Falcon, Griffon, Tejas- Crisis and Opportunities

Ceremonial IOCs apart the date of the effective IOC of the LCA continues to be uncertain. The current bets are on for June 2017 but only the congenitally gullible will believe this. Worn out by overuse, these occasions usually mark not progress but the retirement of someone who had joined the project as a young man. The latest date for the Mk.1A given by the DRDO Chief is of significance.The Mark 1A’s first flight is given as 2018 with a completion of testing by 2021 and production starting from 2022. These dates, normal for a new project, indicate comprehensive redesign is required to make a Mk1 into a Mk.1A. New readers are referred to Vayu I/2015.

 The truth is that this LCA project has done more to reduce the frontline strength of the IAF than the two attempts by the Pakistan Air Force. Precisely for this reason if the LCA Mk1 was even half decent the IAF would be glad to have the forty Mk1s if only to work out its SOPs whilst waiting for the Mk1A. This was what the RAF did with the less than satisfactory Hunter Mk.1.This has not happened. The official rumour, as Sir Humphrey Appleby of Yes Minister would say is that the production is constrained by supply of composite parts produced by NAL. It will be noted that three  limited series (italics mine)  production aircraft LSPs 3, 4, 5 were turned out within a period of six months in 2010 i.e. So if the IOC 1 was not purely ceremonial we should have had at least 36 aircraft, admittedly hand built and admittedly below par by now. It would have given us something better than the Hawk as a close support aircraft in an emergency. The despair is that five years after an IOC the production rate is one per year and dates continue to remain uncertain. Given such, below is my unkind but perhaps not unreasonable assessment of the situation.

i)                    The IOCs etc are “Nautankis”- a form of rural folk entertainment often noted for not following of scripts.

ii)                  The aircraft has severe technical flaws and is unfit for service. No one can clear it for mass production.

iii)                Aircraft debugging is not some form of black magic. Is the problem cultural? I mention this because I have noticed this in the CAD/CAE Industry. When things do not come out right the people know what needs to be done but lack the faith and the energy to put it right on the actual product.

iv)           Or worst ,were the delays condoned so that things slid to imports?

The Prognosis

 The story is told of a RAF twin engine light bomber of WW2 whose engine speed governor required “a look at” every fifteen hours. Unfortunately the cowling had  for aerodynamic reasons not been provided with a suitable access panel and it was in one piece so the entire cowling had to be taken off. To take the cowlingoff first the propeller had to be taken off. In the LCA where the customer was kept at arm’s length to “fast track the project” (official “pomp” in the ‘90s, if I remember aright) serviceability related issues would be quite likely.

There have also been reports of an engine /inlet mismatch. This would be more serious at take off - at high speed the ram effect would help- so we have an engine which is giving less than max. thrust at take off. MTOW from standard fighter fields would be degraded. Recall that the LCA has operated so far from civil airfields. Does this tie up with the extraordinary keenness at this pre IOC stage- I am sorry I do not believe 45 squadron being raised- for a FR capability? That way one could take off with a lower load and then tank up on fuel once flying. Sounds ridiculous? So does two IOCs! It is disappointing that we could not get the intake reasonably right first time; Intake sizing is not rocket science. The shame and the pity is that this problem was sat on for sixteen years!

If the above prognosis is roughly right this is what needs to be done:

i)                 Presuming individual systems are working reliably the Mk1 airframe has to be stripped skin inwards of every system and frame and redesigned for weight improvement, inlet modification etc.

ii)               The airframe will then have to be re-engineered for ease of production, re stressed and tested for fatigue.

iii)             The systems have to be repackaged for and of servicing. This last means that on the ramp the armourers do not get in the way of re-fuellers and so on. The ballast weight has to be reduced to the minimum, perhaps less than 30 kg.

All this will take about two years  to get together and may be another two years to test so we are looking at four years from start date before we can think of producing in series. Assuming that the new government put pressure on by end of 2014 we are looking at 2018 for the first series production Mk1 and Dr. Christopher’s dates are right for the Mk.1A. Even though the Mk.1A’s dates are breathing down the neck of the  Mk.1’s, going directly to the Mk.1A is not the best because we still don’t know all the “gremlins” in the aircraft until it gets into some kind of normal service assuming of course that the Mk.1 can be IOC’d by 2018/2019.

