A cat amongst the pigeons – an Indian concept of an universal light fighter.

The techniques of Market Research results in products which meet the customers’ needs to a greater degree. When it comes to combat aircraft the application of MR is conspicuous by its absence. The West prefers to sell their complicated specifications as the universal standard. The other reason is sophisticated specifications act as an entry barrier to Asian competition.

Sufficient statistical data exists to have a scientific approach to combat aircraft specifications. With changes in the Government policy the Indian Private sector will now have an opportunity to move into combat aircraft development and they start with handicaps. Therefore the importance of Market Research and a statistical approach to design appropriate fighters rather than “just like” fighters is imperative.

The air arms of India and Pakistan flew around 11,000 fighter sorties in the wars of 1965 and 1971. This involved mainly 2^nd and 3^rd generation Fighters and is extremely valuable a resource base because we own every bit of it. The Israeli Air Force flew about 14,000 fighter sorties in the 1967 and 1973 wars. The Arab Air Forces flew at least as many. If we now add the Sinai Clashes of 1967-1973, the Iran Iraq wars, the Vietnam wars and the various Gulf Wars we are looking at a data base of around 100,000 sorties. Much of the above, except the Syrian AF’s very interesting experience is known and much  can be gleaned.

These were sorties flown by 2^nd and 3^rd generation fighters operated by Air Forces with wide variety of training, operational doctrines and traditions. The combatants thus varied from well matched to so mismatched as to be almost asymmetric warfare. Operating conditions varied from clear infinite visibility over Sinai to sub continental haze to Vietnam monsoon and clouds. There is obviously a good comprehensive statistical data base on which to formulate what should be an ideal requirement. The West is not interested in such a study. They are at a disadvantage in producing to low cost. An Indian initiative in the direction of a “zero base” fighter may set the proverbial (lightweight) cat amongst the pigeons.

What are the real requirements?

The actual requirements that emerge will go against brochure wisdom.

The dogfight is not dead. Fighter aircraft will be designed to win the air to air. However these constitute  only perhaps ten per cent of all sorties (and combat losses) flown.

The main task of combat aircraft is close support and strike duties in VFR conditions. This task also sees the biggest losses- about 60-70% to low cost defences - but scant provisions are paid at the design stage to surviving this task or minimize losses.

There were perhaps a total of 10 cases, if that, in 100,000 sorties when a single seat radar equipped fighter located engaged and destroyed a hostile aircraft at night using its own radar. Work out the implications.

Even when opposing aircraft were capable of all-weather/Mach2/20,000mts altitude performance thousands of clashes occurred where the starting parameters were 450kts/3000mts/ VFR conditions which then wound down to WW2 parameters until one had to break out and run. Tongue in cheek, one would say that internal fuel capacity is more of an “outcome decider” than the max. AOA and other such performance consuming abilities.

BVRs/CCMs/Cannon

BVRs are not new. In Vietnam they showed a strict impartiality in what they knocked down so much so that soon the SOP was one flight went ahead to “visually identify so that the other flight could launch. This compromised the “surprise” element which is a BVR feature. The impartiality of BVRs about the “enemy” continues till this day.

BVR advantages are accepted but it is also important to know also the following.

1.      What were the numbers of BVRs that were launched and missed and under what parameters?

2.      Numbers that did a “blue on blue”?

3.      BVRs are heavy and “draggy”. How many had to be jettisoned at the beginning of a combat to “clean up” the aircraft?

Though CCMs are combat proven and definitely useful nobody is making the ‘sixties mistake of deleting the gun.

Sauce for the Gander?

If we transpose the above findings to a map of the performance envelope of the various generations we get Fig 1 which plots design speed and altitude capabilities of the various generations of fighters and matches it with what has been used in combat. The BVR effective ranges with altitudes is also marked. It will immediately be noted that some of the 2^nd generation Fighters were in every way nearer and better placed in terms of performance, size and handling for where the fight will take place rather than the 3^rd, 4^th and 5^th generation fighters. Combat experience vouches for this. More comprehensive equipment adds ‘global” versatility which is irrelevant to the Afro Asian Latin customer we are focussing on.  Starting from this we then have the conjecture what would happen if some of the 4^th and 5^th generation technologies were selectively read across to redesigned 2^nd generation airframes.It will be seen that a redesigned 2^nd gen airframe with later systems both has a Market exciting products can be developed at low cost. Having handled several system upgrades programmes a n approach of airframe plus systems upgraded is the logical next step.

Why “copy”

There are sound economic reasons for doing so. It certainly makes sense to any Engineer. Wise copying provides the “shoulders of a Giant” on which to stand and see further. Like the Chinese the Indian Industry will in the beginning base its designs on “copy”. Tales of “Makkhi ( squashed fly on drawing) to Makkhi” copy exists in every language in which engineers talk but actually it is rarely possible or indeed useful to do so. Copying has pejorative connotations but actually it can be an art form. The T 34 tank so shocked the Germans (surely, after the Russians, the “Herrenvolk” of Tank design) that they actually proposed to copy the T 34 “makkhi to makkhi” until it was realized that the German Industry would find it difficult w.r.t . supplies of aluminium required for the B2-34 Diesel Engine’s crankcase. The other nicer story, though probably apocryphal, was that it was pointed out that the “finish” of the T34 was so poor it would not pass the QC standards of the Technische-Amt-Heer! Ha! What the Germans did was actually the highest form of copying. They studied the T34 absorbed its philosophy and concepts and adopted it for their industry’s ecology. The resulting superb KPzW V “Panther” had the sloping armour and the “overhung” gun of the T 34 (something the “West” was long hesitant to introduce) but retained the peculiar interleaved road wheels the Germans were so fond of- doubtless for track metallurgy constraints. Between “makkhi to makkhi” and “philosophy” the possibilities of low cost product development are endless and exciting.

For the Project Engineer/Director the reasons for “copying” in Aeronautics are many and pressing.

Calculations and wind tunnel data are always optimistic. Having an actual aircraft as a near basis e.g. Folland Midge/Gnat or BAC 221/Concorde is reassuring and is wiser than going off the deep end and end up red faced and spluttering.

Aerodynamics is literally skin deep. Even a tiny aircraft like the Gnat had 10,000 parts. Each has to be conceived, located, stressed, detailed and specified in terms of metallurgy and production. All this takes time which is saved even by copying broadly.

The production details-manufacturing, jigs tools and fixtures, QC, heat treatment all can be that much more rapidly decided.

