The AMCA – Look before you leap!

The cost of the LCA programme  not including the engine is given as the arithmetic sum of all the sums released from time to time; it is somewhere around Rs. 8425 crores  E&OE. The present day value PDV i.e.adjusted for inflation would be closer to Rs.40,000 crores.  This is a four fold increase over the initial estimate adjusted to PDV. The time scale overshoot is of the same order. The money does not matter. It can be regenerated but the time lost is irreplaceable. That is the price paid for what is  the longest running development programme ever in aviation history. 

We are about to sanction to the same techno-structure the development  of a fifth generation aircraft the AMCA.  It is important to pause and think out the simplest of questions lest we get swept away by ill planned dreams. The AMCA is several orders of magnitude more sophisticated than its “4rh generation” predecessor. The time is now to passionlessly rethink. Significant changes in the techno- structure is indicated if we are not to repeat the LCA fiasco.

As a start we need to ask ourselves the following questions:

1. What is the Fifth generation and what is its logic?
2. Do we, India, need the so called Fifth generation?
3. Do we have the required base infrastructure to develop the fifth generation?
4. What is the level of usable research done to solve the detail problems posed by the new technologies?
5. What is a realistic time scale and a budget?

If we sweep aside these questions in our rush to “get “ the project or we trammel our thinking to create a “same as” product we may be squandering resources which could have been deployed elsewhere in the field of Defence Engineering. 

The Fourth and the Fifth Generation Reviewed

The so called Fourth generation introduced the following technologies into combat aircraft.

1. Composite structures
2. Fly by wire controls
3. Glass cockpit
4. BVR missiles

I will emphasize that the first three technologies were spurred by the availability of technology that was developed specifically for Civil airliners. In fact it would be impossible today to design an economically competitive main line civil transport without using the above technologies. For combat aircraft that imperative is doubtful. For Combat aircraft these technologies are useful if you have it “off the shelf” but not essential to give the other side a bad fright in a fight. The 4th generation is no more than a convenient index of the equipment sophistication level of the aircraft and it would be unwise to believe that a 4th generation will naturally beat a 3rd generation fighter. The best example is perhaps the MiG 29 initial production which had none of the first three (if you overlook a 8% use of composites for the engine nacelles- that too later converted to metal because of problems!) but it was THE bully on the block as far as air to air was concerned. On a lighter note if Airbus were to equip the A350 with BVRs legally it would be a 4th generation combat aircraft. Let us repeat the so called “generation” is a description of the technology level of the aircraft and is not repeat NOT to be automatically equated as an index of lethality in combat.

The Genesis of the Generations

The Fifth generation introduced along with the above technologies the following capabilities:

i) Supercruise
ii) Stealth
iii )Sensor fusion

The relatively poor performance of US equipment vis a vis the “crude” Soviet equipment in the Viet Nam and the Arab Israeli wars had a profound effect on US Military equipment design. The appalling losses suffered by the very seasoned Israeli.AF to Soviet SAMs in the Ramadan War led to a search for RCS reduction. From that direction Full stealth was then a small Yankee step. The back breaking logistics of Vietnam effort led to super cruise and the problem of controlling massed fighter strikes in clinically restricted airspace over hostile Vietnam territory led to sensor fusion as AWACS were horribly vulnerable where it was most needed. Sensor fusion was a form of phased array multiple dispersed AWACS! Both coalesced to form the Fifth Generation which is essentially a US oriented scenario requirement.

For example, the specifications that led to the F 22 Raptor required the following capabilities

i) Super Cruise
ii) Combat radius of 700 n.m.
iii )Stealth
iv) Cruise altitude of 21,000 mts.
v) Ability to operate from 600mts strips
vi) Sensor Fusion

Actually this bundle of requirements has less to do with direct general combat lethality and more to do with the American views of Power projection worldwide consequently Air Superiority over hostile territory. (Italics mine) which is fundamentally different in its level of technical sophistication requirements from air superiority over own territory.

