acre paved field.

Cubing out
Western designs have a relatively narrow cabin to reduce drag and as a result these designs have a tendency to “cube out” i.e they can lift the load but it cannot be fitted in the cabin. India being an agricultural country and with increasing stress on “exotic fruits and flowers’ type of agriculture not cubing out may be a significant selling point

Is naething sacred !?
Decades ago a Japanese Company applied modern analytical methods including, allegedly gas chromatography, to to analyse Scotch to come up with a Japanese Whisky that was indistinguishable from “the real McCoy” stuff. If Punch (late and still lamented) is to be believed The Scotsman printed the news with a very plaintive “Is naethin’ sacred? “.
No, nothing is sacred  in the business of strategic technology development and the way it is marketed. We must review the certification norms for Asian conditions.  Are the various civil aircraft certification agencies being scrupulously and impartially fair? Or are there various subconscious agendas? Consider the following:

i)                    In the late sixties there was a huge “to do” about the HAL built Avro’s inability to meet the phase two of the climb out requirements. That this requirement is a safety issue is indisputable. Given India’s high ambient temperatures the engine’s power and the wings lift both suffer by about 7% is also indisputable. It resulted in pressure to reduce the MTO of the Avro 748 which would have impacted on the profitability of the type. I can understand that in Switzerland the requirement would be absolute. But in India? Could the restrictions  been applied to only selected airports? Or was it an effort to keep the market open for imports- which was probably a blessing in disguise- given HAL prices!

ii)                  Western regulations for long insisted on twin engines for any aircraft carrying more than nine passengers and our people nodded in synch. The statistics however showed that there were more fatalities when twins lost an engine because the pilot, under stress, often feathered the surviving engine and the aircraft went in! They say more Canberra crews died practicing engine out approaches then in actual engine out emergencies!
 It is interesting to compare the experience of the Russians with the Antonov AN 2. The DOSAAF regularly would allow the single engine AN2 to amble off with a crew of two, two jump masters and ten parachutists each with two parachute packs plus the odd one or two “observers”! That is a load equivalent of perhaps 18 people! So were the Russians being callous, you know being Slavs and all that? The possible logic is that the AN2 had a controllable minimum speed of 45kts (lost in a fog in mountainous terrain the drill was to just fly at minimum speed!) so the impact energy of the AN2 crash was less than half that of the Western types. Secondly the very capacious fuselage of the AN2 meant getting out was quick and lastly Russia being sparsely populated and flat, chances of a successful emergency landing was quite high. Now for the twist in the tale! After the collapse of the Soviet Union many AN2s ended up in the USA. Given their safety record one would think they would easily get the US certification. Last I heard they did but it was so restrictive ( it had to return to the takeoff airfield at the end of the sortie! ) that commercial use except for parachute jumping  was impossible. People say that it was done to protect the US Light Aviation interests but the only point I want to make is that before we quote anybody’s flight safety rules  as a Father’s unalterable curse let us examine the relevance and the applicability of that rule.

The Dakota Genre
The Dakota is a necessary reference point to the subject. The Dakota was successful not because, as has been suggested, that it was so modern that it stayed relevant for eighty years but because it was superbly appropriate for the 300 km.p.h. cruise speed. Wherever that speed was relevant the Dakota earned its living. The Junkers JU 52 and the Curtis Commando were worthy contemporaries and need study. The JU 52’s demise can be attributed to the German collapse and the consequent lack of spares.  The Curtis C 46 Commando relative obscurity underlines the need to be able to match the needs of each customer closely. The Curtis carried sixty percent more at fifteen percent higher speed but required eighty percent more power ( note well!)  but had only fifty percent more fuel- the design’s capabilities was less “harmonized ”. The Curtis initially also had a reliability problem. The lack of wing fuel tank drain vents meant leaking fuel vapourized and after accumulating sometimes exploded. This led to unexplained loss of aircraft which were blamed on the fuel drums being transported- usually from Assam to China. Little design details matter and knowing how and the why of copying is an instinct to develop.
The Baasler BT 67 is a popular turbine conversion of the Dakota and its sales shows the rightness of the Dakota concept, and the advantages and problems of turbinizing. The PT 6A-67Rs- are almost a ton lighter than the Wrights they replace and these results in CG problems which is restored by putting a 40 inch plug in the fuselage ahead of the leading edge. The changes result as the table 1 shows in a more capable aircraft which is nevertheless still a compromise. It has now too much wing area ; a modern aerofoil would save 60kW.h/hr at cruise and the not quite fully circular fuselage cross section preclude pressurization should the customer wish it.  A new design based on the old Dakota would be a formidable contender.
Post War the victors quickly adopted the vanquished Germans concept of the Autobahns and consequently the airspeeds moved out of the 300km.p.h. regime that was the Dakota’s forte.The so-called Dakota replacements –Avro 748s/ Convairs/Fokker Friendships/Handley Page Heralds were really birds of a different feather. The Dakota, the West declared, could not be replaced.
It was the Soviets who came closest to replacing the Dakota with a simpler, smaller but equally appropriate technology aircraft- the Antonov AN 2. Oleg Antonov’s first design project was a “Chinese” copy of the Fieseler Storch a few examples of which had been presented to the Red Army during the Non Aggression Pact bonhomie of 1939. The Douglas DC 3 had been under license production in the USSR as the Lisunov LI 2. It seems to me that Antonov combined the STOL capabilities and the “bug eye” observation window of the “Storch” with the modern structure, large cabin and and the double freight loading door of the Dakota and creatively added the biplane layout to create a design that demonstrated “STOL equals speed with economy”.