Every design has its faults. It is easier to correct a known fault in the “basis” aircraft than identify a potential fault which will cunningly wait till flight testing before it reveals its horns. I have in mind the fin and tail plane layout vis a vis the HJT 36 which is now requires more time and “fiddle” to correct.

Finally certification authorities are conservative to the point of being superstitious! It helps if they have can see something that has worked well before.

You will have noticed that copying is not about “lacking in knowledge” Copying is all about saving time. One can’t /won’t copy if one does not know or have the knowledge or the wisdom. It is certainly not “brainless”! The Designer has to have the brains- indeed wisdom- at every step to decide if the Muse is relevant to his ecology.

Does one need the drawings of the original to copy? No. Modern e –engineering tools and old fashioned engineering “horse” sense can obviate much of such need. What will be needed is one or two of the muse airframe.

Why the Gnat?

My ideal Light Fighter would be a twin engine having the F 86 Sabre’s pilot’s visibility with the MiG 17 wing (AR 4!) modified to have the MiG 19’s wing structural stiffness, may be the Su 7s wing section with its rounded L.E. which gave it superb low level manoeuvrability, the Gnat’s forward fuselage married to a twin engine rear fuselage from the MiG 19 and a “flak vierling” gun layout a la HF 24 all somehow blended with something of the Hunter’s grace and immense strength. Of such stuff as dreams are made on and it won’t cost the  earth! Sponsor for studies anyone? Of course the HF 24 can be the basis of an entire Air Force (AJT, LIFT, Strike and interceptor) all in that one basic air frame!

It has to be emphasised that any of the best of 2nd and 3^rd generation airframes suitably modified will respond to “re-systeming”  with current systems to create a “best” or “most useful” fighter at low cost. The Gnat is being used only as a convenient example of the nature of the effort required and  the metrics of the improvements that can be expected.

The advantages of the Gnat were:

It was naturally stealthy very difficult to see and even to hear which is very important in conflicts where the Mk1 Eyeball and Ear model A continue to be important sensors.

It is a superb fighter-small size, high T/W. high AR, low power burn per “G”

It was naturally area ruled. Formally area ruled aircraft e.g. Blackburn Buccaneer suffer excessive drag when operating at “off design “speeds- which fighters do all the time. The reports of the HF 24 “coming alive” at high speeds low level was probably partly due to the area ruling “kicking in” as it were.

It was brilliant structurally and very well engineered.

The aircraft was modular. Quite considerable surgery can be done on the airframe without involving a total redesign.

Despite the good points the Gnat had some grievous faults and these are listed below.

Lethal/ Totally unacceptable faults:

Poor ejection seat reliability

Poor ejection seat performance envelope

Unreliable Tail plane actuation

The windscreen to rear pressure bulkhead distance did not permit pilots taller than 5’10” unless they agreed to leave their knees behind in case of ejection. Interestingly several Gnat fanatics nevertheless flew the thing.

Unacceptable to very unacceptable faults

Cluttered Instrument panel made worse by the very cramped cockpit.

Gun stoppages in combat

Cracking of gun mounts in full fire out.

Brake parachute would scrape the ground and collapse causing “uncertainty” about reliable operation.

No antiskid

The very poor air- conditioning. The cockpit temperature was 40^o C with full “cold’ at low level summer 400 kts. In the Ajeet we improved it- to 37⁰ C! The very low bleed pressure (65psia) and the bad location of the CAU - in the engine bay so that the brake fan’s output cooled the engine bay- was to blame.

Idiosyncratic faults:

The severe nose up trim change on retracting undercarriage at take-off.

Generator MFO too high resulting in high taxiing speed or battery going flat.

Operational shortcomings

Inability to catch a 3^rd Gen Fighter or stay in the firing bracket long enough to bring it down

Inability to accommodate a CCM system within the existing Gnat airframe.

Equipment &specifications

The engineering approach would be to avoid a thorough redesign to get a golden standard and instead aim to have a reasonable solution to the problems

Seat and Safety

Introduction of the MBMk 16 or KVD 36 seat. In extremis- if cockpit space is a constraint- the old GF4 modified to have a rocket pack.

MDC

Larger Battery and Hydraulic reservoir with fully duplicated Hydraulics and electrical systems.

Redesigned tail plane actuation system replacing the Hobson system. Good conventional systems are available for “copying”

Windscreen –bulkhead distance increased to suit a larger population percentile but not necessarily to “International standards”. I expect the Aeroplane would sell mainly in plus minus 30 degrees earth latitude and we should design to such a population. I cite the example of Imperial Japanese war equipment was tailored to the Japanese population and was ‘snug” to Western pilots and Tank crews who tried them.

Glass cockpit

Redesigned gun feed as per the the Ajeet mods. which reportedly worked.

Strengthened main forgings to take Aden /Gsh 30 recoil which used to crack on full fire out- which incidentally was discovered after 10 years of service. One can never rest tranquil in this business!

The use of two (smaller) parachutes for braking a la Su 7.

The introduction of a “trimming” airbrake to avoid change of trim on selecting air brakes or “up” u/c.

Redesign of Generator/ECU to tune MFO of the generator with the taxiing speed.

What is the additional/ replacement equipment required?

 Seat & Safety: Martin Baker Mk 16/KVD 36/ GF4 Mod seat.LOX or OBOGS*, GPWS*APU

Engine : RR Adour 811/Honeywell 125 N/ Motor Sich 222-25

Fixed Guns and Weapons:2X Aden 30mm/ 2x Gsh 30 AO 65 for Ground attack /4 x Single NS 23  Flak Vierling layout/ 1x 23 mm GSh, 1x GSh-30-2  CCM.

Should there be ejector pylons? A lighter solution is to have Soviet style ejectible stores or our own Arrow pods- they are a lighter solution.

Should IR decoy flares be fitted? Maybe! This needs customer discussions because given the small size of the aircraft there will be situations when the IR flares may actually help locate the aircraft to the defenders!

Cockpit & Displays: HUD, HOTAS, 5xMFD, GPWS *, Lightweight Radar or Laser ranger*, RWR, RAM, Health and usage monitoring system (HUMS)*Radio altimeter,

Avionics: WAC, ADC, HMS, Mission computers*, Radio Compass,Ring laser Gyro*,Digital Map*,IFF, Auto pilot*,Self Protection Jammer.*

Alert readers will immediately note that these are standard equipment fitted to the Hawk and the Jaguar Darin 3 standards. Items marked*are only for select versions of the aircraft.