Let us examine super cruise. USAF F 105s going to Vietnam would stage through from Mc Cellan AFB Sacremento California to Hickham AFB in Hawaii to Anderson AFB in Guam and then on to Takhli Thailand. It took three days, seventeen flying hours and 18 FR “tankings”. Considering the logistics problems a cruise altitude of 21,000 mts. was mandated to reduce the number of “tankings” because of the air density and hence drag would come down by one-twentieth of sea level. The high service ceiling was also required to achieve that “long reach” combat radius of 700n.m. A combat radius of 700n.m., you will note would cover most countries of the world bar three or four. The cruising altitude led to full stealth requirement as the aircraft would be easily “visible”. It worked both ways; At 23,000 feet the radar returns were sixteen times less than at 11,500 mts. Super cruise was introduced to cut down the transit time. TVC was needed because at 23,000mts the reduced “q” values made conventional aerodynamic controls sluggish. The other requirements such as AESA and sensor fusion consequentially became necessary because the aircraft being deep over hostile territory would lack AWACS support/ADGES support. This immediacy of information updates urges the need for AESA whereas a defensive fighter would be updated from ground based systems. Whilst AESA is fine if you already make it, it would not be quite such an imperative as it would be for the US strategy. Note a defensive aircraft would get from ground based support system all the information updates almost instantly and that too as a”voice over the shoulder” i.e. reducing the pilot’s workload and that too without any increase of the empty weight of the aircraft.

The American aircraft achieved enviable operational autonomy but at technical and fiscal costs that are unattainable for most nations. In fact for countries not having global aspirations the American specifications are unattainable folly because each Raptor costs reportedly $ 900,000 million if one factors in the development costs and the operating costs of around $68,000 per hour. These values presumably do not include the enormous global infrastructure- bases, tankers, hangars for stealth storage etc that only the USAF can have or afford. I will stress that many of these 5th generation capabilities are more useful for “spotting” the aircraft at distant bases than actual combat lethality. One of the many penalties of stealth is that the war load is ridiculously low.  If the past is anything to go by the Raptor and the F 35 may well prove to be poor in terms of cost effectiveness when opposed by the generic LCA operating within ADGES.

Most “sacred” specifications have an element of what used to be known as “bull dust baffles brains” in them. Let me raise a “Molesworth, the horrible schoolboy” question! Please, sir! Supercruise cuts the transit time by half. However the FR tankers barely do 400kts. The 5th generation aircraft will require refuelling every 70-80 minutes or so. What will be the effect of the frequent hook ups on super cruise gains, Sir!? To remember is that super cruise will need the most advanced technology of engines available only to the West.

We do not appear to have the base yet to manage a “predictable” AMCA programme. For India we must examine the thought that the counter to a haunting ghost is not your own ghost but the Ojha (witch doctor)! The counter to the Raptor may well be not another Raptor but the improved methods of stealth stripping, methods of confusing or degrading PGMs accuracies and destruction of aircraft at high altitudes using thrust vectored  missiles and new warheads effective at ultra-high altitudes where the blast effect is almost nil.

The scenario is everything- the “generation” less so!

The generic Light Combat Aircraft (gLCA) is a “defensive” fighter designed to an austere philosophy that less is better. It cannot be compared to an F22 point for point as one may compare cars in a catalogue but in actual combat it has been historically proved that the LCA will always outperform the “full service” fighter. There is no magic involved. The LCA uses “offboard” facilities- ADGES , SAMs etc to supplement what it is carrying on board. Let us consider the following scenarios:

1. When FO Nirmaljit Singh Sekhon took off on his intercept mission against six Sabres his chances was about the same as Leutenant Werner Voss’s epic fight i.e. about 3%. Would his chances of survival improved significantly if he had been flying a F22 Raptor? This assuming, of course, that a F22 Raptor could be scrambled within 40 seconds like yon Gnat of yore! Moving forward into time if his hypothetical Raptor was facing even the F6 or the F7Ps would he have survived? I do know that if FO Sekhon had a wingman in place his chances would have improved by a factor of ten!

2. The chance of a Bison surviving against an F 22 with both aircraft heading towards each other at 20,000 mts 90 km apart at M0.9 is in the low 20 per cent. What is the probability such a situation will occur?

3. What would the “game changing” role Ground based systems of stealth stripping, particularly; IR scans play in warning the Bison which would be over “friendly” territory? So what will be the number of MiG 21s which will be “helplessly” shot down by the Raptor? If the Raptor can be detected by IR “Radars” can it be brought down or its efficiency “laughed to scorn” by SAMs modified for High altitude intercepts?

