The
techniques of Market Research results in products which meet the customers’
needs to a greater degree. When it comes to combat aircraft the application of
MR is conspicuous by its absence. The West prefers to sell their complicated specifications
as the universal standard. The other reason is sophisticated specifications act
as an entry barrier to Asian competition.
Sufficient
statistical data exists to have a scientific approach to combat aircraft specifications.
With changes in the Government policy the Indian Private sector will now have
an opportunity to move into combat aircraft development and they start with handicaps.
Therefore the importance of Market Research and a statistical approach to
design appropriate fighters rather than “just like” fighters is imperative.
The
air arms of India and Pakistan flew around 11,000 fighter sorties in the wars
of 1965 and 1971. This involved mainly 2nd and 3rd
generation Fighters and is extremely valuable a resource base because we own
every bit of it. The Israeli Air Force flew about 14,000 fighter sorties in the
1967 and 1973 wars. The Arab Air Forces flew at least as many. If we now add
the Sinai Clashes of 1967-1973, the Iran Iraq wars, the Vietnam wars and the
various Gulf Wars we are looking at a data base of around 100,000 sorties. Much
of the above, except the Syrian AF’s very interesting experience is known and
much can be gleaned.
These
were sorties flown by 2nd and 3rd generation fighters operated
by Air Forces with wide variety of training, operational doctrines and
traditions. The combatants thus varied from well matched to so mismatched as to
be almost asymmetric warfare. Operating conditions varied from clear infinite
visibility over Sinai to sub continental haze to Vietnam monsoon and clouds. There
is obviously a good comprehensive statistical data base on which to formulate
what should be an ideal requirement. The West is not interested in such a study.
They are at a disadvantage in producing to low cost. An Indian initiative in
the direction of a “zero base” fighter may set the proverbial (lightweight) cat
amongst the pigeons.
What are the real
requirements?
The
actual requirements that emerge will go against brochure wisdom.
The
dogfight is not dead. Fighter aircraft will be designed to win the air to air. However
these constitute only perhaps ten per
cent of all sorties (and combat losses) flown.
The
main task of combat aircraft is close support and strike duties in VFR
conditions. This task also sees the biggest losses- about 60-70% to low cost defences - but scant
provisions are paid at the design stage to surviving this task or minimize
losses.
There
were perhaps a total of 10 cases, if that, in 100,000 sorties when a single
seat radar equipped fighter located engaged and destroyed a hostile aircraft at
night using its own radar. Work out the implications.
Even
when opposing aircraft were capable of all-weather/Mach2/20,000mts altitude
performance thousands of clashes occurred where the starting parameters were
450kts/3000mts/ VFR conditions which then wound down to WW2 parameters until
one had to break out and run. Tongue in cheek, one would say that internal fuel
capacity is more of an “outcome decider” than the max. AOA and other such
performance consuming abilities.
BVRs/CCMs/Cannon
BVRs
are not new. In Vietnam they showed a strict impartiality in what they knocked
down so much so that soon the SOP was one flight went ahead to “visually
identify so that the other flight could launch. This compromised the “surprise”
element which is a BVR feature. The impartiality of BVRs about the “enemy”
continues till this day.
BVR
advantages are accepted but it is also important to know also the following.
1. What
were the numbers of BVRs that were launched and missed and under what
parameters?
2. Numbers
that did a “blue on blue”?
3. BVRs
are heavy and “draggy”. How many had to be jettisoned at the beginning of a
combat to “clean up” the aircraft?
Though
CCMs are combat proven and definitely useful nobody is making the ‘sixties
mistake of deleting the gun.
Sauce for the Gander?
If
we transpose the above findings to a map of the performance envelope of the
various generations we get Fig 1 which plots design speed and altitude
capabilities of the various generations of fighters and matches it with what
has been used in combat. The BVR effective ranges with altitudes is also marked.
It will immediately be noted that some of the 2nd generation
Fighters were in every way nearer and better placed in terms of performance,
size and handling for where the fight will take place rather than the 3rd,
4th and 5th generation fighters. Combat experience
vouches for this. More comprehensive equipment adds ‘global” versatility which
is irrelevant to the Afro Asian Latin customer we are focussing on. Starting from this we then have the conjecture
what would happen if some of the 4th and 5th generation
technologies were selectively read across to redesigned 2nd
generation airframes.It will be seen that a redesigned 2nd gen
airframe with later systems both has a Market exciting products can be
developed at low cost. Having handled several system upgrades programmes a n
approach of airframe plus systems upgraded is the logical next step.