The airframe would have to be modified by lengthening and deepening it to accommodate the HMS, the new engine and the ejection seat. The wing has been slightly increased in area whilst keeping the same section plan form and twist etc. The sketch (fig2) shows the Adour Gnat and the Folland Gnat profiles to the same scale as a comparison of the sizes. Table 1.includes a “target volume” i.e Length x span x height which is an approximation of the target the aircraft will present to the enemy. This uses the Folland Gnat as a unit volume. The small target made by the Adour Gnat is noticeable. The dimensions are provisional and the project engineer will have to work like a bespoke tailor with his nips and tucks. The aircraft shown has about 900 litres additional space in the centre fuselage and about 80 litres in the forward avionics bay.

The Adour Gnat (1987)

The Adour Gnat (1987) is built to philosophy of “cheerful pessimism”- things are simple as possible but if they don’t work we will find out and fix them.. The layout is conventional so FBW problems don’t hold up the programme i.e. required it can be flown without FBW until that is debugged.. It also follows the philosophy of “de-optimize locally to optimize globally”; It uses standard supplies and rotables e.g. it uses the Jaguar/ Hawks engines hydraulics, brakes ,wheels, ECS and electrical etc perhaps as Government issue supplies to save time and money. Needless to say because the design would closely follow the Gnat’s  the development cost and time would be low. The prototypes would be built using “knife and fork” methods and standard metal rolled sheet and extruded stock. Forgings could be replaced by “machined from solid “items or open die forgings or even crankshaft quality SG iron where possible. Naturally all tooling and production methods would follow the Gnat /Ajeet’s practice. One nice thing is that like the Gnat the biggest of the sub- assemblies are small in size which would reflect on the tooling costs. This aircraft will be the trials aircraft rather like the Folland Midge and would be similarly used for concept evaluation. The (1987)?  It means that this aircraft could have been on the flight line by 1987 as it uses only technology that was available in India in 1983 but just look at the performance figures! The basic empty weight would be 2850 kgs as compared to the 2160kgs of the Folland Gnat. Today the relatively simple ‘analogue” would be used to check out the “Goods” and reassure the shareholders!It would provide hard test data and a list of mods that would be needed.

The Adour Gnat (1993)

Provided the Adour Gnat (1987) attains 90-95% of its predicted performance and customers are interested the next step would be to design an improved version using optimized made to order accessories where indicated e.g. brakes wheels tyres etc. This would also be the time to see if composites can be brought in. Composite alone can save about 180 kilos on an airframe of this size but the strategic implication of this material has to be understood. About FBW one has to be even more circumspect. In a small fighter like this the weight of the system has to be carefully assessed against the gain in trim drag. For example the pitch inertia would be one seventh of the LCA’s which itself is a small aircraft! A compromise which is interesting is the fitting of a single channel FBW which would take inputs from the Air Data Computer, the G meter, the ASI and select strain gauges embedded in the airframe to let the pilot know where he is on the V-n diagram. This aircraft could have been ready in 1993.

The Honeywell Gnat F125

This is the version that could be built today using the Honeywell F 125 IN engine. The other alternative engines are the latest Adour or that dark horse the Motor Sich AI 222-25 though RU/Ukraine politics are a factor. It may be interesting to develop three proposals each using US. UK and Russian /Ukrainian aggregates so that the customers can get equipment whose “philosophies” they are used to thus easing his logistics. The weight savings due to the Honeywell engine gives rise to the possibility of developing “heavy and light” versions of the Fighter. The terms are relative. The “Heavy series “would be optimized and equipped for Frontline close support and interdiction raids behind enemy lines. This would be equipped with MiG 27 style cockpit armour, fuel tank and lines “inerting” , heavy GSh 30 or GSh 30-2 cannon, armoured control and fuel lines which would give it very relevant protection and slash aircraft losses to  low cost air defence systems..The figure shows the side view which also emphasises the commonality between the variants. The variants will weigh in between 2400 kilos for an AD version with a single underbelly 23mm GSh to about 2850 for a dedicated “Shturmovik with armour protection and using Aden 30mms.The version using the GSh 30-2 would  be in between as that gun is lighter than a pair of Adens by about 90 kilos.

An assessment of the aircraft.

The term Gnat F 125 is being used to describe the generic version irrespective of which set of equipment and engines is used as the differences would be marginal. The table is self-explanatory and I will confine myself to the discussion in which the Gnat F 125 is compared with a F 16 as a typical threat.

The table shows that the Gnat F 125 will be a challenge to the F 16 even in on to one. In 4 vs 4 or 2 vs 2 the advantage will be with the smaller aircraft. In straight line performance the F 16 will gain but the price is the A/B to below “bingo” levels.

The  Gnat F 125 ‘s acceleration levels from M 0.6 to M 0.9 whilst retaining CCMs  will show startling improvement over the Gnat enabling the type to prevent a 3^rd or 4^th generation fighter from breaking off at will. The Folland Gnat’s M limits were 0.91 at LL and 0.98 at higher altitudes so it is reasonable to expect M 1 at “all altitudes” though if it is genuinely required (and I be a doubting Thomas!)  the wiser course would be to design a 6% wing. Fortunately such a change is easy thanks to the Gnat’s “modular” structural design.

General flying characteristics will still be very much “hot rod” like original Gnat though the Gnat F 125 will not have the “hair trigger” feeling of the original because of the  increases in damping and the inertias in all axes but  it will still very much remain a Gnat!. 

In the strike role the Gnat F 125 will carry up to 3000 kilos typically 4x 500 kgs plus 125 rounds/barrel for the 30mms and 2 into CCMs over a 180-220n.m. radius lo-lo-lo with the usual reserves.

At high altitudes, 10,000mts head on BVR case at 100 kms apart the F 16 will have a clear advantage in reach. Given the small size and signatures of the Gnat the F 16s detection range and the AMRAAM Kp will, however, be about 10% that of conventional size fighters.

At low altitude head on the firing window of the missile will be reduced .Chances of a BVR kill will be small to the extent the BVR may have to be jettisoned.

In ground attack the F 16 will have twice the range payload but will suffer four times the hits from SA/AAA of the same intensity. The Gnat’s life cycle delivery will thus be more than the F16’s because the Maths apart the pilot’s efficiency and aggression will increase with his improved survival.