The Crisis

Without doubt the biggest”enemy” to this project has been its progenitor organization which by delays and “unreliable” (and that is putting it very very mildly) promises has now caused a condition where two very good generically similar aircraft are on offer to be built in India. If we have two hundred Gripen Es or Super Falcons then the LCA will slip into the “why bother” category.  To avoid this we need firm and sustained political action. The order for the eighty three Mk.1As is welcome but it should be followed by larger orders for the  specialist versions.

The LCA and the MMRCA.  Drawing the boundaries.

There is little point in discussing here  the capabilities of the MMRCA contenders. In a way they are as with the Howitzers, as alike as peas in a pod. My view is that the even the most painstaking selection could be subject to parliamentary criticism or one could get the dumbest AC2 to pick a name out a hat and that choice could be logically defended! These are products which are competing in peace and will compete in anger and win. They are designed for certain scenarios-mainly North European wars where they will fly in an environment of densely packed, sophisticated as well as well trained and equipped opposition in appalling fog and mist and low or non- existent daylight conditions. They are obscenely over equipped for our kind of war. In winter North Europe compared to India all flying is night/dusk flying. The Radar, RLG,IN, GPS, IR and GPWS ( Ground proximity warning system) is essential and will be needed even in peace just to get safely back to base- bailing out over the Tundra in winter from fuel starvation due to navigation error or CFiT (controlled flight into terrain) in low visibility is not an alternative. The question to be asked repeatedly and carefully is: are they too well equipped for India’s wars? The Israelis were delighted with the performance of their Mirage IIICJs in the 1967 war but being Jewish when they reordered it as the Mirage 5 they sensibly deleted the Cyrano search radar and the Matra 530 and took the cheaper limited capability Aida ranging radar it being correctly argued that the better radar did not give significant advantage over the Sinai; BVR made reduced sense at the low levels. The Israelis used the weight savings to increase range payload and reduce costs. Continuous value analysis is at the heart of the LCA philosophy and the key to its survival as a contender. Only someone with cloven feet will argue that all the “abbreviations” AESA, BVR, MAWS, ECM, ESM, IRST, NV etc do not add to the capabilities but these capabilities exact a price in terms of cost and vulnerability. More is not always better and in a LCA intelligent frugality has to be enforced if the concept is to succeed. The “pro capability” argument that much of these equipment are often carried externally and the aircraft is only plumbed for the equipment is evasive. The “plumbing”- cables, wires, brackets, pipes, power sources, clamps, the additional airframe space and pylons add to the weight. Northrop did a study in the 1960s and found that each kg of electronics adds five kgs. to the final empty weight.  This figure is still too true. In the F16/ Gripen E these capacity enhancers increased empty weight by about three tons with significant effect on handling and prices. External carriage be it a LANTIRN or Towed decoy or a BVRM adds to the weight and the drag en route and over the battlefield.

Further from War further from reality

Just after the ’71 war during planning for the Ajeet we received a request from Air HQ to modify the ISIS F 124 sight .The focus was on simplicity and all features- gyro tracking, ranging, span settings were to be deleted and the sight became almost a simple collimating sight- just one step short of the proverbial chewing gum on the windscreen. Just as we (at least my friend dear V. Pramod ) had worked the mods. out they came back with a request for getting the radar ranging input in. Further change requests followed with uncanny timings until by about 1975 we got back the original ISIS F 124 configuration! The need for all round vision even at the expense of performance was hard learned in WW2 but quickly lost in peace. Study the Mustang P 51 A- P51B-P51C-P 51D- F86Sabre-F 100 Super Sabre-F4Phantom- F 15- F 35 canopy styles with time for example you will see two cycles of the same mistake! Further studies since then leads me to believe that the further one is away from combat experience the sweeter sounds the salesmen. The F 16 story is worth recounting because it reinforces two truths.

i)                    The repeated folly of ignoring lessons hard learned in War.

ii)                  Though everyone loves a fighter finally the main job to be done is Offensive Air Support.