The AN-2 is an obvious anachronism-or is it? An aircraft that remained in production from its inception to the end of the USSR with some 20,000 produced and with continuing efforts (hamstrung by trying to keep the basic airframe intact- rather than using just the philosophy ) to re start production commands respect. To not carefully study the design just because “it’s a biplane” would be to keep a flank exposed. The biplane transport is obsolete in the West but large parts of Asia and India would be relevant to the AN2 philosophy.

Assessing the aircraft
There was an advertisement on the TV some years ago which showed the press conference of a pioneering aviatrix (looked like Amelia Earhart and her Lockheed Orion) and someone in the audience asks “Mileage kitna deti?”- How much mileage does the aircraft give? We value different things. The aircraft has to be assessed not for speed or comfort or ability to operate in Cat III weather but on profitability, utility, versatility, ruggedness and how much money it will make, never mind if the services are irregular during the monsoons, the customers will put up with that if the tickets are affordable for the rest of the year. The table 1 gives a comparison of the operating economics.


The aircraft
The RTA project was planned to compete with the ATR. A snowflake in hell has a better chance!  Suppose your fairy Godmother (mine has indignantly refused!) were to give us the entire drawings, tooling and the DGCA certificate would we be then in a position to become a respectable supplier of this class of aircraft? Immediately questions would rise about the cost of production, delivery rates and their certainty, after sales service and a host of such issues. Would Jet Airways place a big order? Could we stand the price war that the fully depreciated ATR will probably unleash? If the Saras happens will it stand up to the Beechcraft 19D for private airlines orders? These are not discouraging questions. We can never have enough money if we are not going to benefit commercially from our research.

Instead of going bald headed into such (mis) adventures we should look at the niches and the gaps in the product range and develop products that are not possible to be economically produced by the West- simple, labour- rich, low technology aircraft which would break their bank if they tried to compete. India has ninety cities between three million and half a million populations and another hundred with population between half a million and two hundred thousand. All have an agricultural hinterland. The mean distance between the nearest two is around 190 kms. This market is ideal for a series of (relatively) high capacity, mixed freight /passenger near STOL rugged transports different and not competing with any Western product. These would be:

i)                    A  small fifteen seat/ two-and a-half ton single engine utility aircraft between the Cessna Caravan and the Dornier DO 228 with emphasis on the unprepared field/ high altitude capability. About 3000 kms. of our northern borders are at a 2000mts AMSL A biplane with its large light weight wing area and docile handling in confined airspaces might prove the surprising best choice. The Figure 1 shows two configurations.


ii)                  The second niche exists for a 40 seater between the Dornier 228 and the ATR series and we are looking at a kind of a “turbine super-Dakota”.

iii)                The third niche exists as a 6 abreast 150-250 seater twin turboprop – something like the cabin of an Airbus 320 or a Boeing 737 but the entire design is optimized for a cruising of 400 kmph-200 km sectors. The Indian Airlines used to operate a Boeing 737 Calcutta- Ranchi-Patna –Lucknow- Delhi. The many stops meant the advantages of jet speeds were not realized. A large turboprop- partially pressurized, if at all- would certainly be more closely matched to the profile and significantly more economical. The target “audience” is people who now travel such sectors by third AC sleeper. Asia, but not the West, has such a market

iv)                Finally there is a heavy lifter which can be imagined ( if you are old enough!) as a Blackburn Beverly or just imagine a Globemaster II but redesigned for the ability to through load a MBT (T 72/90) or a S 400 system and fly it from Babina or Ambala to Leh or vice versa and designed for sub continental rather than intercontinental ranges. International Air Freighting is growing. It makes little sense to air freight equipment from say the US only thereafter to truck it across the country. There will be a need for a matching heavy but short range air freighting capability.