Compared the LCA the Gnat 125 would be cheaper and just as good in most tactical situations with better close combat abilities. The LCA will be somewhat better in all weather profiles which is numerical not a high demand.

There is no magic. The Gnat is merely optimised for its most probable role and thus excels. It shows that there is a place for such a “concept warplane” in the inventories of even fairly sophisticated Air forces.

 A short note on the Development effort required.

Aircraft development does not require huge resources ,production may. One of the reasons why the Gnat has been selected for this study was that it required very little resources to develop. The following details of Folland Aircraft will be of interest. It was founded in 1940 and had never built a complete production aircraft before let alone a Jet aircraft.Its resource were:
Total area 53 acres. Covered Area including Office and Factory: 46,000 sq.mts.

Personnel: About 800 of which the design strength at its peak was 150 people yet the Gnat flew within 4 years of go ahead using prototyping technology of about 70 years ago.

With the use of Modern CAE, and CAM and the use of sound engineering and project management methods the manpower and capital requirements could be even further reduced.

The time line for development could be approximately as below

0-15 months – Project studies studying alternatives – Adour Engine with British Accessories, Honeywell 125 engine with US accessories and Motor Sich AI 222-25with Russian Ukrainian accessories and about 7 alternatives combinations of engines, seats and guns and various combinations of dimensions, weights and performances.

Tentative project costing, possible vendor /subcontractor identification and talks with suppliers of rotables for project partnership.

16-50 months Prototype in metal as “Company demonstrator”.

51-54 months: Flight trails and reviews of data and analysis

55- 70 months: Definitive pre- production machines with progressive introduction of most relating to “Heavy” and “Light” series fighters.

Price of the Cat

The price of weaponry, as with prices of drugs, has no relation with the actual cost of producing it. In India the true cost of production have been masked by the PSUs operating inefficiencies and weird taxations and customs duties not to mention the  earlier Government R&D policies.

The customer and the market

The market for this type of aircraft is said to be around 12,000 airframes. Currently this sector is served by watered down versions of 4^th generation aircraft and Advanced Trainers. It is tempting to think of the IAF as a launch customer but it may actually be fatal for any Private venture (PV) to even think of it because the “decision cycle” time of the IAF is financially unsustainable for any PV. It would be much better to keep the IAF in the loop, give it the full ego massage befitting a prospective customer but the main customer will be the Asian, American and African air Arms making do with over sophisticated equipment or with combat equipment whose spare parts have to be sourced from museums. The concept will be laughed to scorn but astute companies like Textron are investing. Cap in hand and shuffling my feet I would say that Textron got the balance wrong by being too much Cessna based. The Scorpion is a 1^st Generation airframe with fourth gen systems but the idea is right and it is awaiting the winners! It is inevitable that even the bigger air arms may see the sense of the Gnat F 125 but to be gulled into tailoring the aircraft too much to the point of exclusivity may result in the Bailiffs coming in before the Bank notes.

 A well strategized aircraft development programme is very predictable and within costs manageable as a PV. India has the resources both Human and legacy not to speak of the enterprise of our people to develop a remarkable range of combat aircraft of great potency. The then Government’s decision to anoint an yet to exist organization with no production facilities to develop a state of the art warplane defies logic even “Saturday night at the bar” type of logic. The psychological impact of such ill decisions must not be allowed to cloud our vision of the potential of the Indian Industry in supplying original combat equipment to the world

In sum

Modern airframes are unsuited for the most likely combat condition. This reduces their effectiveness and battle outcome.

Reprise of 2nd generation airframes matched with later gen systems will produce marketable combat equipment. This is the way to go for Indian private companies. India has considerable upgrade equipment and access to many excellent 2^nd generation airframes. This is an exciting potential.

The style of handling the project would like an “armed reccee”. Success at each low cost sub stage alone will guarantee farther exploration.

Past experience notwithstanding such aircraft couldbe in service within 6-7 years.

Table 1

Type	AR	W/L	T/W	ID/T	Target Volume
Folland Gnat	3.6	237	0.71	0.20	1	How good it was as a basis!
MiG 21 Bison	2.2	354	0.64/0.87/1.14	0.39/0.32	2.8
LCA Mk.1	1.8	242	0.52/0.84	0.35	3.1
Adour Gnat  (1987)	3.6	303	0.6/0.9	0.24	1.2	Low cost Demonstrator
Adour Gnat (1993)	3.6	286	0.63/0.94	0.23	1.2	Introduces Composites, made to order accessories
Gnat F125 2008	3.6	267	0.75/1.2	0.18	1.2	Current engines e.g. Honeywell F125
F 16 A	3.2	408	0.64/1.15	0.244	4.4	Target vol. shows the price paid for versatility.
JF 17	3.7	372	0.48/0.95	0.23	4.4

Notes:

AR      Aspect ratio

W/L    is wing loading in clean combat weight with full internal fuel kg/M²

T/W    Thrust to weight in kg/kg at above weight. Two ratios give full military and A/b thrust/weight ratios.

ID/T    Gives the percentage of power consumed at S/L ,3.5 G turn at clean combat weight.

Target Volume indicates the target the aircraft presents to AA defences. Span x length x height .Folland Gnat is taken as unit volume.

The simple table above accurately reflects why that the Folland Gnat gave the MiG 21 Bis a hard time in DACT sorties. The MiG 21 had to use its A/B to disengage. Such a move would be ill advised against the F 125  whose figures above are with two CCMs. These would find the large IR signatures of the F 16/ MiG 21/JF 17 very attractive.

Preparing for Armageddon - Criticality of Developing Indigeneous Weaponry

The rise of new economic powers gives rise to forces which can well be described as ‘Tectonic’. The usual means of resolving such forces since the Punic Wars is prolonged and bloody war. India is re-emerging as an independent economic powerhouse and must expect and prepare for an eventual confrontation, possibly even war, with China and ultimately the USA. The contours of such a conflict cannot be discussed here. Perhaps the paranoid may be forgiven the view that the various ongoing aggressions - the funding and sustaining by proxies of terrorist and insurgent activities, the sustained support for Pakistan by the US, the building of encircling bases by China, the covert acts of cartographic aggressions and even the printing of fake currency notes are all carefully planned opening moves of a campaign to reduce and weaken the Indian State before administering the coup de grace. Sage political leadership may find ways of resolution by peaceful means but the precedents of such leadership being available are not encouraging. Thus sic vis pacem parabellum must be the urgent policy. Of the three protagonists, India is the least prepared for such a showdown. In our past wars sustainability of the war effort was not a significant issue but will be so in this future conflict. In sustainability our weakness borders on the grievous. Seventy percent of India’s war-making equipment is imported. A few years of remorseless sanctions and this shiny hitech equipment will become dust covered junk. An indigenous and comprehensive war industry is worrisomely overdue. Technical “challenges” are the least of our problems; ‘Timeliness’ is. If we have to be ready in time we have to reorganise so that the undoubtedly adequate available resources are best organised for timeliness. Wars can be deterred by having sufficient numbers of adequate, but homegrown, equipment to execute sound doctrines.