4. Comparing the specifications of equipment and performance of the third generation Mirage III, the F 105 and the F4s against the 2nd generation MiG17  apparently the MiG 17 is a no hoper. In the wars over Vietnam and Arabs the little MiG 17 achieved remarkable success in Air Defence and Ground attack even when flown by crews whilst lacking nothing in courage, had standards of training which were no match for the Israelis and the USAF & USN high standards? In fact it was the US that went back to school and the highly professional Israelis never repeated the Aswan clashes.

5. Relevance of the equipment is everything. Possibly because of the quite effective PAF B57 attacks in 1965 the IAF chose the ‘better” MiG 21FL with a bigger radar over the MiG 21F-13. Analysis of the sorties as given for example in “Eagles over Bangladesh” would show that the selection of the MiG 21 F 13 for the first squadrons may actually have resulted in the PAF having several Sabres less. Could it be said that the R2L radar was more  of a nuisance than a help? You would have noted however that the Radio altimeter was much used to maintain height hold in the LLXCs flown.

6. I feel that we do tend to get carried away by foreign requirements completely irrelevant to us. There has been appearing on the Net (where else?) a rather well informed -be it said- discussion on “hot refuelling” as a means of reducing turnaround times. My own reactions are:

i) “hot” refuelling will not reduce turnaround time because in India brake cooling can be the problem. As an aside the LCA reported brake cooling problem will go way when the weight is corrected.

ii) Hot refuelling is extremely hazardous with plenty of chances of accidents.

The Swedish AF has hot refuelling because if you shut down a fighter in the Tundra getting it started again –in the open- may be a devil of a job. The German F 104 crashes were partly due to an idiotic decision about “getting the fighters used to the German weather”! The point I always stress is that we will be cheated if we use without due circumspection the thought of others. Is the AMCA something like this? A peasant’s scepticism for the new-fangled/ over advertised is not a bad quality for a designer!

There has been a constant marketing effort that somehow the 5th generation is somehow the ultimate weapon for dominating the skies but in reality it is a highly specific weapon- you will note that the US closed the Raptor production after only 187 aircraft. Either they have a lemon on their hands and are too proud to say it or it is so specific that it is sine qua non for certain USAF scenarios and- dare I say it - completely stupid for others.  We must think of our scenarios. China may need the F 31 in case they plan to takeover Quemoy or Formosa sometime in the future. Do we want to take back Askai Chin and will the AMCA help in such a scenario and does the cost indicated includes the cost of the associated infrastructure?

Whistling in the dark-  a review of the present 5th generation aircraft.

Reliable information on the 5th generation is hard to come by so cum grano salis here is my take on the current crop. The F22 is the gold plated thing. It really is a marvel of technology and American skills in manufacturing expertise. It incorporates all that the US learnt in ferrying its aircraft all over the world and in the use of the F117 in Iraq and from the B2.

The F22 is the gold plated thing. It really is a marvel of technology and American skills in manufacturing expertise. It incorporates all that the US learnt in ferrying its aircraft all over the world and in the use of the F117 in Iraq and from the B2. 

1. Sanctioned August 1985
2. First flight   September 1990
3. First Production aircraft 1997
4. End of production with 195 aircraft in March 2012.

They took 12 years to get the aircraft to IOC in spite of considerable experience in developing and operating with previous two service aircraft the F117 and the B2. Note that they took 27 years to design build test produce and write  finis to the programme. 

The Russian PAKFA is a very sensible middle of the pack design typically drawing on the Sukhoi/ MiG layouts and just “stealthfying” it much as our Navy has done to its frigates. It would be a surprise if a lot of its under skin stuffing was not from the Sukhoi 30. It is the most “right looking” of the crop which I cannot say about the formidable Raptor which looks like a jet age Jug (Republic P47 Thunderbolt)

The Chinese J 20 is probably a dark horse. It is of a Chinese concept of “Sashoujian”- the Assasin’s mace”.  It is larger than the F22 (23 mts. against 18.92 mts for the Raptor) and has less powerful engines but it uses an interesting “long coupled” canard delta configuration. The configuration will give a good CG range hence the ability to handle a greater variety of weapons. My guess is that the Chinese may be thinking something like this- if stealth is so good I don’t need to go fast. Better I use the power to increase the size of my weapons bay and carry a decent war load so that over Quemoy or Taipei I can loiter around and hit multiple targets using “invisibility” i.e. the Chinese aircraft is a technology demonstrator/ stealth Intruder/bomber and is not ,sensibly, a fighter to match the F22. The Chinese J 21 is inspired by the Raptor but somehow is a daintier looking design.

