The Direction the Indian Private Sector may take to Build up an Indian Military Industrial Complex (MIC): The Bee, the Fly, and the Bottom of the Pyramid?!

The Bee and the Fly

It appears if one puts a bee in an empty glass jar and the glass jar is put in a dark room with its bottom facing a strong source of light the bee- logically equating light with an opening – will repeatedly try to “fly out”  through the bottom until it dies of exhaustion. Interestingly, a fly, being illogical, will zip around in all direction and very quickly fly out from the open end of the jar. Our Private Sector, I feel, is emulating the bee. It is being “logical”, the hope of a logical big launch order blinding it against an invisible and possibly an extremely resilient obstacle.

Am I being unduly pessimistic? A practicing engineer always has an ingrained dour pessimism regarding the cost of money and unlike the PSU the Private sector cannot run on infinite delays and overdraft. (Note. 1)

What we wish to analyse is the role the Indian Private sector can profitably play and if it may not be more fruitful if some apparently radical line of thought is pursued. The illogic of “Latest and Best” Western weaponry must be accepted (Note 2). There are limitations in the capabilities of the Indian Industry and we have to carefully study these contradictions and anomalies to produce weapons which are different, marketable and yet within our present capabilities. (Note 3)

Because Weaponry is per se “useless” no country supplies more than “venture Capital” for any Weapons development programme. That venture capital, too, comes from the earnings of the previous successful weapons programme. No previous exports - no new programmes. China was in the past a possible exception but then the Chairman was spending thirty times more on his MIC alone than what he was spending on his Urban development. Such deprivation is not an option for us. We therefore have to plan for weapons export as an Integral plan right from the start. The idea of funding development of weaponry with the sole objective “to save foreign exchange” is naïve or whitewash. As a corollary the constant moan of lack of funding is appalling. Free funded weapons development is unsustainable. Earn it first!

It is nobody argument that the selling of weapons is a National effort. Every President or Premier that visits New Delhi comes with an appendage of Hawks or Howitzers to sell. So ideally we should have a situation where the Cabinet, the PMO, North Block, DRDO the PSU, the Armed Forces and the Private Sector should be working in close co-operation and harmony creating a National effort to build and export Weaponery. One will instinctively notice how long the chain is.

It is in this idée fixe of somehow everyone should work as a team that I am skeptical of and it is this idea that the Industry must sideline if it is to succeed. Two primary factors come to the fore in any success

a) The quality of the decisions taken and
b ) The quantity of the orders expected.

Let us examine the quality of decision making in matters related to Defence which are in Public Domain:

1. The failure to wake up to the Chinese threat even after the Chip Chap Valley incident in 1959. The troops had to face Chinese PPShs with bolt action SMLEs in 1962.

2. The failure to fund the development of the Orpheus B.Or.12 at the rate of 1 million GBP/ year for two years. This later hobbled the Marut project. Mind you we found money to buy an aircraft carrier and it complement of aircraft about the same time i.e. 1957.

3. Though the Orpheus was for two decades numerically the most important engine in the IAF (Marut. Gnat, Kiran Packet) no attempt was made to develop/improve the engine in terms of thrust, SFC, TBO. One “Science Lab” afterburner programme (Note 4) was closed down with alacrity once the daring test pilot was killed in what may have been a Pilot Error situation. Money was of course made available for a GTX project which had no immediate application.

4. Repeated efforts by HAL to develop the HF 24 –HF 73,GAF, ASA, and HF 25 at costs of around Rs. 70 crores were not funded in circa 1971-1976. In 1983 we funded a “Rahu” Organization –ADA-(For Non Indian readers!-Rahu in Indian astrology is dissatisfied head without a body) to the tune of Rs. 565 crores for the crucial MiG 21 replacement plan. At that time the earlier HAL proposals were not revisited and refunded to keep as a “second string” given the obvious and glaring weaknesses of the venture.

5. The somewhat arbitrary manner in which both the Gnat/Ajeet and the Marut were retired even though it was clear that the Hunters, particularly the T66s were going to the scrapper‘s yard very soon.

6. The incredible seventeen years delay in ordering the AJTs.

7. The delay in following up the HDW submarine programme- resulting in all the skilled manpower retiring out- before taking up the Scorpene programme.

8. Someone sat on the Bofors 155/39 drawings for Twenty years. By that time the fashion had changed to 155/45 calibre. Given this litany why should one be optimistic?

The reasons for such contrariness in decision making are not the present issue. The issue is that in the Indian Techno structure, read Raisina Hill, will not provide the Private Sector speedy logical decisions. The private sector cannot afford delay. Has there been any reliable indication that things are about to change and change very dramatically, for the better?