Reorganising...ad infinitum

“Whenever things go wrong we tend to reorganise and there is no better method of creating an illusion of progress when in reality changing nothing”. Quoted two thousand years ago by the sage Tacitus, this illustrates the inherent difficulty in reorganising. The authority to reorganise lies with those very people who created the problem in the first place. The disastrous track record of weapons development by the state sector was caused by the almost criminal flouting of the simplest rules of management. These failures can be easily corrected if the political leadership wills it. Even if “half improvements” are made in all the areas where mistakes were made, there will be a sea change. The starting fault lay in isolated development without a detailed interweaving with broader strategy. That misstep resulted in chasing the butterflies of latest technology. Confusion was worse compounded by keeping everything within state control and out of reasonable public scrutiny. India has lost time dangerously. The saving grace is that the skilled work forces of today are larger, the design resources have improved and if we can completely shed in defence R&D the wasteful dogma of over protective state control we may, with a few path breaking corrections, surprise ourselves at the turnaround.

The Need for Honest Doctrines

It was a British General who stated rather ruefully “You haven’t fought unless you have fought the Germans”. The truth in the statement can be judged from the fact that the Wehrmacht quickly overwhelmed European armies and then fought the two world superpowers for four years – and almost won! Every country has its doctrines .What made the Germans formidable was the emphasis they paid on honestly developing doctrines and their ability to incorporate available technology into their theories. German equipment was not superior. In fact the German KPzW II and III tanks that ripped France open in 1940 were inferior to the French Somuas and the British Matildas. What set Guderian and Student apart was that instead of trying to justify a concept (which happens here often enough) they went about with clinical impartiality (one could say sterility) to allow the idea to grow. The outcome of such “Brahman” (there is no better word) detachment from the result actually resulted in brilliant tactics and meticulous plans with a cascade of consequential studies and action. The sweep through the Ardennes required the landing of gliders on Eban Emael. When DFS gliders landed the Fallschirmjaegers on to the top of that fortress, the hollow charge weapons required to punch through the roof of the cupolas had been anticipated and developed. Impregnable Eban Emael fell within a few hours to a small and lightly equipped force. This is the end result of a coherent policy of the development of doctrines matured in the full knowledge of the political leadership which gave inputs of political will and sanction from the start. Two fundamental points need to be underlined. The first was the German readiness to use suboptimal but internally available technology to incorporate into their war plans. They used the Junkers Ju-52 as tow planes for their gliders because that was what was available. They did not insist on getting a manufacturing license for the immeasurably superior C-47 Dakota to equip their airborne forces. Equally important, the German General Staff, despite all its Prussian snobbery was reasonably willing to allow non Hochgebornen and relative juniors, the proverbial ‘man on the spot’, to develop and expound doctrines which may have “frightened the horses” in another Army. Guderian and Student were half Colonels when they set out their theories of Panzer and Airborne troops. Generals should be more occupied talking to the political masters (as did General Manekshaw in 1971) sorting out permissions and sanctions to mess around with sweeping ideas. Let that be done by ‘the man on the spot’. The problem with the ‘thinking General’ is that there can never be critical analysis of the doctrines as, during service, he represents the highest perfection in human thinking. Think dispassionately and make do with what you can cobble together. The Wehrmacht, planning for the more difficult war of aggression, thought honestly and based that thinking on equipment that was ‘homegrown’ (indigenous in Indian speak). We have to adopt their ways of gardening.

Bringing the Dogs out of the Doghouse

In India the bureaucracy (‘iron frame’ or ‘iron control’?) has sustained a prolongedand by now irritatingly petty campaign –to keep the Military in the doghouse. Immediately after Independence there may have been some reason but an aspirant ‘Super India’ cannot afford this upmanship. A state funeral for Field Marshal Manekshaw, with all its pomp and circumstance, would have been a great demonstration of Super India. Instead it appears the bureaucracy got its knickers in a twist about the precedence between a Cabinet Secretary and a Field Marshal! Shame! The Military has to be restored as an equal partner because there will always remain the doubt that even a brigade of the most obstructive babus will not halt the Chinese or the Americans: only the Armed Forces will. The babu -Politician nexus must be neutered to bring the Armed Forces out of the Doghouse and make them a respected party to the entire process of decision making at the War Cabinet level. What is the result of ‘dog housing’ the Military? Compared to the Prussian ‘Big Picture Brahmanism’ what we have is a predilection for the incoherent leading on to the incomprehensible. It appears (even 60 years on, the bureaucracy needs to keep its secrets dark!) the decision not to use the Air Force in 1962 came more from the inputs of the IB rather than from the professionals of the IAF! That too after the shooting war had started. The INS Vikrant is a telling case to the point. Did we go in for a carrier because there was a perceived maritime threat that overrode the Army’s/IAF’s need to prepare for mountain warfare or did some British FO babu let an Indian babu know that the HMS Hercules was up for sale and could be had at a reasonable price? Having got the Vikrant we had to wait for the PNS Ghazi to blow up before we risked it in the Bay of Bengal for a mere 3% (one hundred and eighty nine) sorties against a defeated enemy. For much less the Navy could have got shore-based Il-28s or Canberra squadrons which could have been more versatile and ‘expendable’. The question to be asked in sanctioning an aircraft carrier is, would the Navy risk its prize pig in an actual war? The same question arises when the Army wants MBTs that can make surgical thrusts into Pakistan. Are our politicians steeled (no pun) to permit such a thrust? Will the Americans/Chinese allow it? Does the Army’s culture allow it? Losses in defence are accepted but very few Brigadiers (being decent middle class chaps) will proceed if he begins to take losses in an offensive. If the answers are no, then Liddel Hart’s concept is irrelevant. Settle for the Arjun, its reliable even if it is not the “latest and best”. This is not the place for details but the experience of tank warfare in the Gulf wars is as relevant to reality as the bombing of Guernica was to prove that the fast bomber could survive in the face of opposing interceptors! The fault is not with the Armed Forces. As long as the Armed Forces are kept ignorant, they will insure themselves by asking for equipment of the highest technical merit without its relevance to realities. Note that the Wehrmacht was always clear of the political aims well before the war. If the strategic scenario is not settled the rest of the details cannot follow. Why did the HF-24 have to achieve Mach 2? Why did we buy the AMX-13s if we basically used them as mobile pill boxes? Why did the IAF lack hardened shelters? Why were Canberras, Gnats and Mysteres still in natural (silver finish) in 1965? Why was the raid on Peshawar carried out using single 4000lb ‘Blockbusters’ which, as the name indicates, are used against dense strategic targets? A load of 8x250 lbs would have wiped out the entire PAF force of B-57s.