Why “copy”
There
are sound economic reasons for doing so. It certainly makes sense to any
Engineer. Wise copying provides the “shoulders of a Giant” on which to stand
and see further. Like the Chinese the Indian Industry will in the beginning
base its designs on “copy”. Tales of “Makkhi ( squashed fly on drawing) to
Makkhi” copy exists in every language in which engineers talk but actually it
is rarely possible or indeed useful to do so. Copying has pejorative
connotations but actually it can be an art form. The T 34 tank so shocked the
Germans (surely, after the Russians, the “Herrenvolk” of Tank design) that they
actually proposed to copy the T 34 “makkhi to makkhi” until it was realized
that the German Industry would find it difficult w.r.t . supplies of aluminium
required for the B2-34 Diesel Engine’s crankcase. The other nicer story, though
probably apocryphal, was that it was pointed out that the “finish” of the T34 was
so poor it would not pass the QC standards of the Technische-Amt-Heer! Ha! What the Germans did was actually the
highest form of copying. They studied the T34 absorbed its philosophy and
concepts and adopted it for their industry’s ecology. The resulting superb KPzW
V “Panther” had the sloping armour and the “overhung” gun of the T 34 (something
the “West” was long hesitant to introduce) but retained the peculiar
interleaved road wheels the Germans were so fond of- doubtless for track
metallurgy constraints. Between “makkhi to makkhi” and “philosophy” the
possibilities of low cost product development are endless and exciting.
For
the Project Engineer/Director the reasons for “copying” in Aeronautics are many
and pressing.
Calculations
and wind tunnel data are always
optimistic. Having an actual aircraft as a near basis e.g. Folland Midge/Gnat
or BAC 221/Concorde is reassuring and is wiser than going off the deep end and
end up red faced and spluttering.
Aerodynamics
is literally skin deep. Even a tiny aircraft like the Gnat had 10,000 parts.
Each has to be conceived, located, stressed, detailed and specified in terms of
metallurgy and production. All this takes time which is saved even by copying
broadly.
The
production details-manufacturing, jigs tools and fixtures, QC, heat treatment
all can be that much more rapidly decided.
Every
design has its faults. It is easier to correct a known fault in the “basis”
aircraft than identify a potential fault which will cunningly wait till flight
testing before it reveals its horns. I have in mind the fin and tail plane layout
vis a vis the HJT 36 which is now requires more time and “fiddle” to correct.
Finally
certification authorities are conservative
to the point of being superstitious! It helps if they have can see
something that has worked well before.
You
will have noticed that copying is not about “lacking in knowledge” Copying is
all about saving time. One can’t /won’t copy if one does not know or have the knowledge
or the wisdom. It is certainly not
“brainless”! The Designer has to have the brains- indeed wisdom- at every step
to decide if the Muse is relevant to his
ecology.
Does
one need the drawings of the original to copy? No. Modern e –engineering tools
and old fashioned engineering “horse” sense can obviate much of such need. What
will be needed is one or two of the muse airframe.
Why the Gnat?
My
ideal Light Fighter would be a twin engine having the F 86 Sabre’s pilot’s visibility
with the MiG 17 wing (AR 4!) modified to have the MiG 19’s wing structural
stiffness, may be the Su 7s wing section with its rounded L.E. which gave it
superb low level manoeuvrability, the Gnat’s forward fuselage married to a twin
engine rear fuselage from the MiG 19 and a “flak vierling” gun layout a la HF
24 all somehow blended with something of the Hunter’s grace and immense
strength. Of such stuff as dreams are made on and it won’t cost the earth! Sponsor for studies anyone? Of course
the HF 24 can be the basis of an entire Air Force (AJT, LIFT, Strike and
interceptor) all in that one basic air frame!
It
has to be emphasised that any of the best of 2nd and 3rd generation
airframes suitably modified will respond to “re-systeming” with current systems to create a “best” or
“most useful” fighter at low cost. The Gnat is being used only as a convenient
example of the nature of the effort required and the metrics of the improvements that can be
expected.
The
advantages of the Gnat were:
It
was naturally stealthy very difficult to see and even to hear which is very
important in conflicts where the Mk1 Eyeball and Ear model A continue to be
important sensors.