 After Vietnam when the “swing role” (they had not thought up of this jargon at that time!)  Phantom II fared badly against the “non-swinging” (!)  MIG 17/19/21 the USAF went in for the “not a pound for the ground” approach” This resulted in the F 15 which was too expensive ( pl. note well!) and so a cheaper solution was also desired as a supplement. The F 16 started life as Light Weight Fighter (LWF) an aircraft using only one of the F 15s engine. The first F 16 weighed only 6857 kilos- which justifies my view that the much smaller and lower powered LCA empty weight should be around 5300kilos- , used a 108.57 kN F 100 engine and with two Sidewinders and 3162 kilos of fuel and pilot weighed in at 10,952kilos giving a clean combat  T/W of 1.02. It was sensibly equipped – a AN/ APG 66 radar, Marconi HUD, FBW, SKN 2400 INS, Sperry CDAC, AN-ALR 69 RWR, UHF, VHF, ILS,TACAN in addition to all the usual avionics. Today the same fighter has put on around three tons of weight, can handle all the current abbreviations that can be mounted on its pylons and there has been no growth in its wing area though now the engine is bigger at 131 kN to help attract the IR missiles like Stingers and its cousins. It is undeniably a more versatile fighter but is it a more ‘sensible” fighter? Do we need all the Night/Low daylight/ long distance navigation, Ferry capabilities essential in the Global policing role for all our platforms? The AESA is essential for the Western scenario because he may have to fight without ground based radar coverage. Is it true for us? If we ape the West we will get a ”barn door” and not a fighter and in fewer numbers because of the cost push.

The Table 1 below is illustrative. It compares an early model A of a bestselling contemporary fighter with a gun armament and two IR CCMs and the latest standard model F of the same aircraft but plumbed for all the updates and with enhanced capability and carrying full internal fuel, two IR CCMs and four BVRs. 

Table 1 MKS units

Type	W/L	T/W	ID/T	FF
MIG 21 Bis	354	0.87	0.39	0.27
Model A	393	1.05	0.244	0.29
Model F	533	0.86	0.36	0.256
Degradation A to F	0.36	0.18	0.16	0.12

 The following is to be noted:

i)                    The model F is a better ‘all rounder” but inferior in performance both to the Model A and  the MiG 21 which was the original “to beat” target.

ii)                  The combined increase of Wing loading and Power loading means handling at cruise and landing speeds will be noticeably inferior..

iii)                The T/W ratio has gone down by 18%.The noteworthy point is the same “philosophers” had expounded the dire necessity about 1:1 T/W earlier. Marketing people sell not the truth but their products!

iv)                ID/T is a poor man’s index of Specific Excess Power and gives the amount of engine thrust that is eaten away by the induced drag as the aircraft executes a 3 g turn at 350 kts. The reduction is significant. In reality it will be worse because the drag of those BVRs and the increase in Cd_o has not been factored in. Is it any wonder that BVRs have been jettisoned before entering combat? Why carry them on marginal platforms?. Let some bigger “power surplus” platforms e.g the Su 30 MKI. carry them. They will be very effective on the Su 30MKI.

v)                  FF is the fuel fraction and gives the amount of max internal fuel divided by the engine thrust in Kgs. It is an indicator of combat persistence i.e. who has to break off first he usually loses. The model F has 12% less persistence than the Model A. In reality, allowing for standard reserves the case would be worse.

Keep the L in the LCA!

In the ‘80s the Soviets did not hesitate to use four different types- MiG 21, SU 17, MiG 23BN/ 27 and the SU 24-  just to meet the battlefield Air needs of their Frontovaiya Aviatsya. The IAF has wisely gone in, like the Soviets, for a combination of LCA, MMRCA and the MKI. Let us reap the benefits of this stratification to the maximum .The LCA has a niche position and it can survive only if it stays within its “Laxman rekha” of being a limited capability fighter which is its raison de etre. Whether the fighter should be small and adequate or large and versatile for a penalty of 50% increase in IR/ visual signature is a question that only pilots climbing 1500 mts AGL in bright sunshine to make rocket attacks will have to decide. In an LCA something has to go- range, payload or equipment levels. 

The Beastie and the beasts - a comparison of the MMRCA.

Below is a personal assessment of the MMRCA contenders and why the selection went the way it did.

The MIG 29 was my personal favourite. Having worked in technology transfer projects of various Soviet military engineering projects I am admittedly biased but I found them robust –in war the Su 7 never missed a sortie due to unreliability- enormously sensible and fascinatingly effective. The MIG 29 SMT/K should have won on grounds of commonality (with the Navy), familiarity, just right equipment fit, great performance and, one hopes, lower prices. The fact it was not chosen means that there was sustained move to disengage from Russia.