To be sure the New Government has been remarkably “sure footed” in its pronouncements so far but caution suggests that we do not plan on the basis of anticipated change for the better. There are two very important reasons for ignoring, as of the present, of a “helpful” Government Techno structure. One is from the past. You will note that many of the above weird decisions were taken during the Nehru/ VK Krishna Menon watch where sincerity of aims was unquestionable. The other reason is pragmatic. You may have noticed it is remarkably easy to change one’s plans when the circumstances suddenly change for the better. So whilst optimism about the new Government is to be retained such hope must not find a place in the Private sectors plans. Better prepare as if Raisina Hill will be ready with the spokes and spikes.

The Bottom of the Pyramid

The second area we must look at is the value of the order- particularly the annual production order. Presuming the Private sector has survived the first hurdle above what will it get anyway? What have been the procurements over the past 30 years or so? 3-500 combat aircraft, 2500 tanks, 500 field guns, a million rifles in several varieties and so on. The Navy’s procurements have been better but again the annual value would still probably be sub profitable. Whilst the figures look impressive prima facie they work out a miserable production rates which is what the Industry will have to factor in. ( Note 5) Between the long delays pending a (possibly) weird decision it is quite possible that the Private sector will realize the wry truth of Northkote Parkinson’s dictum that delay is the deadliest form of denial. I may add that according to Parkinson we may find that strong support and enthusiasm at one level of Government is usually replaced by ridicule and harassment at the next level.

To sum up this section we may conclude that:

a) The Indian decision making process is “unreliable” for business planning.
b) The Indian market is too small to tailor our products to the Indian Armed Forces need
c) And finally- the Indian Private sector is still not ready to produce competitive weapons- i.e. products that can match the big Five (US, Russia, China, Europe, France!). It has the POTENTIAL to do so but potential is so different from reality.

So what would be a summary?

1. What the present Government is doing-Make in India” is extremely welcome but it still remains a “Hygiene”- it will improve the situation, it will create a base, but it will not transform our capability.

2. Our present capabilities in the Private Sector is not still sufficient to “create” new weapons. It is still some time away from making competitive “big league” equipment.

3. Fortunately there is a vast untapped equipments market worth- my conservative guess is about USD 10 billion per annum for appropriate equipment which the Private sector can supply.

4. The CII and similar such bodies must resolve to do what the Government has failed to do i.e. to develop a comprehensive set of weaponery and equipment which is specifically suitable for fighting the Third World’s wars”. Today the Third World is equipped with expensive unsuitable equipment developed for fighting the White Man’s wars or making do with “Grandfather’s Generation “equipment!.( Note 6, 3)

5. Do an analysis of the economic conditions of these countries and how much money they are spending on Defence and what are they getting for it, what we can buy from them and what can they buy from us. (Note7)

6. Accept as an axiom that an Indian designed weapon, built with Indian or local labour, to Indian standards, and Indian materials will be two to five times cheaper. (Note7)

7. Set up a Think Tank of independent (note) experts who would be able guide what kind of equipment should be developed. 8. Do Professional market research.

9. Set up Test Standards that realistically reflect Third world Warfare conditions rather than the Global Market/Temperate and Arctic zone conditions.

Can the Private Sector develop a MIC without any Government aid ? I am reminded that the Germans-after the First and Second World Wars formed offshore enterprises in Denmark, Sweden and Spain to keep their MIC intact under the noses of the victorious Allies Commissions. I have absolute confidence given our ancient Mercantile skills we can do better.

Notes

1. The delay in clearing the F 35 and the F 22 Raptor may spell a period of great difficulty regarding US dominance in the Aerospace market because of Commercial failure of the product. The B 787 Dream liner may be giving nightmares in Seattle not because of the Technical problems which Boeing will definitely solve but because of red ink in ROI. Convair went with the Coronado CV990, Douglas went with the DC 10, is it now Boeing’s turn, I wonder ? I just want to illustrate the harsh realities of the real world as compared to the world of PSUs.

2.Take the case of the so called Mine proof vehicles. It was a Western “latest and Best” idea that is less than successful. Is that the best for counter Insurgency? It’s weak point is that it is confined to the motor able road. The Maoists know they are safe in the jungles. Would not an armed and lightly armoured (STANAG1 level) All Terrain Vehicle e.g a Bren Gun carrier or a Kettenkrad that can get off the road and give them hot chase be more useful.