Reining in the Bureaucracy

Such lapses indicate that war planning was inefficient and neglected. Since the Military was being kept out of the developing “big picture” the essential time required to plan was never available. When the ‘Desert Rats’ (LRDG) went to war they had the technical expertise of ten years of desert operations taught to them by archeologists who had spent time investigating Carthagian ruins in North Africa. The details went down to how to store maps – “don’t fold them-keep them between sheets of plywood”. Success in war is critical on detail. Compare that with our para commando’s gallant efforts (or picnic, if one is uncharitable) with Jongas in the Western desert. It is fortunate for us that the Pakistanis were just as chaotic. The concept of dropping parachutists at Adampur, Pathankot and Halwara was brilliant but the Pakistani planning details were a Buster Keaton comedy. One hopes there is not a re-run by the US First Airborne. There is a need for “thinking” which needs “time”. To obtain the necessary time, the bureaucracy and the Military must talk as equals instead of one devising crafty protocols so that only the other is frisked at our airports. “Frisk the lot” one can hear the public say. The same attitude problem bedevils the formation of a General Staff; a bête noir for the bureaucracy who are the only gainers in the inevitable inter-services rivalries that the lack of such an institution fosters. A Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS) makes for coordination and efficiency. The force multiplier effect of the CCS can be gauged by the fact that after the First World War, the defeated Germans were allowed an Army and a Navy but not a CCS. We can no longer deny ourselves this potent force multiplier.

Operations Research is the key

“I put so little milk in my tea”, said the Irishman, “that you could hardly call it tea”. Like Paddy’s’ tea, we are taught to think OR is not OR if it does not have lots of mathematics. Our professors substitute mathematics which they can teach (after a fashion) for real experience which they never got. In OR, mathematics comes at the last to quantify the problems which OR has defined. Since disconnected mathematics is boring and meaningless, the present pedagogy has succeeded in frightening and confusing people off meaningful OR. That is unfortunate because OR is an outstanding zero cost force multiplier. What should be the TBO of our engines given that many engines will be downed due to FOD well before the brochure figures? What should be the actual airframe life given our flying conditions and CAT “E”rates? What are the “g”s we normally pull in Su-30 sortie profiles? What is the average g-loc level of the Indian pilot? What will be the reduction of effort in having standardised aggregates? What is the real shooting range for tank guns given our varying terrain? What are the weapons our intruder aircraft must carry given the accuracy of the bombing equipment? Will it be more effective to have a salvo of low accuracy but much cheaper SAMs compared to the imported ‘single shot’ wonders? OR studies could minimise our technology needs and the work burden in weapons development. Even in daily operations the impact of OR, done by practical men, can reduce the workload of preparing for war. There may be thousands of ‘Kaizen’ applications which will help in reducing the ‘run rate’ required if we are going to be ready on time.

Standardisation: de-optimise

The Soviets thought nothing of fitting the same AGD horizon on all aircraft from the Yak-18 basic trainer to the Tu-20 intercontinental bomber, over a hundred times bigger. This standardisation extended across all systems and aggregates that went into combat equipment, be they gyros, generators, batteries, instruments, heat exchangers. Unthinkable de-optimisation for the West, the dividends were huge: availability, reduced prices and simplified logistics; in short, optimised war capability. The Soviets, unlike the West, even avoided having a sacrosanct materials grade for aviation. Used to GOST they would laugh to see mild steel for a bracket being called DTD S1 and being imported with a release note. Our Government functionaries will not initiate this vital rejig. Why bother? The pension is guaranteed. They have to be re-educated. India’s automotive industry, having adapted the AS 9100, has quality standards which are often equal to the aerospace standards being followed. The Private Sector and its various collective associations such as CII must give the lead to re-examine current automotive expertise vis-à-vis aerospace technologies of fifty years ago. Russian standardisation went further. The TsAGI (their NAL) would investigate aerodynamic layouts e.g. the uniquely Russian ‘tailed-delta’ layout and leading design bureaus would further tailor the data for widely diverse aircraft such as the MiG-21, the Myasischev Bounder intercontinental bomber and the Su-9 all weather interceptor. If resources were so organised India would be the envy of many aerospace nations because of the vast, diverse and deep pool of world class technologies in aerospace/automotive equipment we have access to and experience of. What needs to be done is to examine our range of products and select for standardisation those which are most indigenisable completely and quickly. Being proof against sanctions must be the deciding criteria. Standardise ruthlessly. Compared to the MiG-27’s R.29B the M53’s exterior is so elegant that you could wear it on a tiepin. But is a jet engine for wearing on a tiepin? They are all alike as peas in a pod functionally. What goes for jet engines and ventilating fans probably goes for Army howitzers also if one sees what is being meant. God bless the Army but there was nothing wrong with the Bofors 155mm howitzer selection! Mount the Bofors barrel and systems on an expendable aluminum carriage to get an ultra light howitzer. Howzzat?

Limit the Technology

What Tacitus observed for ‘War’ is true in India for ‘Technology’. The enthusiasm for technology seems to be the highest with those with the least experience of it. It is painful to see the Government run weapons development organisations take on jobs that many have patently no experience or attitude for. Any discussion on aero-engine development, for example, soon gets in to jargon like SC blades, flat rating and smokeless combustors. Such jargon and its usage betray a lack of the practical. These fascinating technologies are not essential. For example low TBO is not a core problem. It can greatly simplify the timely development of an acceptable engine. The IAF will kick and scream but it can be persuaded to accept an engine that gives only 300 hrs TBO provided it was utterly reliable within those 300 hours, was easy to change and spare parts were plentiful. The IAF quite rightly will not accept any engine if it is ‘unreliable’.