The F 16/Gripen E These pose the most direct threat as they are generically similar i.e. single engine single seat to the Tejas, particularly the Tejas Mk2. However these aircraft have put on between two and three tons since inception and are no longer the cheerful things they were though they remain very effective for global wars. We need something smaller and simpler. Again in its non selection the reason is probably political. Having gingerly disengaged from the Russian Bear it is hardly wise to rush into the arms of the American Grizzly! Both these countries are large enough to twist our arms! The Gripen, like the Viggen earlier is “sanctionable”. I am also leery of buying any single engine warplane from the West. These things cost half their weight in gold and single engines have a five time higher attrition rate than twins in peacetime .

The Rafale is the median aircraft in the Table 2.France is economically manageable- hopefully cannot “bully” us. They have been reliable suppliers-In the Falklands Affair they supplied equipment impartially to both sides. The fact that they also go by principles (hard cash only, please!) must have also played a role. It is an excellent choice and role wise a good replacement for the Jaguars and the Mig 23 BNs. I am sure we shall buy some more.

The Typhoon was another excellent contender and could have been chosen but was dropped for commercial reasons. The project is Multi-national but there is no truth in the rumour that it was feared that after the next World Cup Italy may invade Germany and then where would we be? Remember what happened with difficulties about Ukrainian spares for Russian equipment.

The Super Hornet is also excellent but falls nearer to the Su 30 but more oriented now to strike roles and suffers from being American.

All these aircraft claim to have been “blooded” in combat but that is sales jargon. Fighting poorly trained North African Armed Forces which are often racked by internal dissensions-one has had the Air Force bombing the Army etc  or Jihadi Militias out to conquer the world is really not even Spain 1936 i.e a half decent proving ground.. Successes and achievements in these “colonial” wars are irrelevant- specially regarding effectiveness of advanced equipment effectiveness. I am still waiting for results of PGMs and BVRs in a full blown professional war. The Chinese or the Pakistan Armed Forces are professional forces and the mayhem in North Africa has little relevance on what we may expect from our two neighbours- they are in a different league altogether.

Size is “armour”

In the last “one and a half ”front war” in 1971, even with the PAF partially crippled by disaffected Bengali personnel, we lost about 75 combat aircraft due to all causes. Of these about sixty were involved in OAS (offensive air support).Nineteen of the very capable SU 7 was lost to cheap AAA whilst about fifteen Hunters fell equally to AAA and fighters in this role. The Mig 21 losses were just two to AAA in OAS roles and the little Gnat still unreliable and  hobbled by the lack of 250 kg. bombs which confined it to RP attacks did a very creditable job being visually and aurally stealthy. Out of over three hundred OAS Gnat sorties only one was hit by a few bullets but even that recovered to base. There is strong correlation between size and losses. These lessons are still relevant. The latest F 16 and the Gripens are like the Hunters of the past and the Tejas is the Gnat of the present. Technology can improve the Gnat’s lacunae of range /payload and safety to very acceptable levels. It should be debugged and more specialized OAS versions for strict VFR roles should be developed and ordered after the present orders for eighty three Mk.1 As.

The need for numbers

The final argument for the Tejas is a question of numbers and, therefore, costs. Numbers are also capability. Given the improvement in Air Defence technologies since ’71 we must prepare for a combat loss in a “one and a half front war” of around one hundred and twenty aircraft in the first two weeks. If you do not believe this ask the Israelis about the Ramadan/Yom Kippur War losses. Post the Yom Kippur/Ramadan War’s devastating losses the Israeli IDFAF took ten years to recover their former arrogant elan. They also doubled the number of their combat squadrons from eleven to twenty. The lessons are stark and clear. One hundred and Twenty aircrafts equal about seven squadron’s worth. To remain a viable fighting force without any resupply by any Uncle (Sam!) as was available to the Israelis we must have be having an OAS element alone of about twenty five squadrons i.e. about four hundred aircraft with a suitable establishment in pilots of whom we should expect a loss of about fifty- just to sustain the force for re growth!  A large air force is needed. Economics limits the MMRCAs numbers and technology limits the LCA’s versatility. We must break up the Tejas into “cheap” specialist variants and strictly leave the multi role function to the MMRCA and the Su 30 MKI which is superb in its own way.

The LCA variants

The Western philosophy of ‘One size fits all” does not fit us. We can neither afford nor design “swing role” aircraft and they do not make sense for India. The LCA must be developed in specialist variants to keep within the 5300-6000kg empty weight limits..