It
is a superb fighter-small size, high T/W. high AR, low power burn per “G”
It
was naturally area ruled. Formally area ruled aircraft e.g. Blackburn Buccaneer
suffer excessive drag when operating at “off design “speeds- which fighters do
all the time. The reports of the HF 24 “coming alive” at high speeds low level
was probably partly due to the area ruling “kicking in” as it were.
It
was brilliant structurally and very well engineered.
The
aircraft was modular. Quite considerable surgery can be done on the airframe
without involving a total redesign.
Despite
the good points the Gnat had some grievous faults and these are listed below.
Lethal/ Totally unacceptable faults:
Poor
ejection seat reliability
Poor
ejection seat performance envelope
Unreliable
Tail plane actuation
The
windscreen to rear pressure bulkhead distance did not permit pilots taller than
5’10” unless they agreed to leave their knees behind in case of ejection.
Interestingly several Gnat fanatics nevertheless flew the thing.
Unacceptable to very unacceptable faults
Cluttered
Instrument panel made worse by the very cramped cockpit.
Gun
stoppages in combat
Cracking
of gun mounts in full fire out.
Brake
parachute would scrape the ground and collapse causing “uncertainty” about reliable
operation.
No
antiskid
The
very poor air- conditioning. The cockpit temperature was 40o C with
full “cold’ at low level summer 400 kts. In the Ajeet we improved it- to 370
C! The very low bleed pressure (65psia) and the bad location of the CAU - in
the engine bay so that the brake fan’s output cooled the engine bay- was to
blame.
Idiosyncratic faults:
The
severe nose up trim change on retracting undercarriage at take-off.
Generator
MFO too high resulting in high taxiing speed or battery going flat.
Operational shortcomings
Inability
to catch a 3rd Gen Fighter or stay in the firing bracket long enough
to bring it down
Inability
to accommodate a CCM system within the existing Gnat airframe.
Equipment &specifications
The
engineering approach would be to avoid a thorough redesign to get a golden
standard and instead aim to have a reasonable solution to the problems
Seat and Safety
Introduction
of the MBMk 16 or KVD 36 seat. In extremis- if cockpit space is a constraint-
the old GF4 modified to have a rocket pack.
MDC
Larger
Battery and Hydraulic reservoir with fully duplicated Hydraulics and electrical
systems.
Redesigned
tail plane actuation system replacing the Hobson system. Good conventional systems
are available for “copying”
Windscreen
–bulkhead distance increased to suit a larger population percentile but not
necessarily to “International standards”. I expect the Aeroplane would sell
mainly in plus minus 30 degrees earth latitude and we should design to such a population.
I cite the example of Imperial Japanese war equipment was tailored to the
Japanese population and was ‘snug” to Western pilots and Tank crews who tried
them.
Glass
cockpit
Redesigned
gun feed as per the the Ajeet mods. which reportedly worked.
Strengthened
main forgings to take Aden /Gsh 30 recoil which used to crack on full fire out-
which incidentally was discovered after 10 years of service. One can never rest
tranquil in this business!
The
use of two (smaller) parachutes for braking a la Su 7.
The
introduction of a “trimming” airbrake to avoid change of trim on selecting air
brakes or “up” u/c.
Redesign
of Generator/ECU to tune MFO of the generator with the taxiing speed.
What is the additional/ replacement equipment
required?
Seat &
Safety: Martin Baker Mk 16/KVD 36/ GF4 Mod seat.LOX
or OBOGS*, GPWS*APU
Engine : RR Adour
811/Honeywell 125 N/ Motor Sich 222-25
Fixed Guns and Weapons:2X
Aden 30mm/ 2x Gsh 30 AO 65 for Ground attack /4 x Single NS 23 Flak Vierling layout/ 1x 23 mm GSh, 1x
GSh-30-2 CCM.
Should
there be ejector pylons? A lighter solution is to have Soviet style ejectible
stores or our own Arrow pods- they are a lighter solution.
Should
IR decoy flares be fitted? Maybe! This needs customer discussions because given
the small size of the aircraft there will be situations when the IR flares may
actually help locate the aircraft to the defenders!