No Time for Invention - Learn to Copy! 

The Chinese have a tradition of making painstaking copies: sneered at by the West – the word ‘Chinese Copy’ having insinuations of brainless copying – the Chinese have an admirable capability of getting into detail, reputedly the very place where the devil resides. It is significant that when we got the Gorshkov, the Chinese bought very cheaply the hulk of the Varyag for copying. Copying does not result in second rate weapons. Real engineers – those who by definition can do for six pence what any fool can do for six shillings – copy all the time. The Soviet strategic bomber force was built up within four years by Tupolev who was astute and humble enough to copy the B-29 from examples which had force landed in the USSR. “Legend in his lifetime” status notwithstanding, he would have returned to prison had he failed! The Tu-4 with its remote controlled turrets was ready for service with the Dalnaiya Aviatsiya in the stipulated time with numbers and reliability and gave the Russians the deterrent force they needed. Our weapons developments have been done by Governmental Scientists, unfortunately, without the persuasion of possible imprisonment. Having no effective experience or capability, it appears that connections, politics and ‘organisational tribalism’ decided the selections, the project leaders ignored the world’s richest and most diverse source of advanced weapons technology. They seem to have betrayed their lack of engineering abilities by starting with clean sheet designs. The national disaster, it is nothing else, is repeatedly there to see. To note is that the experienced French consultants to ADA, for example, stuck to their known devil of the tailless delta/FBW which was not the wisest choice for India. In fact they did not even venture to go from a 3-digital plus one analog channel (as an engineering concept it had much to commend it) to the ‘latest and best’ all four digital configuration. Apparently that added 4 years to the LCA’s delay. We have to copy and evolve for the present. For example we have a range of engines The AL-55(I), the Adour, the R.25, the RD. 33 and the AL.31F whose details we largely have. Let us select any three as our light, medium and large engines, with or without afterburner as singles and multiples cover everything from light trainers to strategic long range missile carrier aircraft. These engines should be copied not necessarily within the Government Scientist biradari but at the ‘Indian Nation’ level i.e. including the private sector with completely equal and fair advance funding! Current ‘Apex’ (jargon for bottleneck) organisations, especially the failed ones, must be turned on their sides to become ‘bus bars’ feeding detail technology to the teams. True, certain items such as rolling bearings and alloy elements and microchips need to be stockpiled but that is manageable. Of course the results would be suboptimal, in the way a Chinese J-10 or a Hong 6 is suboptimal but the US will think carefully before trying to take on China. Skilled designers can produce effective and affordable warplanes from the menu of engines and accessories that we already possess.

Innovation or ‘Jugard’

The other ace is to innovate. When Britain needed a multirole fighter to face the Germans, Frank Barnwell of Bristol, being an engineer, did not go about designing the ideal aircraft. He took the wings and tail of the existing Blenheim light bomber, married it to a slimmer fuselage and produced in time the Bristol Beaufighter, an aircraft that later revolutionised anti shipping strikes. The Soviets had a long tradition of adapting Naval guns for tank gunnery. At usual firing ranges they were effective. The famous 88, dreaded as a tank/anti-tank weapon, started life as an anti-aircraft gun. And so on. In the neglected area of AAA, the greatest harvester of enemy aircraft even today, our main need is not static but air transportable AAA. It may be wiser to use the gun and fire control of the Shilka, Tangushka or naval 76mm dual purpose guns as the basis of a range of static AAA weapons rather than design a new gun from the carriage up. Similarly barrage balloons on the approaches could reduce the efficacy of runway busting bombs. The possibilities are endless, given our resourcefulness.

Equipment for that War

Indian defence tasks for future conflicts can perhaps be summarised in the following:

» Denial of immune approaches to the Indian Coast by large Aircraft Carriers.
» Ability to thwart hostile advances in the mountains.
» Denial of using Pakistan territory as a spring board for launching military offensive operations.

The above abilities must be maintained in the face of prolonged sanctions over the issue of Nuclear Proliferation, carbon emission or similar pretexts. The roots of the Pacific War were in America imposing sanctions on petroleum and rubber to Japan for the same contemporary ‘outrage’ which was overlooked in the case of Italy. To stand up to such blackmail we will need totally indigenous weapons and vast numbers of them. The fright about the weaponry displayed in the Chinese Golden Jubilee parade was not advanced technology. The fright was that it was available in such large numbers and that it was all Chinese down to the last ‘O’ ring. Should nuclear weaponry have lower priority over building up sustainable conventional forces? During the 1960s, when China’s nuclear teeth were still ‘milk’, they routinely shot down any US aircraft that intruded into Chinese airspace because of Chinese confidence that any war could be sustained indefinitely. They knew their ‘obsolete’ technology was not ‘ineffective’ in the minds of the Pentagon. To put the mindless harping of ‘Fifth generation technology’ in the correct perspective, the reality is this: even as we talk of the FGFA, MCA etc, the IAF Chief of Air Staff, would be deeply grateful if he were given three hundred new build MiG-21s. If on the top of that, the fighter “landed slowly and did not burn up” he would feel a man reprieved. With this perspective in mind, the country needs to develop a range of simple, secure and effective warplanes.