3. I was looking up at random about the Republic of Salvador. The GDP is USD 50 billion and it’s armed forces is about twenty thousand personnel who are engaged in-what else- counter insurgency. We can presume that it’s defence budget is around 2 billion annually of which perhaps 300 million USD is for new acquisitions. Now there are eighty countries which represent an Arms market of may be 24 billion USD. Is it not worth looking into?

Salvador’s armed forces are equipped with guns of 120 mm caliber maximum, light armoured vehicles, and the Airforce uses 40 Vietnam era Helicopters, 10 Basler modified Dakotas and 16 Cessna T 37 jet trainers for their strike duties. Until the ‘90s I think they used to use ex- Israeli Ouragans. Their heavy truck is a MAN, perhaps similar to our Shaktiman. .What is the equipment we can supply to Salvador to upgrade their combat capabilities? Similarly when we talk about Tanks we think automatically of super power MBTs. What about the old concept of the “Infantry Tank”?. Surely the Abrams or Arjun tank- good as they are -is not the best equipment for Salvador! A modernized Stuart -that did so well in the Burmese terrain- or perhaps a KPzW IV with all the mod cons which can be afforded in large numbers may be more suitable than the incomparable Leopard or Abrams in a country where the max vehicle load for bridges is thirty tons. It should be possible for Indian Industry to develop very simple but modernized replacements without risk of great additional investments.. The best part is there are 77 countries like Salvador’s and even trickle orders can keep the lines busy and profitable.

4. I can’t remember to have seen a variable area nozzle of any sort on the surviving HF 24 R prototype in HAL’s flight test hangar.. If this is indeed so then the jet pipe must have been enlarged to the higher after burning jet pipe temperature. This would have meant a modified ‘fatter” rear fuselage. This would have increased the “base” drag- no wonder she performed badly when the Afterburner was not “on”. I can’t myself believe this but that is what I had seen- oh! so many years ago! Notes/ corrections anyone?)

5. The production rates of the Chinese make for sober thinking. In 1961 they were producing thirty MiG 17s a month! Their current production rates – witness the line ups of J10s – means they have not lost the habit!

6. The Tamdaw Lay ( Burmese AF) flies the MiG 29. What they probably needs is a simple close support aircraft more in line with a “baby” A-10 or Su 25. Across the world the G77 countries are “making do” with over potent platforms with watered down equipment or weaponery where one has to buy the spare parts from museums or from David Monathan AFB boneyard!!

7. We may buy to re- export or assist to export I think it is Chad which makes an excellent cheese out of Camel’s milk. It cannot be exported to the Euro zone because the Euro zone wants fully automatic milking machines (in Chad! Lieber Gott!) What we can do is to see if Amul will help the Chad people to use Indian expertise to export the product so that they can buy from us.

8. In the HJT 16 Kiran after setting the cabin pressurization capsule setting ( at 7000’?) the setting screw had to be held in place by a small collar which slipped over the hex. Head to prevent it from rotating. The hex head was slightly smaller than the hex. Hole in the collar and did not come even in contact with the collar. Yet the collar had to e made from imported “S1” steel- which is exactly ordinary mild steel ut made in a :certified” factory in the UK. The Russians don’t have this business of “certified” materials and GOST standards are sufficient. The MiG 21s spars are made from ΧΓСΑ30 material the A denoting not Aerospace as is sometimes mistakenly assumed but that it is an economically valuable material and is to be used with reserve! My experience in production of high tech licensed engineering products was that our manufacturing prices were one fifth of their selling prices!

Prodyut Das

Professor

Prodyut Kumar Das is an Alumnus of St.Xaviers’ Hazaribagh, IIT Kharagpur, and IIM Kolkata. He started his career with Aircraft Design Bureau HAL and for twenty years worked and led various vehicle related Product Development Projects with leading Indian and multi National Companies.

He left Industry to join IIT Kanpur in 1993 as a Professor in the Department of Mechanical Engineering. There he won a prize of the Royal Aeronautical Society of UK for his design of a light sports aeroplane using grants given by ARDB. He also did a project study on “The design of a Light Car costing less than 1 Lakh” which was a Ministry of HRD funded project IDICM 36 and started his research on Stirling Engines in which the IN was keen.

When IIT Kanpur did not renew his 5 year tenure he returned to the  Industry as a Vice President Technical and finally retired as Advisor Aerospace in the e- Engineering Division of a Leading Indian Engineering Company.

He currently teaches Engineering in a Private Engineering College in his hometown and continues his Research as a Consultant. He has been writing on matters related to Defence Engineering since 1990s.