Cockpit & Displays: HUD,
HOTAS, 5xMFD, GPWS *, Lightweight Radar or Laser ranger*, RWR, RAM, Health and
usage monitoring system (HUMS)*Radio altimeter,
Avionics: WAC,
ADC, HMS, Mission computers*, Radio Compass,Ring laser Gyro*,Digital Map*,IFF, Auto
pilot*,Self Protection Jammer.*
Alert
readers will immediately note that these are standard equipment fitted to the
Hawk and the Jaguar Darin 3 standards. Items marked*are only for select
versions of the aircraft.
The
airframe would have to be modified by lengthening and deepening it to
accommodate the HMS, the new engine and the ejection seat. The wing has been
slightly increased in area whilst keeping the same section plan form and twist
etc. The sketch (fig2) shows the Adour Gnat and the Folland Gnat profiles to
the same scale as a comparison of the sizes. Table 1.includes a “target volume”
i.e Length x span x height which is an approximation of the target the aircraft
will present to the enemy. This uses the Folland Gnat as a unit volume. The
small target made by the Adour Gnat is noticeable. The dimensions are
provisional and the project engineer will have to work like a bespoke tailor
with his nips and tucks. The aircraft shown has about 900 litres additional
space in the centre fuselage and about 80 litres in the forward avionics bay.
The Adour Gnat (1987)
The
Adour Gnat (1987) is built to philosophy of “cheerful pessimism”- things are
simple as possible but if they don’t work we will find out and fix them.. The
layout is conventional so FBW problems don’t hold up the programme i.e.
required it can be flown without FBW until that is debugged.. It also follows
the philosophy of “de-optimize locally to optimize globally”; It uses standard
supplies and rotables e.g. it uses the Jaguar/ Hawks engines hydraulics, brakes
,wheels, ECS and electrical etc perhaps as Government issue supplies to save
time and money. Needless to say because the design would closely follow the
Gnat’s the development cost and time
would be low. The prototypes would be built using “knife and fork” methods and
standard metal rolled sheet and extruded stock. Forgings could be replaced by
“machined from solid “items or open die forgings or even crankshaft quality SG
iron where possible. Naturally all tooling and production methods would follow
the Gnat /Ajeet’s practice. One nice thing is that like the Gnat the biggest of
the sub- assemblies are small in size which would reflect on the tooling costs.
This aircraft will be the trials aircraft rather like the Folland Midge and
would be similarly used for concept evaluation. The (1987)? It means that this aircraft could have been
on the flight line by 1987 as it uses only technology that was available in
India in 1983 but just look at the performance figures! The basic empty weight
would be 2850 kgs as compared to the 2160kgs of the Folland Gnat. Today the
relatively simple ‘analogue” would be used to check out the “Goods” and
reassure the shareholders!It would provide hard test data and a list of mods
that would be needed.
The Adour Gnat (1993)
Provided
the Adour Gnat (1987) attains 90-95% of its predicted performance and customers
are interested the next step would be to design an improved version using
optimized made to order accessories where indicated e.g. brakes wheels tyres
etc. This would also be the time to see if composites can be brought in.
Composite alone can save about 180 kilos on an airframe of this size but the
strategic implication of this material has to be understood. About FBW one has
to be even more circumspect. In a small fighter like this the weight of the
system has to be carefully assessed against the gain in trim drag. For example
the pitch inertia would be one seventh of the LCA’s which itself is a small
aircraft! A compromise which is interesting is the fitting of a single channel
FBW which would take inputs from the Air Data Computer, the G meter, the ASI
and select strain gauges embedded in the airframe to let the pilot know where
he is on the V-n diagram. This aircraft could have been ready in 1993.
The Honeywell Gnat F125
This
is the version that could be built today using the Honeywell F 125 IN engine.
The other alternative engines are the latest Adour or that dark horse the Motor
Sich AI 222-25 though RU/Ukraine politics are a factor. It may be interesting
to develop three proposals each using US. UK and Russian /Ukrainian aggregates
so that the customers can get equipment whose “philosophies” they are used to
thus easing his logistics. The weight savings due to the Honeywell engine
gives rise to the possibility of developing “heavy and light” versions of the
Fighter. The terms are relative. The “Heavy series “would be optimized and equipped
for Frontline close support and interdiction raids behind enemy lines. This
would be equipped with MiG 27 style cockpit armour, fuel tank and lines “inerting”
, heavy GSh 30 or GSh 30-2 cannon, armoured control and fuel lines which would give
it very relevant protection and slash aircraft losses to low cost air defence systems..The figure shows
the side view which also emphasises the commonality between the variants. The
variants will weigh in between 2400 kilos for an AD version with a single underbelly
23mm GSh to about 2850 for a dedicated “Shturmovik with armour protection and
using Aden 30mms.The version using the GSh 30-2 would be in between as that gun is lighter than a
pair of Adens by about 90 kilos.