The Indian AMCA

There has been two AMCA mock ups and frankly it continues to show the lack of design supervision of details  that ADA is becoming well known for!. The first issue was the fin. It looked as if it had come off the HAL HA 31 Basant Ag aircraft!. This near vertical leading edge is un stealthy and certainly would have led to controllability/ structural problems at high speeds. This has just recently been corrected and we have a stealthier fin on show. The other is the intake! Sure the Raptor has splitter plate intakes – which are unhappy stealth wise – but the Raptor was conceived 30 years ago. I had hoped to see diverter less supersonic intakes (DSI). Is no one in ADA looking at the JF 17, the F 35 or the J 20? There is also the question of how the design does not seem to have taken too much care to “mask” the A/B petals by the empennage- the F35 and J31  does make the effort. Finally the information on the net about the AMCA is ludicrous in real terms. The thing is supposed to be capable of carrying the Helina ATGM! Why should anyone even think of wasting a rare resource like the AMCA on close support duties! Really! About the AMCA being capable of carrying Brahmos (stealthily or otherwise) strains the imagination. How does one carry a Ø 650 by 6558mm missile between the nose wheel well and the front engine face of a 16.570 airframe is doubtful even if the air launched version needs a shorter booster. The relatively low operating ceiling means that the radar returns will be 3-8 times larger.  These may seem trifles but as the ancient said so tiresomely long ago- hae nugae in seria ducent mala- “These trifles continued will lead to grave evils”.

Do we need the Fifth generation?

The 5th generation programme is a political statement that we are ready to play Bully Boy in the neighbourhood.. Whether we invest people and effort on a colossal project like the AMCA will have to be decided by the people who will decide the country’s foreign policy. The PMO, MEA, MoD and MoF with inputs from the Armed Forces. It has to be a very careful assessment of the threats, their likely time scales with the Armed Forces going deeper into the targets- bridges, dams, air craft carriers, installations, the weapons likely to be sanctioned for use and the tactics to be followed and the infrastructure to be put in place- training, people, tankers, bases and hangars et al i.e. a total system has to be estimated before the development agencies are brought in to the picture. We know what happened when the customer was side tracked to fast track the earlier project.

What will it cost in time and money? 

The earlier LCA cost us Rs. 40,000 Crores so far. This was mainly due to sheer mismanagement and it would be “optimism” to assume that we have learnt from the earlier project. We have learnt technical skills which we always had but there is no evidence, given the uncertainty about dates, of improved management. A budget for the AMCA should be around Rs 100,000 crore not counting the engine. The Fifth generation being a political statement as much as it is a weapon it makes little sense politically if we do not develop the engine. So we are looking at something in the order of 150,000 crores. The time for development can be approximated by noting that the Americans times for the F22. I would doubt any target figure short of twenty years ie. 2035 before IOC as a “salesman’s optimism”.  What will be the political compulsions and priorities by then?

What is to be done

The Kaveri failed because the basic facilities required for doing the projects were not at hand. As in the LCA the problems were compounded by not separating the problems into details before- integrating them in the package. What the design agency must do is to identify the problems associated with the development of the 5th generation and solve them in detail. There could be as many as 500 such problems but I am listing some of the more obvious ones.

1. Unlike ordinary “supersonics”, a super cruiser will ‘soak”. Its skin will soak at 125 °C whilst the core structure may be at - 65° C. How does one attach a composite skin to metal structure both having widely different co efficient of expansions reliably so that in service stealth, is not affected. I am emphasizing this because the LCA is supersonic for a few minutes at best and will not “soak” as the AMCA skin will.

2. Because of the high skin temperatures of 125⁰ C stealthiness is compromised to IR scans. The trick is to cool these areas using coolants or fuel. What is the standard of preparation on this as far as laboratory work is concerned? Same with cooling of the jet efflux.