The Simplest Air Superiority Fighter

Thus, the LCA nettle must be grasped firmly. As of present it is a ‘failure’. The LCA is not going to be ready in any useful time. No one loses his pension/ Padma Shri in case the 2010 dateline fails (yet again). Effective squadron service is like “Dilli, dur ast”. Technologically it is totally insecure. Even its material of construction is sanctions prone. The Su-30 suffers similarly with the added problem that it violates a cardinal rule of combat equipment; it is too huge. It will be, like the Su-7, vulnerable to low cost defences. The LCA will be an option once it is redesigned to be ‘sanctions proof’. The so called LCA Mk.2 must be recognised for what it actually is - an effort to undo the worst sins of the Mk.1. The detail engineering of the airframe was careless. To this end the airframe should be redesigned in aluminum and the detail design gone over with a fine comb by engineers rather than ‘scientists’. Working with familiar material, the stress men will achieve a significant weight reduction. The scope is certainly there. Once the weight is reduced, effective performance can be achieved with a copied R25/RD33. No engine is good enough to overcome careless detail design. Without a ‘sterile’ re-organisation, the LCA/F414 will be a re-run. The ideal (LCA) would have been a Gnat enlarged sufficiently to pack the MiG-21 Bison’s systems and weaponry in a new airframe which would conform closely to the Gnat’s aerodynamics and structural philosophy. The power plant would be again a ‘secured’ R.25 or RD.33 but without the afterburner as supersonic performance is known to be of little use and the Gnat concept is fine tuned for excellent transonic or ‘real’ combat conditions. The obvious improvements (LEX, LE Flaps etc) can come progressively in the Mk.X! ‘Scientists’ may not know enough to believe in scaling up (one actually spouted Reynolds Numbers–wrongly–to frighten the ‘ignorant’) but engineers know that the list of aircraft, including world famous ones, developed by direct ‘enlargement’ is as long as one’s arm! A scaled down MiG-29 using either AL.55s or non-reheated RD.33s and optimised for clear weather air superiority at transonic speed i.e. tuned for the regime where 95% of the combat takes place would be an option. You will still win the war because almost all the time you will be in the right aircraft at the right place at the right time and in the right numbers. If three simultaneous fighter projects seem much too much, remember that faced with a similar crisis, the Soviets sponsored twenty six! That was good management wisdom because they got three ready in time. Two of the three winning designs then actually saved Russia.

The Simplest Strike Aircraft

Two warplanes are envisaged in this category. The first is a minimum engineering revival of the Ajeet airframe to take the Saturn AL 55 engine, possibly with afterburner in the later models. Critics will say that the warload is too small. The improvement in AAA is such that the ‘Western cold war’ concept of a very large war load is now illogical. In actual combat the small size of the Gnat meant that not one was lost to AAA in the East though it flew as many strike sorties as the Hunter and the MiG-21 - the bangs per kilo buck were thus quite comparable. The turbofan and re-engineering will double the radius of action and far more. The second is a revival of the HF-24’s proven airframe to carry the MiG-21 Bison/Jaguar systems and equipment and powered again by the AL-55. It should be possible to provide additional over wing pylons like the Jaguar as well as a centre line pylon but many other ideas like LEX, or shortening the fuselage, can wait for the later marks. One important ‘human’ advantage of using proven airframes and systems is that not only can the work be reliably completed within three-four years but also the babus are less hesitant about certifying the bird! For the potential achieved by re-engineering a warplane of this class, read Vayu Aerospace Review II/1990 by this same Author. Past failures were entirely avoidable. The earlier Ajeet and the HF-24 Mk.1R failed because the ‘improvements’ pushed up weight and therefore drag but the engine remained the Orpheus. In the case of the HF-24 Mk.1R, the locally developed afterburner was so simple that it possibly even lacked a variable area nozzle. In fact these projects should not have even been tried! To add insult to injury the detail engineering, which really makes or breaks an aeroplane, was always a weak point with the organisations concerned. Recently it appears that an ‘expert’ from Germany had come and pointed out that the cable guards were fouling with the control runs in the NAL Saras. If true this is appalling but gives hope for the future! One does not need experts from Germany to point out such simple things- one needs Engineers who will get off their b***sides and crawl over the prototype when it is undergoing assembly. A mention of this is made to show that things are going wrong because the simplest rules of product development are being ignored.

The “expendable” Transports

Logistics form the backbone of warfaring capability. Without airlift capability some of those ultra light howitzers may end up in the Beijing and Washington war museums. Transports are needed and in large numbers. A enlarged version of the Otter or the An-2 and a revival of the Dakota or may be the Dornier 228 but with about twice the power will be needed. The same goes for a new avatar of the C-119 Packet but with turboprops or the An-12. Robert Watson Watts of HM Post Office, charged with getting the British Radar Interception system ready in time to meet the Luftwaffe, used to say something which is worth repeating because it is so relevant to us: “Don’t go for state-of the art. Cobble together the third best! The second best will be almost too late and the best will never come.”In fact the British CH and CH low radars were technically inferior to the contemporary German Freya, See Tackt and Wurzburg systems but it was adequate for the task and was available in right numbers in time and reliability to help win the Battle of Britain.

The High Altitude Close Support Aircraft

No Air Force likes to do close support work because it is not ‘their’ work; this disinclination makes them ill prepared for it and thus losses are higher in this already hazardous job. The mindless use of helicopters is an American concept. It may be good for Bell Textron but the Vietnamese guerrillas are still laughing about it. Helicopters are noisy deathtraps in an AAA environment and with limited high altitude capabilities. The conventional attack aircraft is too unwieldy. What is needed is an aircraft where the armament is turreted so that the aircraft manoeuvre envelope demands are not restricting the ability of bringing the guns to bear. The starting point could be most of the MiG-25’s fuselage and systems married to two HBPR turbo/prop fans and possibly a biplane configuration which has excellent handling qualities at altitude whilst remaining compact in size. Given the excellent record of the Il-28’s tail turret to keep Mujahedeen Stinger operators heads down during the withdrawal part of the firing pass, a tail turret (copy the IK 5!) would be a ‘must’ feature.

The Brahmos / Super Brahmos Carrier 

The Brahmos missile has great promise and we should work for enlarging it to a size that will give a range of around 700 kilometres i.e. enough to dissuade any hostile aircraft carrier to approach within effective launch distance of the Indian coast. Such missiles will need carrier aircraft. The most reliable route to development will be to scale up the Canberra-type by about 30% which will give a bomb bay of three meters in diameter and ten meters in length i.e. sufficient to carry three to four Super Brahmos together with the personnel and systems to acquire and operate the missiles. The power plant would be the unreheated AL-31 and all systems would be from the existing standardised aggregates. Such an aircraft would be cheaper, carry more missiles ensuring higher Pk, have better acquisition and control systems than the Su-30MkI, and yet be just as fast as carrying a Brahmos externally. In 1962 we lost a winnable war. It affected our lives more than one may concede. For a re-emergent India, confrontation with China and/or USA is inevitable. The US, in war, is wily, powerful and (against the Asiatic), ruthless. We lost in 1962 because of bottlenecks not in our resources but in our leadership, our ‘professionalism’, our planning and thinking and in our inability at the top to respect each other’s sentiments. The same situation exists today. It is at the top, perhaps less than a hundred people, who will have to re-orient their attitudes and co-operate. The rest will immediately follow. Given that we will not only acquire the wherewithal to defend our sovereignty but also project our unique brand of ‘soft skills’ for a better world. Time, however, is running out.