An assessment of the aircraft.
The
term Gnat F 125 is being used to describe the generic version irrespective of
which set of equipment and engines is used as the differences would be
marginal. The table is self-explanatory and I will confine myself to the
discussion in which the Gnat F 125 is compared with a F 16 as a typical threat.
The
table shows that the Gnat F 125 will be a challenge to the F 16 even in on to
one. In 4 vs 4 or 2 vs 2 the advantage will be with the smaller aircraft. In
straight line performance the F 16 will gain but the price is the A/B to below
“bingo” levels.
The Gnat F 125 ‘s acceleration levels from M 0.6
to M 0.9 whilst retaining CCMs will show startling improvement over the Gnat
enabling the type to prevent a 3rd or 4th generation
fighter from breaking off at will. The Folland Gnat’s M limits were 0.91 at LL
and 0.98 at higher altitudes so it is reasonable to expect M 1 at “all
altitudes” though if it is genuinely
required (and I be a doubting Thomas!) the wiser course would be to design a 6% wing.
Fortunately such a change is easy thanks to the Gnat’s “modular” structural
design.
General
flying characteristics will still be very much “hot rod” like original Gnat
though the Gnat F 125 will not have the “hair trigger” feeling of the original
because of the increases in damping and
the inertias in all axes but it will
still very much remain a Gnat!.
In
the strike role the Gnat F 125 will carry up to 3000 kilos typically 4x 500 kgs
plus 125 rounds/barrel for the 30mms and 2 into CCMs over a 180-220n.m. radius
lo-lo-lo with the usual reserves.
At
high altitudes, 10,000mts head on BVR case at 100 kms apart the F 16 will have
a clear advantage in reach. Given the small size and signatures of the Gnat the
F 16s detection range and the AMRAAM Kp will, however, be about 10% that of
conventional size fighters.
At
low altitude head on the firing window of the missile will be reduced .Chances
of a BVR kill will be small to the extent the BVR may have to be jettisoned.
In
ground attack the F 16 will have twice the range payload but will suffer four
times the hits from SA/AAA of the same intensity. The Gnat’s life cycle
delivery will thus be more than the F16’s because the Maths apart the pilot’s
efficiency and aggression will increase with his improved survival.
Compared
the LCA the Gnat 125 would be cheaper and just as good in most tactical
situations with better close combat abilities. The LCA will be somewhat better
in all weather profiles which is numerical not a high demand.
There
is no magic. The Gnat is merely optimised for its most probable role and thus
excels. It shows that there is a place for such a “concept warplane” in the
inventories of even fairly sophisticated Air forces.
A short note on
the Development effort required.
Aircraft
development does not require huge resources ,production may. One of the reasons
why the Gnat has been selected for this study was that it required very little
resources to develop. The following details of Folland Aircraft will be of
interest. It was founded in 1940 and had never built a complete production
aircraft before let alone a Jet aircraft.Its resource were:
Total area 53 acres. Covered Area including Office and Factory: 46,000 sq.mts.
Total area 53 acres. Covered Area including Office and Factory: 46,000 sq.mts.
Personnel:
About 800 of which the design strength at its peak was 150 people yet the Gnat
flew within 4 years of go ahead using prototyping technology of about 70 years
ago.
With
the use of Modern CAE, and CAM and the use of sound engineering and project
management methods the manpower and capital requirements could be even further
reduced.
The
time line for development could be approximately as below
0-15
months – Project studies studying alternatives – Adour Engine with British
Accessories, Honeywell 125 engine with US accessories and Motor Sich AI
222-25with Russian Ukrainian accessories and about 7 alternatives combinations
of engines, seats and guns and various combinations of dimensions, weights and
performances.
Tentative
project costing, possible vendor /subcontractor identification and talks with
suppliers of rotables for project partnership.
16-50
months Prototype in metal as “Company demonstrator”.
51-54
months: Flight trails and reviews of data and analysis
55-
70 months: Definitive pre- production machines with progressive introduction of
most relating to “Heavy” and “Light” series fighters.