3. Stealth requires Radar anechoic chamber to confirm and refine the shape being chosen w.r.t. radar returns? Have we already got such chambers? And what is the skill we have developed so far in validating the experiment with theoretical studies?

4. Stealth requires careful detail work. Gold flashing the canopy, minimizing the radar returns from joints such as panels and door etc. How much work has been done so far?

5. “Simple things” like drain holes caused problems between “stealth” and “corrosion damage” on the Raptor. As I said these are typical of the many questions that have to be asked and solved before taking up the AMCA  The standard of preparations regarding the sub problems are to be examined by a body independent of direct and indirect influence of the controllers of the programme funds. From past experience the usual panel of “eminent scientists and professors” would be the worst choice. What is needed is “engineering” common sense and experience.  There is also a somewhat naïve belief that CAE will can usually replace an experimental approach. This is partially true but with the tricky caveat that CAE is most useful to those who need it the least i.e. the seasoned engineer! CAE is very useful if one has identified and quantified the problem. It then allows rapid “optimization” Unfortunately the computer is politely silent if the engineer does not focus on the problem! This is more common than one supposes. Just one example from “open source”: In the HF 24 the ballast weight was – in the days of slide rules- 134 kgs. In the LCA, where with CAE one can get the CG at the push of a button- the ballast should have been ideally less than 50 kgs. If what is rumoured- 300 kgs- is true- it illustrates what I have said. The other and I speak from my own years in a large e- engineering firm is that rare is the engineer who will look at a screen and say with confidence “Yes! That is right! We need to do such and such!” Thus my caution about computer enthusiasm.

Divide et Impero!

To go bald headed in to the AMCA would be to repeat the LCA experience- the unfailing folly of introducing unproven technologies on an unproven platform. We should rather break up the job into technology modules:

i) Stealth technology
ii) Sensor fusion technology
iii) Supercruise

Stealth technology and sensor fusion technology has priority. Super cruise needs the most advanced engine technology and firstly it is not available at a corporate level or else the enterprising Chinese would have had it by now. They are beavering away at their WS 13 Taihang engine. We should better drop the engine for the present or we will be spreading too thin. The Kaveri programme showed we lacked the basics when people rushed in with enthusiastic promises!

Stealth technology has the following features.


i) Hard chine (as in small boats) fuselages
ii) RAM
iii) Intake masking
iv) DSI
v) Internal weapons bay
vi) Serrated panels and covers
vii) Gold flashing of the canopy etc
viii) Stealthy gun ports, AESA/SLAR installation and IR scanners
ix) Design, production and maintenance of pressure cabins with angular exteriors.

Since the AF is not exactly prancing with joy about the Mk.1 it would be possible to convert the last six airframes to a LCA Stealth model incorporating the stealth features. These six can be built to an “experimental” rather than a “combat” standard. For example the internal weapons bay need not be capable of handling all the weapons planned for use or the stress levels need not go to 9 g etc. The idea is to give everyone –designers, planners, operators  much needed “hands on” stealth experience. Because the aircraft is based on a “proven” design a first flight by early 2018 and completion of field testing by early 2020 is expected particularly given the confident enthusiasm being proclaimed for the AMCA project.

These aircraft will explore the following:

i) Stealth effectiveness

ii) Stealth maintainability, particularly in humid and dusty conditions

iii) Manufacturing and airframe ageing effects on stealth deterioration.

iv) Problems of stealth in LLXC profiles.

Since only three countries are in stealth technology it would be arrogant to presume we “know stealth”. We know nutt’in yet! The accompanying sketch shows a possible adaptation of the LCA Mk1 to a LCA Stealth Research Vehicle. The effort will be to confine the changes to the fuselage and see how some of the problems mentioned above show up in actual conditions. Similarly should be the approach to developing Sensor fusion. Sensor fusion has applicability even in ordinary strike sorties and so has priority over supercruise. The capability can be developed using a flight of Embraer145s or Dornier228s. These are roomy aircraft and will allow much space for a “bread board” approach and will confirm the technology and its bugs before final packaging. CABS and team would be an obvious resource given the work they have turned in on the Embraer AWACS. The obvious advantages of using a proven platform is that the testing is not held up whilst the platform itself is getting rid of its sinuses as happened with the LCA.