In the following section the definitions are as follows: LCA Mk.1 is the “as is” aircraft and has a dry empty weight of 6600 kgs. The LCA Mk 1A is the structurally and aerodynamically refined version with a weight of 5300 kilos. The LCA Mk.IN  is a Mk1A with a cranked delta wing with a span of 10 mts, an area of 40 sq. mts and an AR of 2.5. (Ref.LCA 5400/2.5) Vayu I/2015)

The LCA Mk 1 This seems to be pretty much a “gone case” and we should induct it in the same spirit as the Hunter F 1- a good aircraft for extended field trials of the other systems- perhaps just the forty or until the LCA Mk 1A catches up. Reduction in empty weight and with the intake sorted out it will be a fair strike aircraft. Historically it would be like the Hurricane Mk IIB- a good fighter bomber but wary when it ran into the Hayabusa on the Burma front.  40 units .

The LCA Mk 1 A   Standard VFR light attack aircraft with self defence capability for short range i.e. 180 n.m.at SL radius of action with a three ton war load. Typical equipment fit would be a non AESA radar, VHF, UHF, TACAN, IFF, Autopilot, HUD,INS,FBW,RWR,HMD,HUMS and CCM. No BVR, FR, NV capability. 100 units.

LCA Mk 1B As above but optimized for VFR close support with armoured cockpit and armoured  “get home” systems. GSh 30-2 cannon. This is technically like a “tailless” miniaturized MiG 27  replacement in a much smaller aircraft with better handling. This would be the ideal time to introduce ‘cranked wing” version. (see Vayu I/2015)  200 units.

LCA Mk 1C  are the 40 Mk1s to be withdrawn and rebuilt to 1C standards with cranked wing to serve as VFR escort fighters with BVR capabilities including AESA radar and flying top cover forMk1. 40+20 units

LCA Mk 1N Two seat night capable aircraft for LLXC intruder roles. LANTIRN, NVG compatible cockpits, Conformal tanks. This would be a replacement for the Jaguar. This may use the more powerful GE 414 engine. 60units

LCA LIFT/Maritime   As in Mk 1N but specialized with capability of carrying Anti Shipping missiles. Trainer is fully equipped including BVRand Night capabilities but with reduced energy and speed performance. 60+ 60 units.

LCA F414 Mk 2 In theory thanks to having half the wing loading of the Sea Harrier FRS Mk.1 the LCA Mk1a with the F 404 should actually be doing a better than the Sea Harrier provided its empty weight is held to around 5500 kilos. This weight target is not unreasonable because the Sea Harrier FRS Mk1 weighs 5891 kg empty and it is a bigger aeroplane without composites and with a heavier engine. If the NLCA is not doing better than the Sea Harrier it is because of the overweight airframe and the inlet engine mismatch problem. The risk with the F 414 solution is that the additional weight of the engine ,systems, fuel, structure, airframe mods means fairly extensive redesign of a tailless planform which is more “touchy” of such things. Another point to watch out for is that the LCA Mk1 has a record low aspect ratio (AR) of 1.8. This makes it especially critical of any weight overruns. The configurations shown in open source that wing area has been added in a manner to further reduce AR. This is a risky path to disappointment should weight control supervision fall below “outstanding” levels.

The best we can do is to try the cranked wing of the Mk1c (10mts span, 40 sq.mts. wing area, AR 2.5) perhaps with folding tips to assist stowage and an empty weight of less than 5600kgs.

The above break up is to illustrate the need so as to stay within weight limits so as to stay within the LCA advantages of good performance at low costs. If one needs all the capabilities in one platform – which I feel is difficult for us to justify- then we are looking at something in the range of Rafale upwards.

Conclusions

The only certainty Western Military Planners is certain about the next war he may be asked to fight is that it will not be over home territory. The ferry distance from his peacetime base, the weather, the terrain, the type of targets, the quality and numbers of the bases he has to be prepared to operate form and indeed the whole logistics of warfare is unknown to him. The equipment he must therefore is of ‘ready for anything and for any eventuality” comprehensiveness with a high degree of independence from ground /base located systems. Despite complex and expensive equipment he pays the price for “swing role” capability in terms of complexity reduced numbers and reduced performance.

By contrast the Indian Military planner knows everything about the war he is going to fight- targets, distances, routes, terrains, tactics ,the bases he will use, the extent of situational awareness support he will get from AWACS and ADGES systems, the likely time of the year he will be asked to fight and in some cases the profiles and personalities of his opponents.

It cannot be that these two completely different tactical situations will require the same and identical level of equipment. The Light Combat Aircraft fits into this scenario like a glove whereas for the Western commander it is a non starter from the word go.

 Our equipment can be simpler. India must persist with the introduction of a large number of LCA Mk1As and its variants as the core of its operational strength.  