Price of the Cat
The
price of weaponry, as with prices of drugs, has no relation with the actual cost
of producing it. In India the true cost of production have been masked by the
PSUs operating inefficiencies and weird taxations and customs duties not to
mention the earlier Government R&D
policies.
The customer and the market
The
market for this type of aircraft is said to be around 12,000 airframes.
Currently this sector is served by watered down versions of 4th
generation aircraft and Advanced Trainers. It is tempting to think of the IAF
as a launch customer but it may actually be fatal for any Private venture (PV)
to even think of it because the “decision cycle” time of the IAF is financially
unsustainable for any PV. It would be much better to keep the IAF in the loop,
give it the full ego massage befitting a prospective customer but the main
customer will be the Asian, American and African air Arms making do with over
sophisticated equipment or with combat equipment whose spare parts have to be
sourced from museums. The concept will be laughed to scorn but astute companies
like Textron are investing. Cap in hand and shuffling my feet I would say that
Textron got the balance wrong by being too much Cessna based. The Scorpion is a
1st Generation airframe with fourth gen systems but the idea is
right and it is awaiting the winners! It is inevitable that even the bigger air
arms may see the sense of the Gnat F 125 but to be gulled into tailoring the aircraft
too much to the point of exclusivity may result in the Bailiffs coming in
before the Bank notes.
A well strategized aircraft development
programme is very predictable and within costs manageable as a PV. India has
the resources both Human and legacy not to speak of the enterprise of our
people to develop a remarkable range of combat aircraft of great potency. The
then Government’s decision to anoint an yet to exist organization with no
production facilities to develop a state of the art warplane defies logic even
“Saturday night at the bar” type of logic. The psychological impact of such ill
decisions must not be allowed to cloud our vision of the potential of the
Indian Industry in supplying original combat equipment to the world
In sum
Modern
airframes are unsuited for the most likely combat condition. This reduces their
effectiveness and battle outcome.
Reprise
of 2nd generation airframes matched with later gen systems will produce
marketable combat equipment. This is the way to go for Indian private
companies. India has considerable upgrade equipment and access to many
excellent 2nd generation airframes. This is an exciting potential.
The
style of handling the project would like an “armed reccee”. Success at each low
cost sub stage alone will guarantee farther exploration.
Past
experience notwithstanding such aircraft couldbe in service within 6-7 years.
Table 1
Type
|
AR
|
W/L
|
T/W
|
ID/T
|
Target
Volume
|
|
Folland
Gnat
|
3.6
|
237
|
0.71
|
0.20
|
1
|
How
good it was as a basis!
|
MiG
21 Bison
|
2.2
|
354
|
0.64/0.87/1.14
|
0.39/0.32
|
2.8
|
|
LCA
Mk.1
|
1.8
|
242
|
0.52/0.84
|
0.35
|
3.1
|
|
Adour
Gnat (1987)
|
3.6
|
303
|
0.6/0.9
|
0.24
|
1.2
|
Low
cost Demonstrator
|
Adour
Gnat (1993)
|
3.6
|
286
|
0.63/0.94
|
0.23
|
1.2
|
Introduces
Composites, made to order accessories
|
Gnat
F125 2008
|
3.6
|
267
|
0.75/1.2
|
0.18
|
1.2
|
Current
engines e.g. Honeywell F125
|
F 16
A
|
3.2
|
408
|
0.64/1.15
|
0.244
|
4.4
|
Target
vol. shows the price paid for versatility.
|
JF 17
|
3.7
|
372
|
0.48/0.95
|
0.23
|
4.4
|
Notes:
AR Aspect ratio
W/L is wing
loading in clean combat weight with full internal fuel kg/M2
T/W Thrust to weight
in kg/kg at above weight. Two ratios give full military and A/b thrust/weight
ratios.
ID/T Gives the percentage of power consumed at S/L
,3.5 G turn at clean combat weight.
Target Volume indicates the target the aircraft
presents to AA defences. Span x length x height .Folland Gnat is taken as unit
volume.
The simple table above accurately reflects why
that the Folland Gnat gave the MiG 21 Bis a hard time in DACT sorties. The MiG
21 had to use its A/B to disengage. Such a move would be ill advised against
the F 125 whose figures above are with
two CCMs. These would find the large IR signatures of the F 16/ MiG 21/JF 17
very attractive.