Since the profitability of the customer will depend on how exactly we can match his needs the approach to the design would be that of a lego brick model with various fuselage cabin lengths, wings areas and undercarriage options would be available so that the offer can be carefully tailored to the needs. The customer will have options of pressurized / partially pressurized and un pressurized fuselages and retractable or fixed undercarriages. It would mean hard but repetitive work at certification. The “pod and twin boom” layout is a very strong contender.

Nec Quis quam Nisi Ajax
The heading roughly means “only Ajax can replace Ajax” or “you can do nothing till Ajax comes”. The Aviation Industry is a high risk high profit “full time” business. It requires all the time, dedication, energy attention, knowledge and efficiency such a business needs. The Soviet Union had it absolutely organized. Their political leaders had seen frontline service; their Military held cabinet ministerial rank and their top engineers held military ranks and senior party positions. It was cohesion, and teamwork knowledge and passion at its productive best. No time was wasted in trying to educate ab initio an intelligent, powerful but skeptical ignoramus “team member”. It explains the excellence and rapidity of Soviet development. Despite professions of equality the performers had no pay bands; all of General Designer Andrei Tupolev’s cheques were unconditionally honoured by the Soviet state. (Apoplexy epidemic in North Block!?)

In the Totalitarian states it was possible for “the man in charge”- e.g. Admiral Gorshkov- the father of the Soviet Navy’s renaissance to stay at the helm for thirty years (he was retired only at his own request at the age of 75.). As a senior “cabinet minister” and political leader he combined job knowledge, national policy and clout in one person. The result was that  the Soviet Navy became a challenge to the mightiest Navy, the USN. The magnitude of the achievement can be gauged by the following. In 1956, the year he took over Nikita Kruschev, seeing some Morskoya Flota sailors in a rowboat on the River Moskva said, half jokingly, “That is our Soviet Navy”. The Russian Navy was in one of its periodic declines. He built it up to its present size in twenty years with the pioneering effort of exporting Soviet naval equipment helping finance a part of his own formidable vision.  

  This continuity is not possible in Western Democracies so they, recognizing reality, hand over the knowledge, passion, and day to day dedication required to run the business to the private sector. An example would the firm of Marcel Bloch which is better known as GA Marcel Dassault . Marcel Dassault (1892-1986) started as a propeller manufacturer in 1913 and went on to manufacture of aircraft during the 1920s. Renaming himself after the Second World War he went on to lead General Aeronautique Marcel Dassault, which achieved brilliant results for its shareholders and France by using fairly basic technology with great élan.  Dassault’s passion was so great that as long as he was alive apparently he did not allow his worthy successor and son, Serge, to run the company! Between the two, father and son, we are seeing a century of continuity, job knowledge and passion. From many possible names I have deliberately chosen Dassault and France because France was the European country most affected by leftist ideals and communism and yet the French Communists were knowledgeable enough, pragmatic enough and patriotic enough to realize that certain areas were inviolable even to politicians. When they nationalized the French Aviation Industry they left Marcel Bloch in charge of his plant.

What do we get for our Ajax? An IAS;  A good student. St. Stephen’s or JNU with a degree in History or Economics with perhaps a stint at Imperial College or Cambridge, usually exposed to Leftist Economic philosophies. As a “clod hopping Collector” did good work in Gonda district in the area of rural indebtedness. Articulate, meticulous, hardworking and upright, he is up from a stint in the Ministry of Animal Husbandry where he tied up with FAO for an important programme in Holstein/Zebu/ Illawarra cross breeds and this is his third year in the Ministry and now he is stamping his feet to move into the PMO which was his lifelong ambition; with his abilities and experience he deserves it. He has a frequent flyer card with several airlines but prefers Air India.  Courtesies apart, it is- technically- entirely correct to call our “Ajax” as “ignorant”. He is certainly no Churchill/Hitler or Stalin who were interfering busy bodies even in the matters of weapons design! The privilege of any comment is yours.  