A Stealthy Foxbat?

Assuming that we still feel that a 5th gen “super cruiser” is essential it would be much wiser to have a very careful “engineer’s” look at the MiG 25 Foxbat and develop our own stealth aircraft based on the excellent proven high speed aerodynamics, systems and structure of the aircraft and “stealthifying” it rather than go off the deep end with a completely new and must I say it- sloppily configured aircraft.  Incidentally the MiG 25 would handle a Brahmos internally! 

It would be possible to go on but summarizing:

1. The 5th generation is a political weapon. It gives an aggressive message that we want to play the bully of the block.  Is that our priority?

2. It is a doubtful asset and requirements are too small to be economical.

3. The possession of such aircraft by our future adversaries cannot be countered by our possessing similar weapons. From these follow:

4. Our priority is not a 5th Generation but countering them e.g.

     i) Development of stealth stripping techniques

     ii) Development of techniques to confuse and degrade PGMs

     iii) Development of suitable SAMs

    iv) Development of structures capable of defeating bunker busters. Try Kanchan armour slabs for roofing?

If after this we still need a 5th generation we can go for a half house solution with emphasis on “range/payload capability” i.e. a carrier for the Brahmos as a priority rather than a “me too” Raptor like AMCA.

Surprising Even Ourselves

Finally we must return to the problem mentioned in the techno structure. Until this is energetically and drastically revised without the baggage of obsolete ideology we will waste and fail. To rephrase an Old Testament saying “But for the Government reviseth the structure/ the engineers will toil but in vain!” The socialist pattern of society of our infancy chose to believe that only the Government Departments and the Public sector was the worthy and trusty repository of public funds. The fact is as repeatedly demonstrated e.g. the Tatra truck affair that money has no respect for which side of the economic theory one is on. I give you the case that suppose the Government had selected say Tata’s or Mahindra or L&T for the LCA project and they had turned in the very same “results”. What would have happened? How would the Press and the Parliament react? Why should performance which could have been early declared as a swindle or scam be accepted with some nursery admonishment of better behaviour from the CAG if done by the PSUs or Government? Given the proven disappointment with the present arrangements, the present Government should grasp the nettle firmly:  Restructure drastically.

The Government must dismantle the “Commanding Heights of the Economy” mind-set so beloved of theoretical economists of a certain hue. Commanding heights gained by decree rather than excellent effort soon turns into Toll gates.
For weapons development all countries use the entire resources of the country. By keeping the private sector out or emasculated we are denying our weapons Industry the larger more vibrant and enterprising portion of our Industrial strength. Talk about going to war with one hand tied behind our back.

I have talked enterprise. Enterprise is the difference between Air India International a small airline under JRD Tata and the present day Air India. A Command economy cannot, by doctrine, have enterprise.

Welcome the private sector without bureaucratic caution. The Government must involve the Private sector as a valued resource rather than convicts on parole. Allow FDI without limits. Indian Industry is the only one in the world where the domestic automobile industry has successfully fought back the challenges of well-established international Giants. Why should they fail in the field of Defence? Those who raise the long dead ghost of the Honourable East India Company should be reminded of the “bogey” they had raised earlier:

1. Computerization will lead to loss of jobs.

2. Mobile phones will lead to loss of sovereignty (sic) and we should go in for the C DOT RAX- a 100 line rural automatic exchange.

3. Liberalizing the Automotive Industry will result in a foreign exchange crisis. 

Given this kind of accuracy of prediction the opposition to 100% FDI is short sighted or aimed at proving a certain economic theory rather than pro bono publico. Along with the  big giants will come also the small brilliant firms the likes of Burt Rutan of Scaled Composites and designers of the class of Stelio Frati and innovators like Edgley who would find that the canvas of India the ideal medium for their dreams. I have in mind also the Swiss ALR group who in the 1980s was working on the interesting Pirhana light Fighter. In India, with the same funds, they could have progressed five times as much. The FDI policy must be particularly tuned for such enterprises and encouraged at 100% FDI.

The present Government’s task is difficult because it must change the way people think! It must breakdown “the narrow domestic walls of our thinking” so that thoughts merge into broad urgent streams. If we do that we may surprise even ourselves.