The possibility of manufacturing 200 F 16s/Gripen Es is a direct threat to the LCA. These fine aircraft are too well equipped, too expensive, too general purpose and may be “too global policing “to be economical in our scenario and budget. The prospect of export is ‘sales talk”. It will be six years before we ourselves get even one! Our Bureaucracy will ensure that!

The reengineered LCA Mk1a will be an effective solution comparable or better than the  to the others. The unpardonable delays happened because such delays were condoned in the past by the Establishment. One hopes this is now past.

If we are forced by politics to go in for the F 16 /Gripen we should go for the simpler “tailored” versions of the Block 5/10/15 for the major part of the fleet and may be Block 60/70 for just two three squadrons.

Since the 1960s the IAF has handled a polyglot variety of aircraft with panache. The IAFs decision to use three categories LCA/MMRCA/MKI is extremely sound though with development of the LCA the MMRCA category could be of lesser numerical importance in our threat scenario. We may look at a mix of 30/4/10 squadron mix of the respective types.

The cost of these six hundred LCAs will be less than two hundred of any of the two hundred MMRCAs.

The Rafale selection is very good –its supply is reliable, it is a twin and it is sufficiently differentiated between the LCA and the Su 30MKI. We may need some more.

3.                  Given the inherent limitations of the LCA concept we must develop role specific variants for our air superiority/OAS/Night and Maritime roles. Trying to do it all in one airframe is foredoomed. The LCA’s engineering problems require a different approach than hitherto. The LCA and its variants, well re- engineered, offer an economical but effective solution to our essentially “defensive” or “non-policing” scenario. We cannot afford to accept the more glamourous Western concepts. We need a large core force of LCAs beyond the eighty three Mk1As.

1.                   

Table 2

Type	U We	UDL	UDL/UWe	U vol	U thrust
LCA mk1	1.18	0.87	0.74	0.96	1
LCA mk.1A	1	1	1	1	1
Gripen E	1.42	1.3	0.92	1.24	1.3
F 16 Bl.40	1.81	1.63	1.1	1.44	1.46
Rafale C	1.85	2.0	1.08	1.85	2.25
Typhoon	2.03	1.84	0.91	1.85	2.25
Mig 29	1.98	1.34	0.82	1.95	2.6
Super Hornet	2.65	2.3	0.87	2.46	2.9
Sukhoi Su 30	3.36	2.31	0.7	4.15	4.25

Notes:

1.U We.  is empty weight unitized using the LCA Mk1A’s dry weight of 5400 kgs as unit. It can be used to compare costs also by factoring approx $17,000/kg as the asking price for current Western equipment. The LCA in established production should cost at the rate of $ 6000-8000/kg.

UDL .is the unitized disposable load and is the difference between the empty and MTO weights reduced by 500 kgs to allow for pilot, parachutes, hydraulic fluids etc. It indicates how much more the type carries compared to the LCA Mk1A’s unit of approx 6500 kgs. It indicates how much more payload the type has compared to the LCA Mk1A range range.

The UDL/We gives how much offensive capability we are getting per kilo of aircraft weight.”Bangs per buck” is the appropriate slang!

UTV the unified target volume compares the visual signature of the aircraft and is also the index of the aircraft’s vulnerability to AAA. It is based on the span x Length x Height of the aircraft compared to those of the LCA’s.

UT is the Unified thrust and compares the type’s installed max thrust with the LCA’s. It is being used as an index of the IR signature of the aircraft.

What do these figures indicate?

1. The re-engineered LCA Mk1 A and its variants will be an effective solution comparable or better than the others. The unpardonable delays that have happened, I feel, are because these delays were repeatedly condoned. One hopes this is now past.

2. The Su 30s large visual and IR signature indicates it should be only for the air dominance role where its UDL/UWe indicates a very formidable performance even when carrying its entire ordinance such s BVRs. It would be a disaster in low cost roles. If used in such roles it will repeat the history of the Su7.

4.      There is little to choose between the various contenders in terms of cost effectiveness in our scenario.

5.                  The Rafale’s selection is very good- its supply is reliable, it is a twin and it is sufficiently differentiated between the LCA and the SU 30 MKI.For a one and half front war we will need an OAS component of 25 squadrons. The MMRCA contenders, are unsuitable, uneconomical and an unproven solution for this role as we will fight it.. We need to look at a production of around six hundred role specific LCAs over the next decade.