The right path of the Buddha
The different ways the British and the Americans set about developing airliners for the post WW2 civil market is relevant. Britain started well in time by forming the Brabazon Committee which was headed by Lord Brabazon of Tara who was a pioneer aviator. Though the committee was representative the “say” was concentrated with the Bureaucracy. The Committee recommended the simultaneous development of five types of aircraft covering the entire spectrum of air transport as visualized in 1943. Two of the projects recommended were bemusing. These were the Bristol Brabazon (like the Ford Edsel, the West names their disasters after the “promoter”! The idea has merit!) and the Saunders Roe Princess. Mercifully these giants did not progress beyond the prototype stage. The elegant Airspeed Ambassador was hugely popular but slow development, failure to adapt the new Rolls Royce Dart and the inability of the design to stretch-partly because of its beautiful lines- led to only twenty being built. The aircraft could have,  been the Fokker Friendship success but tardy development did the project in.

The Vickers Viscount was a great success by comparison with 444 sold worldwide though probably as many more could have been sold had the company moved faster in responding to the customer’s demands. The last of the pentad was the famous De Havilland Comet. It entered service in 1952 as the world’s first commercial jet airliner only to, unfortunately, pioneer the problem of metal fatigue and had to be withdrawn from service in 1954. The cracks were mainly in the forward escape hatch and the windows for the ADF aerials. (Over) re design of the aircraft as the Comet 4 was completed by 1958 when it was re-launched in the transatlantic run –a year ahead of the Boeing 707. There are people who believe that had this “bad luck”   not happened the Comet may have “swept the board” in terms of orders but this is not borne out by facts. The Sud Aviation Caravelle was hugely popular with passengers, had no problems and yet ran out after 280 orders. The problem of both the Caravelle and the Comet was that they were too slow, thanks to Government involvement, in everything- development, rectification, and production and they thought too small. Capacity wise the Comet and the Caravelle ended where the Boeings – the 707 or the 737- began. They stood no chance.

The American aims were identical to the British but there approach was much more “worldly wise”. The US Government was never under any compulsion to prove any political philosophy. It knew that it did not know the business. It trusted the US Industry to take the lead as it had ample faith that people would know more about aeroplanes and would move mountains to do what was needed. The Government relegated itself to the role of being a “Vigna Hanta” (destroyer of obstacles) and a provider of venture capital! The story of the development of the Boeing 707 is a story of how this alternate approach worked.

Having developed the atom bomb there was the need to transport the wretched thing across intercontinental distances. Of the four contenders who responded to the RFP Boeing proposal formulated from 1943 onwards were for the model 424/432/448/450 the last, the 450 being submitted in March 1945, hastily revised to incorporate German data on swept wings “liberated “ in the advance to the Elbe and with six engines mounted under the wing on pylons to emerge as the XB 47.

The new bomber had many technical problems- the slender high aspect ratio wing flexed almost two meters up and down from the datum in flight unnerving the first crews and there was reverse aileron effect. At certain speeds and altitudes the stalling speed and the critical Mach number coincided; this was appropriately called the “coffin corner”. Nevertheless the structural and aerodynamic advantages of the “podded” engine and pylon approach were amply proved in service.
Having developed the B 47, Boeing then proposed the development of a tanker capable of matching the B47 speeds thus making FR less of a hazard. The result of the marketing effort led to an order for a hundred and thirty five tankers as the KC135 whose prototype was the famous “dash 80”. The KC 135 allowed Boeing to reduce the launch costs and risks of the Boeing 707. However their hopes of using the KC 135 fuselage jigs were dashed because they realized that the fuselage diameter had to increase by another 8 inches (200mm) if the customer was to be satisfied. Legend has it that the fuselage was just one inch more in diameter than the competing DC 8 but that one inch made a lot of difference in the packing of a six abreast sitting. This required an investment in new fuselage tooling and Boeing spent $ 16 million to do so. Boeing could take the decision to invest within the precincts of its office. There was no need to educate anyone to get the sanction. The short decision chain helped Boeing to move at the rate demanded by the Customer. 

Conclusions
Asian economics and demographics dictate larger capacities, short stage lengths and more primitive field capable aircraft than is in the vision of the Western manufacturers. These augur well for the economics of an air ticket. The civil transport market in India has the advantage of a shorter decision chain and within the existing capability of our Industry. It can be truly a White Hope whilst we all wait for the Government to extract digit fully. A full discussion on the fascinating subject of appropriate technology air transport is not possible here nor is it necessary. The potential private sector customers and the private sector Industry are people who use earned money and know their business and both are equally interested in coming to a conclusion. Between them they know what is needed and how to do it. The complete liberalization of the strategic Industries is the need. The time to continue with unworkable political theories is long past. The industry is too dynamic and knowledge based to be effectively managed by the present set up- and the results show repeatedly.


Supplementary notes: There was an interesting discussion on the topic from an expert and there were differences in approach. I found the exchange refreshing. An edited version is reproduced below for the benefit of the reader.
                                                                                                                    

The reply is more delayed than I would have liked but the task was voluminous. A point by point response would have taken too long. I am confining myself to very brief comments.

1.       The data is excellent and interesting but has been cast into a “Western” mould. For example we have given the distances as a hub and spoke pattern which I am convinced is not an optimum solution for India.
2.       The American airline practice is again not the best. I think we should study the Australian/ Canadian third level airline operations of the 1950s as a basis.
3.       The main bottleneck is the Bureaucracy and the Politicians. They go abroad and see things and are strongly influenced. They lack the training to “see through” what they see and when they come back they try to get it implemented and they are powerful
4.       Airports should be re defined. Again para 2 above refers. We should think of Municipalty run airports handling between 100 to a 1000 people per day. i.e. 0.03 to 0.1 % of the population of the municipality per day. Sangli or Akola should have an airport accessible by three- wheeler or cycle rickshaw from the city centre.
5.       One third of Indian air space is amenable to flights where a sortie distance of 150 to 200 kms will be competitive.
6.       As said earlier “Hub and spoke” is not the best solution. We have better models which will require much less aircraft.
7.       Frequency of service must be at least twice a day.
8.       Pressurization may add up to 45 kg per passenger in structural weight. This contradicts the use of expensive light weight materials? If at all pressurization should be an option/ sparingly applied.
9.       In the same vein why talk about an all electric aircraft. Why not a “Zero electric “aircraft? For short hops manual controls is the best.
10.   Freight is important. Rear loading is a must to get paramilitary/ Military, e-marketing  markets which would be useful in proving the aircraft.
11.   The economics of passenger handling – sales /booking/ticketing /passenger handling/information should be informal and app based. Our people are the best in the world for the Smart Phone applications.
12.   These aircraft should avoid the metros and even the busier state capitals! Focus on class C and D towns.
The points above indicate the simplest type of aircraft.- the turbine engine “Piper Cub” or the Cessna Caravan ( in terms of simplicity of technology) . 

We tend to re-invent the wheel. There are two ways to design an aircraft. The simplest is to pick a proven design and keep refining it so that the total cost of running an airline becomes the simplest and lowest. For example I would for the LTA /RTA for example have chosen the Avro 748 and kept simplifying and refining the design. Modern engines, propellers, electrical systems 115V a.c. etc will reduce the weight by a ton and drag quite significantly. Then further refinements can be used to reduce weight whilst increasing capacity and economics. My estimates show that we can easily achieve we/Wmto of around 0.5 or better.

The gap between the existing competitive products must be large. The Indian/ Asian projects are not going to succeed.

I strongly insist on copying. Start with a Dakota and keep tweaking it till it ends up a same aircraft but not recognizable as such. If it is a must that we need to draw ab initio and aircraft design then we should, like the Germans, draw up a table listing all the possibilities and then categorize them the list below is an indication:

Fuselage –                  Conventional/ Pod and boom/ Pod and twin tail-----       3
Wings --                        High wing/ low wing/ Biplane/ Hurel Dubois                        4
Undercarriage           Fixed/ retractable in wings/ Retractable in sponsons      3
Material                       Totally conventional/ Advanced /Mixed conservative     3

We have 108 possibilities. Like a matrix with zero elements many of the possibilities will quickly be resolved and we will have a residue of 15 or 16 that can be explored in more details. The advantage is that this method induces or forces brain storming and very attractive solutions can emerge as many people can contribute to the evolution of the design and to avoid pitfalls. We should have done this in our current projects. The disadvantage is that we in India do not have the patience since we know the answer from beforehand!

The other thought is that it is useless to even try to achieve the perfect aircraft right by calculations alone. Deep thinking about alternate plan Bs for doubtful areas is a must.

I will close by saying this that the above in no way contradicts any other views. It is merely another way or just one way of looking at the problem and another engineering approach.

With regards

Prodyut Das

Kolkata 28/02/19